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Abstract
The increasing demands for Internet of things (IoT) applications and the tremendous in-
crease in the volume of IoT generated data bring novel challenges for the fifth generation
(5G) network. Verticals such as e-Health, vehicle to everything (V2X) and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) require solutions that can guarantee low latency, energy efficiency,
massive connectivity, and high reliability. In particular, finding strong security mecha-
nisms that satisfy the above is of central importance for bringing the IoT to life.
In this regards, employing physical layer security (PLS) methods could be greatly
beneficial for IoT networks. While current security solutions rely on computational com-
plexity, PLS is based on information theoretic proofs. By removing the need for com-
putational power, PLS is ideally suited for resource constrained devices. In detail, PLS
can ensure security using the inherit randomness already present in the physical chan-
nel. Promising schemes from the physical layer include physical unclonable functions
(PUFs), which are seen as the hardware fingerprint of a device, and secret key generation
(SKG) from wireless fading coefficients, which provide the wireless fingerprint of the
communication channel between devices.
The present thesis develops several PLS-based techniques that pave the way for a new
breed of latency-aware, lightweight, security protocols. In particular, the work proposes:
i) a fast multi-factor authentication solution with verified security properties based on
PUFs, proximity detection and SKG; ii) an authenticated encryption SKG approach that
interweaves data transmission and key generation; and, iii) a set of countermeasures to
man-in-the-middle and jamming attacks. Overall, PLS solutions show promising perfor-
mance, especially in the context of IoT applications, therefore, the advances in this thesis
should be considered for beyond-5G networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The physical layer security (PLS) paradigm dates back to Wyner’s pioneering work in
the late 1970’s [1]. However, after decades of advancement, it is just recently that PLS
is being considered as an enabling technology in a large set of applications such as: ve-
hicular communications [2, 3], underwater communications [4], optical fiber [5], visible
light communication [6] and many more as summarised in [7, 8]. The aim of PLS [9–11]
is to make use of the inherent randomness in the physical layer, including the commu-
nication channel and electronic circuits, and achieve improvements in critical security
aspects. In particular, PLS can offer: i) user and message authentication [12]; ii) symmet-
ric key generation and key agreement solutions [13,14]; iii) countermeasures to jamming
attacks [15, 16]; and, iv) confidentiality [17].
The increasing interest in PLS has been stimulated by many practical needs. Notably,
many critical IoT networks require fast authentication, e.g., in autonomous driving and
vehicle to everything (V2X) applications, telemedicine and haptics. However, standard
cryptographic schemes, particularly those in the realm of public key encryption (PKE),
are computationally intensive, incurring considerable overheads and can rapidly drain
1
1.1 MOTIVATION
the battery of power constrained devices [18–20]. For example, the recent (2019) third
generation partnership project (3GPP) technical report “Study on the Security of URLLC”
[21], mentions that all aspects related to low-latency authentication remain open and no
solutions have so far been standardised. In this regard, PLS has been explicitly mentioned
in the first white paper on 6G [22]: “The strongest security protection may be achieved
at the physical layer” and more importantly, it is stated as an enabling technology in the
IEEE International Network Generations Roadmap [23].
A further challenge comes from quantum computing, which has seen significant prog-
ress after massive investment by companies such as Google, Intel and IBM to build
prototypes with more than 50 qubits. In October 2019 Google published in the jour-
nal “Nature” their quantum computer experiments showing they have achieved quan-
tum supremacy for a particular set of problems [24]. In this aspect, PLS, that relies
upon information-theoretic security proofs, could resist quantum computers, unlike corre-
sponding asymmetric key schemes relying on the (unproven) intractability in polynomial
time of certain algebraic problems [25]. Even state-of-the-art elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) schemes [26], that require substantially shorter keys than Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) [27] or Diffie Hellman (DHE) [28] schemes, are still considerably more intensive
computationally than their PLS counterparts and have not been shown to be post-quantum
secure.
Another motivation in improving PLS solutions stems from the fact that a number of
vulnerabilities, e.g., jamming during the beam allocation in mmWave [29], arise during
the establishment of the radio link. In this aspect, standard security protocols that build
on the premise that the communication link has already been established, cannot offer
solutions when this is not the case, whereas, PLS schemes can be seamlessly incorporated
(e.g., can be interwoven with channel estimation).
In conclusion, PLS provides a new opportunities of security for IoT networks. How-
ever, it has not been completely developed and efficiently integrated yet. Therefore, the
proposal of novel PLS based solutions for future networks security is highly pertinent.
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Figure 1.1: Today’s security architecture
1.2 Approach of this thesis
The architecture of today’s wireless systems uses layers. As it can be seen in Fig. 1.1 the
layers above the physical layer enable security by various methods. In this sense, the nat-
urally arising question is: Why do even need PLS?. In fact the higher layer cryptography
mechanisms have numerous of advantages: i) there are no known feasible attacks; ii) they
are widely employed and tested; iii) they provide trustworthy authentication. However,
these methods have some disadvantages: i) they are built on unproven assumptions about
the difficulty of the certain computation problems; ii) they are built on the assumption
that the physical connection is already established; iii) they require significant infrastruc-
ture. Therefore, the answer to the above question is that PLS will be used in emerging
technologies.
In the past years, PLS [9–11, 14, 30, 31] has been studied as a possible alternative to
classic, complexity based, cryptography. Signal properties can be exploited to allow for
confidential data transmission [32–34]. Therefore, work in the present thesis, proposes to
move some of the security core functions down to the physical layer, exploiting both the
communication radio channel and the hardware, as unique entropy sources.
Since the wireless channel is reciprocal, time-variant and random in nature, it offers
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a valid, inherently secure source that may be used in a key agreement protocol between
two communicating parties. The principle of secret key generation (SKG) from correlated
observations was first studied in [35] and [36]. A straightforward SKG approach can be
built by exploiting the reciprocity of the wireless fading coefficients between two termi-
nals within the channel coherence time [37,38] and this thesis builds upon this mechanism
and proposes an optimised SKG mechanism for delay-constrained systems. This is per-
tinent to many forthcoming beyond 5th generation mobile (B5G) applications that will
require a strong, but nevertheless, lightweight security key agreement.
However, unauthenticated key generation is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MiM)
attacks. In this sense, physical unclonable functions (PUFs), firstly introduced in [39]
(based on the idea of physical one-way functions [40]), can provide authenticated en-
cryption and furthermore can decrease the computational cost and have a high impact on
reducing the authentication latency in constrained devices [41]. Consequently, this thesis
provides a full PUF-based authentication solution. Finally, SKG schemes are known to
be malleable over the so called “advantage distillation” phase, during which observations
of the shared randomness are obtained at the legitimate parties. As an example, an active
attacker can inject pilot signals and/or can mount denial of service attacks (DoS) in the
form of jamming. Therefore, this thesis investigates the impact of injection and reactive
jamming attacks in SKG and presents set of countermeasures.
To conclude, conventional cryptography mechanisms are a vital element for securing
wireless networks. However, they are computationally intensive and require significant
infrastructure to extract high entropy keys. On the other hand, the physical layer provides
a source of domain-specific information which can be used to complement and improve
conventional security methods. The mechanisms proposed within the present thesis, could
be easily incorporated in today’s security architecture as a substitute to today’s authenti-
cation protocols (Chapter 3) and session key generation mechanisms (Chapters 4, 5).
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Figure 1.2: Roadmap of contributions.
1.3 Contributions
The contributions of the present thesis are illustrated in Fig. 1.2 and can be summarised
as follows:
Chapter 3
Lightweight and low latency security mechanisms are becoming increasingly impor-
tant for a wide range of IoT applications. Promising schemes from the physical layer in-
clude (i) PUF, (ii) localisation based authentication, and, (iii) SKG from wireless fading
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coefficients. The work in Chapter 3 proposes a complete, fast, multi-factor authentication
protocol that uniquely combines PUFs, proximity estimation and SKG. It focuses on short
blocklengths and provides a novel closed form expression for the channel dispersion in
the SKG setting. Furthermore, the SKG keys are incorporated in a forward secure zero-
round-trip-time (0-RTT) resumption protocol for fast re-authentication. All schemes of
the proposed mutual authentication protocol are shown to be secure through formal proofs
using Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN) and Mao and Boyd (MB) logic as well as the
Tamarin-prover [42].
Chapter 4
In computational complexity and latency constrained emerging 5G applications, e.g.,
autonomous vehicles, haptic communications and enhanced reality, SKG at the physical
layer could be considered as an alternative to currently used key agreement schemes. In
this framework, the work present in Chapter 4 proposes i) a novel authenticated encryp-
tion (AE) using SKG, and, ii) a pipelining mechanism of the AE SKG and the encrypted
data transfer in order to reduce latency. Implementing the pipelining at the physical layer,
the work investigates a parallel SKG approach for multi-carrier systems, where a subset
of the subcarriers are used for SKG and the rest for data transmission. The parallel ap-
proach is evaluated under power, security, rate and delay constraints. The amount of data
that can be transmitted with a single key is determined by the cryptographic suites used, so
that realistic key rate constraints can be identified. This allows to formulate the subcarrier
allocation as a subset-sum 0−1 knapsack optimisation problem that is solved using i) the
standard dynamic programming approach, and, ii) a greedy heuristic approach of linear
complexity. Numerical evaluation shows that the proposed heuristic induces virtually no
loss in performance. Furthermore, a comparison with a baseline scheme in which secret
key generation and data transfer are performed sequentially, shows that the proposed par-
allel approach offers gains in terms of efficiency. All of the proposed mechanisms, have
the potential to pave the way for a new breed of latency aware security protocols.
Chapter 5
Physical layer SKG from shared randomness (e.g., from the wireless channel fading
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realisations), is a well established scheme that can be used for session key agreement.
SKG approaches can be of particular interest in delay constrained wireless networks and
notably in the context of ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) in B5G sys-
tems. However SKG schemes are known to be malleable over the so called “advantage
distillation” phase, during which observations of the shared randomness are obtained at
the legitimate parties. As an example, an active attacker can act as a MiM by injecting
pilot signals and/or can mount denial of service attacks (DoS) in the form of jamming.
In this sense, Chapter 5 investigates the impact of injection and reactive jamming attacks
in SKG. First, it is demonstrated that injection attacks can be reduced to – potentially
less harmful – jamming attacks by using pilot randomisation; consequently, a novel sys-
tem design with randomised quadrature amplitude phase shift keying (QPSK) pilots is
presented. Subsequently, the optimal jamming strategy is identified in a block fading ad-
ditive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channel in the presence of a reactive jammer,
using a game theoretic formulation. It is shown that the impact of a reactive jammer is far
more severe than that of a simple proactive jammer.
1.4 Outline of thesis
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2, highlights the elements of the problems discussed in the present thesis. The
following three chapters contain the main contributions of the present thesis. The organ-
isation of these chapters is inspired by the sequence of actions taken in an actual system,
i.e., 1) authentication; 2) session key generation; 3) attacks during the key generation
process. In this sense, Chapter 3, proposes a novel PUF-based authentication mechanism
that is initialised by location confirmation approach. Furthermore, building on the SKG
process it provides a forward secure resumption protocol to quickly “resume” sessions.
The concept of the work presented in this chapter was published in [12], whereas the full
solution is under review for publication in the “IEEE Internet of things journal”. Next,
chapter 4 presents a physical layer resource allocation method that jointly optimised data
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rate and key generation rate. This chapter is based on works presented in [12–14, 43] and
involves collaboration with Dr. Leila Musavian. Chapter 5 presents countermeasures to
active attacks in wireless networks through a game-theoretic approach. This chapter is
based on works presented in [15] and involves collaboration with Dr. Veronica Belmega.
Finally, my perspectives for future research are presented in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter summarises only the general background in which this thesis was built. It
provides an overview of physical layer security highlighting its applicability within IoT
networks. The relative background to each study presented within the present thesis is
provided later as part of the respective chapter.
2.1 Physical layer security within the 5G framework
The fifth generation (5G) communication technologies such as ultra-reliable low-latency
communications (URLLC) and massive machine-type communications (mMTC) are ex-
pected to enable numerous IoT applications [44]. IoT devices are distributed in our daily
life environment gathering information that ranges from temperature to location mak-
ing security and privacy of critical importance [45]. However, despite the continuous
improvement of security protocols, there are still open issues that have not been fully ad-
dressed [46]. In this sense, transforming the security design bottom up starting from the
physical layer, will provide additional level of protection which can help overcome the
security hurdles [47]. PLS mechanisms can enhance the security of IoT networks from
several aspects. Authentication is central in building secure IoT networks; confirming the
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identity of devices and their role in the network hierarchy eliminates the possibility of
numerous attacks [48]. However, the low-latency and computational power constraints
present in many IoT systems [20], renders the design of IoT authentication mechanisms
a challenging task. Current solutions rely on modulo arithmetic in large fields and typi-
cally incur considerable latency, in the order of tens of milliseconds [49]; as an example,
it has been reported that verifying digital signatures on a vehicle with a 400 MHz pro-
cessor takes around 20 msec [50], exceeding the delays that are tolerated in vehicle to
everything (V2X) communications [51]. In that direction PLS schemes exploit physical
layer entropy sources, including both in the hardware, as well as in the communication
medium [12–15]. With respect to the former, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are
hardware entities harnessing entropy from physically unclonable variations that occur
during the production process of silicon [39, 52]. These unique and unpredictable vari-
ations allow the extraction of uniformly distributed binary sequences [53]. Due to their
unclonability and simplicity, PUFs are seen as lightweight security primitives that can
offer alternatives to today’s authentication mechanisms [54, 55]. With respect to authen-
tication, the research presented in Chapter 3 includes multi-factor authentication protocol
with PUFs, wireless fingerprinting and localisation. The necessary background on PUFs
are given in Section 3.2.2. Furthermore, a novel PLS-based resumption protocol that
allows for data exchange within 0-RTT is proposed.
In numerous IoT scenarios mobility is an important factor [56]. In applications such
as V2X and drone connectivity the objects of interest may leave or enter the network in a
random manner [2,57–59]. This requires strong security mechanisms with low overhead.
Furthermore, the massively distributed IoT devices have limited resources and therefore,
cannot employ complex cryptography [46, 60]. In this sense, IoT networks could greatly
benefit from employing PLS solutions. Since the wireless channel is reciprocal, time-
varying and random in nature, it offers a lightweight, inherently secure source for secret
key distribution protocols [7, 8, 61]. In fact, it has been experimentally validated that mo-
bility could highly increase the entropy of PLS generated keys [62,63]. Furthermore, new
5G wireless methods will employ advanced channel state information (CSI) estimation
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techniques towards optimal beamforming and improved reliability [64, 65]. In this re-
gards, Chapter 4 within the present thesis, shows that the CSI measurements can be used
simultaneously towards both: generation of secret keys and reliable data transfer.
The roll-out of 5G mobile networks and the forthcoming the beyond 5G (B5G) will
bring about fundamental changes in the way we communicate, access services and con-
sume entertainment [66]. With respect to the latter, the multi-fold increase in the service
data rates will provide users with ultra high resolution in video-streaming, multi-media
and virtual reality, offering immersive experiences [67, 68]. However to support such a
large variety of services, requires novel solutions that will enable higher resource effi-
ciency [69]. From that perspective, Chapter 4 within the present thesis proposes a novel
optimised PLS resource allocation algorithm that jointly optimises data and key genera-
tion rates.
A further motivation in exploring PLS solutions stems from the fact that a number
of vulnerabilities may impact the reliability of the exchanged information [70, 71]. For
example, jamming attacks in URLLC may provoke re-transmission and increased overall
delay [15, 72], furthermore, jamming during the beam allocation in mmWave [29] may
disrupt the establishment of the radio link. A common assumption of security protocols
is that the communication link has already been established, however, this may not be the
case. Consequently, PLS offers several counter-jamming techniques, including: jamming
detection mechanisms and counter-jamming measures in the form of i) energy harvesting
(EH) [16,73], ii) channel hopping [74] and power spreading [75,76], further approaches to
counter jamming attacks include iii) friendly jamming [77, 78], and iv) localisation [79].
In fact, studies [16, 73] are carried in a game-theoretic framework. The legitimate users,
who have EH capabilities, act as a single player who aims at maximizing the transmis-
sion rates while the jammer aims at minimizing it. It is demonstrated that, for specific
scenarios, the legitimate users could benefit from the harvested jamming energy by sub-
sequently using it to boost their transmission. On the other hand, channel hopping [74]
and power spreading [75, 76], are commonly used technique to counter jamming attacks.
The legitimate users can use channel hopping in a random fashion in order to avoid most
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of the jamming interference, however, depending on the scenario, it may be more benefi-
cial to spread their power over the entire spectrum rather than concentrating it on a single
channel. In this sense, Chapter 5 of the present thesis explores jamming attacks during a
PLS SKG process and gives a set of countermeasures.
Overall, the physical layer properties carry important information which is directly re-
lated to security and privacy of today’s systems. The intelligence of any actual system in
the physical world relies on its physical infrastructure. Important questions that naturally
arise are then: “how to turn the collected data into useful knowledge?”; and, “why the
characteristics of the physical channel are used in enhancing the systems’s reliability but
are not used towards improving security?” In response to this questions, the present thesis
proposes a set of techniques that could be employed independently or as a complement
to existing techniques, with minimal changes in the control plane. The physical layer
solutions developed within the premise of this thesis include: a lightweight PUF authen-
tication mechanism, fast proximity detection, a resumption protocol based on physical
layer SKG, an authenticated encryption (AE) SKG approach, a pipelining algorithm that
interweaves data transmission and SKG, a near-optimal subcarrier allocation algorithm
of linear complexity, pilot randomisation as a countermeasure to injection attacks and
optimal power allocation policy in the presence of active jammers.
2.2 Key-based and key-less physical layer security
As discussed, current security solutions: are focused at the higher layers of the com-
munication systems; are computationally intensive; and, are not suitable for resource
constrained devices, such as in an IoT scenario. In this sense, PLS has proven itself
as a lightweight information theoretic secure mechanism regardless of the adversary’s re-
sources [80, 81]. This section gives an introduction to the two basic PLS methods [82]:
key-based PLS and key-less PLS.
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2.2.1 Key-based PLS: secret key generation
Due to the nature of radio waves, wireless communication remains vulnerable to different
types of attacks. Passive attacks such as eavesdropping or traffic analysis can be per-
formed by anyone close to the area of communication. Furthermore, wireless devices
can be targeted by active attacks such as jamming [15, 74] or spoofing which can cause
interference or even disruption of the device (summary of attacks and countermeasures
in wireless systems can be found in [83] and [84], respectively). Therefore, to ensure
confidentiality, data encryption is vital for communication security. However, most of the
traditional public-key encryption primitives such as RSA [27] and ECC [26] have high
computational complexity and are not suitable for portable and battery-driven devices,
such as in an IoT system.
In this sense, key-based PLS [85] methods are seen as a lightweight alternative for
secret key generation (SKG)1 by using the properties of the wireless medium. The reci-
procity of wireless medium can be used as a tool for key generation between two parties
(Alice and Bob), as shown on the block diagram in Fig. 2.1. In this case, Alice and Bob
perform pilot exchanges that take place over the coherence time of the channel2. During
this period, Alice and Bob observe highly correlated channel states, as opposed to Eve,
whose observations are uncorrelated to the main channel. Following from that, Alice and
Bob can use their observations to generate a shared secret key between them. Important
properties that support the above mechanism are:
i) in order to reduce the key mismatch rate, each round of the pilot exchange must be
within the coherence time of the channel. One round refers to one pilot sent in each
direction, i.e., during each round, two pilots are sent, one from Alice and one from
Bob;
1The term SKG throughout this thesis refers to the key-based PLS mechanism introduced in this section.
2 The coherence time corresponds to the interval during which the multipath properties of wireless
channels (channel gains, signal phase, delay) remain stable [3, 86, 87]. It is inversely proportional to the
Doppler spread, which on the other hand, is a dispersion metric that accounts for the spectral broadening
caused by the user’s mobility (for more details and derivation please see [87]).
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Alice Bob
zB
zA
Eve
zE
Figure 2.1: During the coherence time of the channel Alice and Bob observe highly
correlated channel responses. Eve’s observation is uncorrelated to their observations.
zA, zB, zE represent the AWGN noise variables observed by Alice, Bob and Eve, respec-
tively.
ii) in order to have uncorrelated key bits, the time interval between rounds must be
greater than the coherence time of the channel.
Overall, the SKG mechanism could greatly benefit from the time-variability property
of the wireless channels [82,88]. In fact, the security key is generated from the variations
in the received signal (i.e., fading). Therefore, time-varying signals could produce secret
keys with higher entropy.
However, in some static scenarios, Alice and Bob may struggle to extract enough bits
from the channel. To overcome this, instead of transmitting publicly known pilot signals,
one or two-way randomised signal transmission can be performed which can be used as
an additional source of randomness [89]. Furthermore, Chapter 5 within the present thesis
will show how randomised pilot exchange can be used as a countermeasure to injection
attacks.
Commonly used parameters as source of shared randomness are the received signal
strength (RSS) and the full CSI [90] (some channel estimation techniques can be found
in [90]). However, RSS-based schemes are open to predictable channel attacks [86, 91]
whereas CSI-based approaches, have proven to be resistant [92]. Therefore, this work
assumes the usage of a CSI-based SKG, which has been practically investigated in nu-
merous scenarios [92–95] as briefly described below.
The authors of [92] investigate the effect of non-reciprocity of the CSI caused by ad-
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ditive noise, antenna gains etc., between two devices. To overcome this, a non-reciprocity
component is evaluated during a learning phase before the SKG process. Based on this,
the authors present a channel gain complement scheme which eliminates the impact of
non-reciprocity in both indoor and outdoor environments.
Another important step in a practical implementation is to build a suitable unit for pre-
processing in order to decorrelate the signals in the time / frequency and space domains.
As an example, some recent works have shown that the widely adopted assumption [96]
that a distance equal to half of the wavelength (which at 2.4 GHz is approximately 6
cm [92]) is enough for two channels to decorrelate, may not hold in reality [86].
In [93] the problem caused by the similarity of the characteristics (phase and ampli-
tude) of neighboring subcarriers is addressed. This effect can cause a high correlation in
the CSI measurements which may lead to security issues. To overcome this a three-step
protocol for wireless SKG between two entities is proposed: i) CSI measurements are
converted to bits; ii) universal hash function is applied to the bit strings and, iii) if the
resulted bit strings after hashing differ, part of the bits on both sides are recombined until
same bit sequence is observed at each of the parties. This final step helps remove the
correlation of bits generated from neighbouring subcarriers.
A further measure addressing correlation between the eavesdropper and communicat-
ing devices is role reversal [94]. The party that initiates the SKG process is considered to
be a leader, while the follower is trying to match the leader’s bit stream. If an eavesdrop-
per is close to the leader her channel might be correlated to the main one, thus she could
obtain part of the key bits. With role reversal the legitimate parties change their roles –
from leader to follower and vice versa – during the process and the obtained bit strings
are concatenated at the end. This step prevents leak of key bits through eavesdropping.
To summarise, the impact of channel correlation on SKG needs to be explicitly ac-
counted in actual implementations. However, in this thesis its effect is neglected as its im-
pact on SKG has been treated in numerous contributions in the past [62,63,93–95,97–100]
and will not enhance the problems formulated in the following chapters.
In addition to channel correlation issues, to improve error correction in the SKG pro-
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Figure 2.2: Secret key generation process between Alice and Bob.
cess, alternative quantisation schemes have been proposed [95]. In [95] two legitimate
parties divide their observations into two bit streams and perform quantisation on two
different levels. Next, one of the streams is used as error correction data and the other is
used as a key generation string.
SKG process
The SKG process takes an important part of the work presented throughout the present
thesis. In fact, Chapter 3 employs the SKG method to built a quick authentication pro-
tocol; Chapter 4 proposes an optimised SKG method for delay-constrained networks;
Chapter 5 introduces a set of countermeasures to jamming attacks performed during the
SKG process. The SKG system model within this thesis assumes that two legitimate
parties, Alice and Bob, who wish to establish a symmetric secret key using the wireless
fading coefficients as a source of shared randomness (See Fig. 2.2). Generally, the SKG
procedure encompasses three phases: advantage distillation, information reconciliation,
and privacy amplification [35, 36, 101–103] as described below:
1) Advantage distillation: This phase takes place during the coherence time of the
channel. The legitimate nodes sequentially exchange constant probe signals to obtain es-
timates of their reciprocal CSI. Note that, the pilot exchange phase can be made robust
with respect to injection type of attacks (that fall in the general category of MiM) as anal-
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ysed in Chapter 5 [15, 38]. At the end of this phase, Alice and Bob obtain observation
vectors xA and xB, respectively, over a set of N subcarriers. On the other hand, an eaves-
dropper (Eve) observes xE . The work within the present thesis assumes a rich Rayleigh
multipath environment, such that Eve’s channel measurement remains uncorrelated to
main channel.
2) Information reconciliation: At the beginning of this phase Alice’s and Bob’s ob-
servations, xA,j, xB,j , respectively, are quantised to binary vectors3 rA,j , rB,j , where
j = 1, . . . , N [104–106], so that Alice and Bob distill rA = [rA,1|| . . . ||rA,N ] and rB =
[rB,1|| . . . ||rB,N ], respectively. Due to the presence of noise, rA and rB will differ. To
reconcile discrepancies in the quantiser local outputs, side information needs to be ex-
changed via a public channel. Using the principles of Slepian Wolf decoding [107], the
distilled binary vectors can be expressed as
rA = d + eA, (2.1)
rB = d + eB, (2.2)
where eA, eB are error vectors that represent the distance from the common observed
(codeword) vector d at Alice and Bob, respectively.
Numerous practical information reconciliation approaches using standard forward er-
ror correction codes (e.g., LDPC, BCH, etc.,) have been proposed [37], [108]. As an
example, if a block encoder is used, then the error vectors can be recovered from the
syndromes sA and sB of rA and rB, respectively. Alice transmits her corresponding syn-
drome to Bob so that he can reconcile rB to rA. It has been shown that the length of the
syndrome |sA| is lower bounded by |sA| ≥ H(xA|xB) = H(xA,xB) − H(xB) [36], note
that H(·) denotes entropy. This has been numerically evaluated for different scenarios
and coding techniques [105, 109–111]. Following that, the achievable SKG rate is upper
bounded by I(xA; xB), where I(·) denotes mutual information.
3) Privacy amplification: The secret key is generated by passing rA through a one-
3Note that each observation can generate a multi-bit vector at the output of the quantiser.
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way collision resistant compression function i.e., by hashing. Note that this final step of
privacy amplification, is executed locally without any further information exchange. The
need for privacy amplification arises in order to suppress the entropy revealed due to the
public transmission of the syndrome sA. Privacy amplification produces a key of length
strictly shorter than |rA|, at least by |sA|. At the same time, the goal is for the key to be
uniform, i.e., to have maximum entropy. In brief, privacy amplification reduces the size of
the sequence while at the same time increases its entropy per bit – compared to the input.
The privacy amplification is typically performed by applying either cryptographic
hash functions such as those built using the Merkle-Damgard construction, or univer-
sal hash functions and has been proven to be secure, in an information theoretic sense,
through the leftover hash lemma [112]. As an example, [86, 113] use a 2-universal hash
family to achieve privacy amplification. Summarising, the maximum key size after pri-
vacy amplification is [12]:
|k| ≤ H(xA)− I(xA; xE)− H(xA|xB)− r0, (2.3)
where H(xA) represents the entropy of the measurement, I(xA; xE) represents the mutual
information between Alice’s and Eve’s observations, H(xA|xB) represents the entropy
revealed during information reconciliation and r0 > 0 is a safety parameter that ensures
uncertainty on the key at Eve’s side. For details and estimation of these parameters in a
practical scenario please see [114]. Some practical implementations can be found in [8,
61].
SKG rate
During the advantage distillation phase, illustrated on Fig. 2.3, Alice and Bob commu-
nicate over a BF-AWGN channel that comprises N orthogonal subcarriers. The fad-
ing coefficients h = [h1, . . . , hN ], are assumed to be independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d), complex circularly symmetric zero-mean Gaussian random variables hj ∼
CN (0, σ2h), j = 1, . . . , N . The legitimate nodes sequentially exchange constant probe
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Alice Bob
h
Figure 2.3: Alice and Bob exchange pilot signals over a Rayleigh fading channel with
realisation h = [h1, . . . , hN ] in order to distill a shared secret key.
signals with equal power P on all subcarriers4, to obtain estimates of their reciprocal CSI.
Alice and Bob obtain observation vectors xA = [xA,1, . . . , xA,N ],xB = [xB,1, . . . , xB,N ],
respectively, so that:
xA =
√
Ph + zA, (2.4)
xB =
√
Ph + zB, (2.5)
where zA and zB denote zero-mean, unit variance circularly symmetric complex AWGN
random vectors, such that zA ∼ CN (0, NAI) and zB ∼ CN (0, NBI). Finally, as dis-
cussed in the previous section the SKG rate can be expressed as I(xA; xB). While the
final result is standard, the full derivation is not clearly given elsewhere, therefore, it is
added here as follows:
I(xA; xB) = H(xA) + H(xB)− H(xA,xB) (2.6)
=
1
2
log2 2πe(σ
2 +NA) +
1
2
log2 2πe(σ
2 +NB)−
1
2
log2(2πe)
2|Kx|
=
1
2
log2(2πe)
2(σ2 +NA)(σ
2 +NB)−
1
2
log2(2πe)
2(NANB +NAσ
2 +NBσ
2)
=
1
2
log2
(σ2 +NA)(σ
2 +NB)
NANB +NAσ2 +NBσ2
=
1
2
log2
Ç
σ2(NA +NB) +NANB
NANB +NAσ2 +NBσ2
+
σ4
NANB +NAσ2 +NBσ2
å
=
1
2
log2
Ç
1 +
σ4
NANB +NAσ2 +NBσ2
å
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
σ2
NA +NB +
NANB
σ2
)
. (2.7)
4An explanation of the optimality of this choice under different attack scenarios is discussed in [38].
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Figure 2.4: Wyner’s wiretap channel model. Alice sends information to Bob, who ob-
serves channel with noise zB. Eve acts as an eavesdropper and observes degraded version
of Bob’s channel.
Assuming a unit variance noise, the rate can be represented as function of the transmitted
power as [37, 74]:
I(xA; xB) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
Pσ2
2 + 1
Pσ2
)
. (2.8)
This is a key result that is used later in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
2.2.2 Key-less PLS: secrecy capacity
Key-less PLS is based on the information theoretic concept known as secrecy capacity.
The secrecy capacity is the metric which defines the achievable rate for reliable and se-
cure transmission. It was firstly introduced in the seminal works of Wyner [1], where he
introduced the wiretap channel model, illustrated in Fig. 2.4. The model assumes: Alice
(transmitter) and Bob (receiver) exchange data over a main channel while Eve observers
degraded version of the same channel (i.e., Eve’s channel outputs are noisier that Bob’s).
Given Bob’s “advantage”, Alice can encode the data in a way that Eve is unable to de-
code. Later, this concept was generalised for AWGN channels in [115], where the secrecy
capacity is estimated as the difference between Bob’s and Eve’s achievable rates. Given
that, the secrecy capacity CS can be expressed as:
CS =

log(1 + SNRB)− log(1 + SNRE), if SNRB > SNRE
0, if SNRB ≤ SNRE,
(2.9)
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where SNRB and SNRE , denotes the SNR level at Bob’s and Eve’s sides, respectively.
Building on that premise, the work in [116] evaluates the outage secrecy capacity for
different practical scenarios versus the SNR and the distances Alice – Bob and Alice –
Eve. Today, various techniques such as artificial noise at Eve’s side [117–119] and wiretap
coding schemes [120–122] are used in order to achieve positive secrecy capacity.
Nevertheless, key-less PLS has several drawbacks such as reduced rates and increased
overhead with respect to the security feature, plus until recently there were no existing
coding scheme exist only for finite blocklength [82] (note that recent advances show
promising result, however, these are still in the domain of very large blocklengths, there-
fore not suitable for IoT applications [123, 124]). Furthermore, a major limitation of the
secrecy capacity compared to the SKG presented in the previous section, is that it re-
quires knowledge of the adversary channel and capabilities. In this regards, using the
time-variability of the physical channel, the SKG process allows the legitimate users to
quickly generate secret keys and use them in existing encryption algorithms. Due to the
above, the rest of this thesis focuses on key-based PLS approach in the form of SKG
presented in the previous section.
2.3 Possible deployment scenario for SKG:
Narrow-Band IoT
Narrow-band Internet of things (NB-IoT) is a standard developed by 3rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) in 2015 [125]. It main focus is on low cost indoor applications
for battery-driven devices. The NB-IoT physical resource block (subframe) consists of 12
subcarriers with 15 kHz spacing, resulting into 180 kHz transmission bandwidth. In or-
der to have efficient use of the spectral resources, NB-IoT can use three different modes,
i.e., stand-alone, in-band and guard-band. While stand-alone mode is intended to replace
GSM carriers with NB-IoT ones, in-band and guard-band modes uses LTE carriers, i.e.,
allowing LTE and NB-IoT traffic to coexists in the same frequency band.
21
2.3 POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT SCENARIO FOR SKG: NARROW-BAND IOT
Subframe 0
DwPTS GP UpPTS
Subframe 2 Subframe 3 Subframe 4 Subframe 5
DwPTS GP UpPTS
Subframe 7 Subframe 8 Subframe 9
Figure 2.5: One radio frame of the NB-IoT TDD standard
The NB-IoT standard has two frame structures: one based on frequency division du-
plex (FDD) and the other based on time division duplex (TDD). This makes NB-IoT suit-
able for the physical layer SKG method described in Section 2.2.1. While FDD frames
use different frequency bands for uplink and downlink, the links in a TDD frame are
separated in time and not frequency. As discussed earlier, the SKG approach within the
present thesis is based on the reciprocity of the wireless channel, i.e., using the method
described in Section 2.2.1 Alice and Bob extract a shared secret from their channel re-
sponses. The responses are highly correlated during the coherence time of the channel
which allows Alice and Bob to exploit the reciprocity of the wireless channel, using the
TDD based frame and perform the SKG process. On the other hand, the work within the
present thesis assumes that there is no correlation between neighbouring channels, there-
fore, Alice and Bob would not be able to extract shared secret using the FDD based frame,
making this approach not suitable.
The NB-IoT frame type 2 (based on TDD) is given in Fig. 2.5. It can be seen that there
is a special subframe divided into three parts: Downlink pilot time slot (DwPTS), Guard
period (GP) and Uplink pilot time slot (UpPTS). Therefore, the obtained information
during the pilot exchange in DwPTS and UpPTS can be used towards both: generation of
secret keys and channel estimation.
This ends the general background of this thesis. As discussed earlier the relative
background for each chapter is provided at the beginning of the respective study. Next,
Chapter 3 will show how the key-based PLS approach can be employed in a lightweight
authentication protocol.
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Multi-factor authentication
This chapter introduces a novel PHY-based authentication mechanism. The mechanism
provides provably secure and lightweight session establishment. The concept of the work
presented in this chapter was published within the “Springer EURASIP Journal on Wire-
less Communications and Networking” [12]. The full solution is under review for publi-
cation within the “IEEE Internet of things journal”.
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This study introduces the joint use of PUFs and SKG in a secure authentication mech-
anism. Furthermore, these mechanism are combined in a 0-RTT [126, 127] approach,
allowing to build quick resumption mechanisms with forward security. The resumption
protocol is important as it significantly reduces the use of the PUF to the initial authenti-
cation, thus, overcoming the limitation of a PUFs’ challenge response space [128, 129].
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
1. Proposal of a fast PUF-based authentication mechanism.
2. Combination of an initial proximity-based check with the PUF authentication as a
counter measure to impersonation attacks.
3. Proposal of a forward secure 0-RTT-type of resumption protocol to quickly “re-
sume” sessions.
4. Verification of the security properties of the protocol are provided using Tamarin
prover and BAN logic.
5. Derivation of a closed form expression for the information theoretic bound of the
SKG rate at the finite blocklength
This chapter proposes a novel use of the SKG and does not discuss improvements
of the SKG itself. Next, in Chapter 4 the SKG mechanism is considered in detail and
optimised.
Note that the following assumptions are made for the purpose of this study: i) the as-
sumed network topology is a 1-hop communication between Alice and Bob who want the
authenticate each other; ii) the main part of this study assumes that initial communication
between Alice and Bob has already been established. During this initial communica-
tion, named enrolment phase, they have exchanged set of parameters, such as RSSI0,
challenge-response pairs etc (more details on the exchanged parameters are given in Sec-
tion 3.4.1). The important assumption for the success of the proposed methods, within
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this study, is that the enrolment phase must be carried out over a secure channel. This
can be achieved by using traditional cryptographic primitives, however, this falls out of
the scope of the current thesis and therefore is assumed that Alice and Bob have already
performed this step; iii) Furthermore, without loss of generality, the system model is sim-
plified assuming that neighboring subcarriers of the communication channel are assumed
to be independent.
3.2 Respective background
3.2.1 Cryptographic primitives
The cryptographic process of transforming a message (plaintext) into an encoded cipher-
text is called encryption. The reverse process where plaintext is obtained from a ciphertext
is called decryption. The processes of encryption and decryption in this thesis are denoted
as Es and Ds, respectively. To perform the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext
and vice versa both algorithms rely on the cryptographic keys. The secrecy properties of
the algorithms rely on the secrecy of the keys. Cryptographic systems are divided into
two types: symmetric and asymmetric. In detail, asymmetric encryption uses pair of keys
(public, private), one for each transformation, symmetric encryption assumes the usage
of a single key in both transformations Es and Ds. The work presented in this thesis
assumes the use of symmetric encryption, as the largely used block cipher advanced en-
cryption standard (AES) is considered post quantum for key lengths of 256 bits. On the
other hand, no asymmetric key encryption cipher is considered to be post-quantum. An-
other motivation for using symmetric encryption algorithms throughout this thesis is the
fact that, they require less processing power for computations and are “almost 1000 times
faster than asymmetric algorithms” [130]. This makes the use of symmetric encryption
suitable for lightweight and latency aware IoT applications. The following gives a brief
introduction to the cryptographic primitives used throughout this section.
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Symmetric encryption
As mentioned the work presented in this thesis assumes the usage of symmetric encryp-
tion. Hence, two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob) posses identical and uniformly dis-
tributed key sequences {0, 1}|k| – where |k| is chosen such that a simple brute force attack
should be impractical. An example for symmetric encryption mechanism considered to be
post-quantum secure is |k| = 256 [131]. Given that, a symmetric encryption algorithm, is
denoted by Es : K ×M → CT where K denotes the key space,M denotes the message
space and CT denotes the ciphertext space. The corresponding decryption algorithm is
Ds : K × CT →M.
One of the mostly used symmetric cryptographic scheme used today is the AES [132–
134]. AES was established by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in 2001 by the name Rijndael [135]. Several sub-types of AES were standardised,
i.e., AES-128, AES-192, AES-256. Each of these symmetric-key mechanisms takes as
input a 128-bit (16-byte) block size, but they use different key lengths: 128, 192 and 256
bits, respectively. The key size determines the number of rounds used to transform the
plaintext to ciphertext. The output size is determined by the length of the plaintext. The
AES algorithms ensures that all blocks are with 16-byte size even if the length of plaintext
is not exact multiple of 16 bytes. This is achieved by using padding mechanisms and it is
done to prevent adversaries from knowing the length of the message [136].
Message authentication code
A message authentication code (MAC) is additional information sent with ciphertext to
verify the authenticity of the message [137]. The MAC can be constructed by a pair of
algorithms, one for signing, Sign, and one for verification, Ver. The two algorithms
rely on a pre-shared secret key kMAC between the communicating parties and ensures
integrity and authenticity of the message m. While data integrity assures, the accuracy
and consistency of data, i.e., it has not been modified by a malicious third party, authen-
ticity verifies the identity of the sender. This is achieved by applying the MAC scheme as
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follows: first, the sender signs the message using kMAC, then the intended receiver must
confirm that the signed message corresponds to m. A reason for verification failure could
be the manipulation of the message while in transit or receiving a message not signed
from a malicious node.
Following from the above a pair of message authentication code (MAC) algorithms is
denoted by Sign : KMAC ×M → T , where T denotes the space of signed messages,
with a corresponding verification algorithm Ver : KMAC×M×T → (yes, no). Further
information about standardised MAC algorithms can be found in [138].
Hash function
Hash functions are used to transform messages with various length into fixed output hash
value. The study presented in this thesis assumes the use of one-way hash functions [139,
140]. One-way hash functions are irreversible, i.e., having the initial message one can
obtain the corresponding hash value, however, if only the hash value is available one
cannot obtain the original message. Furthermore, a one-way hash function should satisfy
collision-free property. This means two different inputs should not produce the same hash
value. The collision-free property is denoted as follows:
Hash(x) 6= Hash(y). (3.1)
The output of one-way hash functions is pseudorandom meaning that outputs are inde-
pendent and one should not be able to distinguish a hash value from a random sequence.
Finally, one-way hash functions are used to protect data from modification. For example
they are used in the Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [141] which is
part of security protocols such as SSH [142].
3.2.2 Physical unclonable functions
The idea of physical one-way function (POWF) was introduced in [143]. The authors
proposed a simple challenge-response authentication protocol. It assumes that an identi-
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fier (e.g. server, that will authenticate a user) generates a set of challenges which are run
on a user’s equipment. These challenges are then stored by the identifier along with the
corresponding set of responses, i.e., as challenge-response pairs (CRPs). Next, when the
user sends an authentication request to the identifier chooses one of the previously stored
CRPs and “challenge” the user to produce a response. The authentication is successful,
if the response is identical to the one previously stored in the identifier’s database. The
structure proposed in [143] is based on the usage of a laser beam as input of their system.
This beam propagates through a three-dimensional micro-structure and the final resulting
pattern determines the output of the system. A challenge to this scheme could define the
angle of the transmitted beam.
Later, the authors of [144] brought this idea to integrated circuit (IC) structures by
introducing the silicon physical unclonable function (PUF). Its idea is to utilise the fact
that every integrated circuit differs to others due to manufacturing variability [52, 145]
and cannot be cloned [54]. A challenge to this scheme can refer to delay at each gate,
power-on state and other variable features. Nowadays, due to its randomness and un-
clonable properties, PUFs continues to attract the researches’ attention and since the in-
troduction of PUFs in [144], numerous PUF architectures have been proposed many of
which suitable for IoT applications. A few of these architectures are: arbiter PUF [146],
ring oscillator PUF [39], transient effect ring oscillator PUF [147], static random-access
memory PUF [148], hardware embedded delay PUF [149] and more [53, 128].
As mentioned above, each PUF can be used as a challenge – response scheme, mean-
ing that a PUF takes a challenge as input, runs it and outputs the corresponding response.
Depending on the number of CRPs that each PUF can support, two types of PUFs can be
differentiated: i) strong PUFs, suitable for authentication and ii) weak PUFs, which can
be used for secret key generation. Intuitively, a weak PUF can process a small number
of challenges, while a strong PUF is capable of processing a large set of CRPs. Further
requirement for a strong PUF is backward secrecy, meaning that if some of the previous
CRPs are revealed, an attacker should not be able to predict the response of any future
challenges. Throughout this thesis PUFs will refer to strong PUFs from this point on-
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Figure 3.1: Arbiter PUF.
wards.
To familiarise the readers with the basics of PUFs, two structure examples are pre-
sented. The structure of Arbiter PUF was presented in [146]. In this scheme the authors
propose the usage of the delay variations of wires and transistors within integrated cir-
cuits. The idea is based on transmitting rising edge signals through two “identical” delay
paths which consist of several switching elements. Due to variation properties the delay
will slightly differ at each path. Finally, an arbiter determines the corresponding “win-
ner”, i.e., the signal that arrived first at the end of the trace. The produced response (output
bit) depends on the “winner”. A challenge to this scheme is composed by choosing the
configuration of each switching element as illustrated on Fig. 3.1. Another PUF scheme,
called recombined oscillator PUF, was proposed in [150]. The scheme calculates fre-
quency differences between pairs of oscillators which produces set of random variable.
The challenge to this scheme determines the sign in front of each random variable. To
produce the response to a specific challenge the scheme calculates the sum of all random
variables and compares it to a pre-defined threshold. Similarly, [151] proposed an im-
proved scheme which increases the secrecy of the output by choosing a different subset
of the oscillators each time (defined by the challenge).
Following from the above, a typical PUF-based authentication protocol consists of
two main phases, namely enrolment phase and authentication phase [152–156].
During the enrolment phase each user runs a set of challenges C on his PUF and
characterises the variance of the measurement noise in order to generate helper data hd.
Next, a verifier creates and stores a database of all CRPs (C,R) for each user’s PUF within
its network. A CRP pair in essence consists of an authentication key and related helper
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data hd. Within the database, each CRP is associated with the ID of the corresponding
user. The enrolment phase is a one-time operation and it is assumed to be done on a
secure channel. Later, during the authentication phase an user sends its ID to the verifier
requesting to start a communication. Receiving the request, the verifier checks if the
received ID exists in its database. If it does, the verifier chooses a random CRP (Ci, Ri)
that correspond to this ID and sends Ci to the user. The user computes the response Ri
by running the challenge Ci on its PUF, as follows Ri = PUF(Ci), and sends Ri to the
verifier. However, the PUF measurements at the user are never exactly the same due to
measurement noise, therefore, the verifier uses the new PUF measurement and the helper
data hdR,i stored during the enrollment to re-generate the authentication key. Finally, the
verifier compares the re-generated key to the one in the CRP and if they are identical the
authentication of the node is successful. In order to prevent replay attacks, once used, a
CRP is deleted from the verifier database.
A widely used method for helper data and key generation is by employing fuzzy
extractors (FE). FE are method that allows for key derivation from nonuniform noisy
sources [157]. Due to their properties they are referred as a common technique to cope the
noise present in biometric data and PUF measurements [158–162]. A so called (m, l, t, ε)
FE is built from a pair of randomised functions, namely Generate Gen and Reproduce
Rep. The function Gen requires a single input R ∈ R and produces two outputs, helper
data hdR and a key kR ∈ {0, 1}l. The function Rep is deterministic reproduction and can
reproduce the key kR by using the helper data hdR and a sequence closely associated to
R, i.e., R′. The correctness of the Rep function can be satisfies if only D(R,R′) ≤ t (D
refers to Hamming distance). On the other hand, when hdR is public the key sequence
kR is close to uniformly random only if the min-entropy of R is at least m. This im-
plies the following condition on the statistical distance between kR and the universe of
sequences with length l, whenever hdR is public SD((kR,hdR), (Ul,hdR)) ≤ ε. More
details about FEs’ parameters and bounds can be found in [157, 163, 164].
To summarise, as it is possible to construct a PUF that does not require any complex
operations, it can be used as a lightweight mechanism to generate an unclonable and ran-
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dom secret. However, to guarantee a secure transmission of challenges and responses one
cannot send these in clear text and risk to be obtained by an adversary. Therefore, further
security mechanisms have to be employed to create a secure authentication protocol based
on PUF. Many examples of PUF-based authentication protocols have been proposed in
the literature: some for unilateral authentication [165, 166] and some for mutual authen-
tication [166–169]. A comprehensive survey on lightweight PUF authentication schemes
is presented by Delvaux et al. [55].
3.2.3 0-RTT protocols
This section briefly describes the 0-RTT authentication mode introduced in the transport
layer security (TLS) 1.3 protocol [126]. The use of 0-RTT obviates the need of performing
a full authentication procedure for every re-authentication through the use of a resumption
secret z, thus reducing latency. The TLS 1.3 0-RTT handshake works as follows: in the
very first connection between client and server a regular TLS handshake is used. During
this step the server sends to the client a look-up identifier kl for a corresponding entry in
session caches or it sends a session ticket. Then both parties derive a resumption secret
z using their shared key and the parameters of the session. Finally, the client stores the
resumption secret z and uses it when reconnecting to the same server which also retrieves
it during the re-connection.
If session tickets are used, the server encrypts the resumption secret using a long-term
symmetric encryption key, called a session ticket encryption key (STEK), resulting in a
session ticket. The session ticket is then stored by the client and included in subsequent
connections, allowing the server to retrieve the resumption secret. Using this approach the
same STEK is used for many sessions and clients. On one hand, this property highly re-
duces the required storage of the server, however, on the other hand, it makes it vulnerable
to replay attacks and not is not forward secure. Forward secrecy assures that past sessions
will remain secret even if current or/and future secret keys are compromised [170]. Due to
these vulnerabilities, the work within this chapter focuses on the session cache mechanism
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described next.
When using session caches the server stores all resumption secrets and issues a unique
look-up identifier kl for each client. When a client tries to reconnect to that server it
includes its look-up identifier kl in the 0-RTT message, which allows the server to retrieve
the resumption secret z. Storing a unique resumption secret z for each client requires
server storage for each client but it provides forward security and resilience against replay
attacks, when combined with a key generation mechanisms such as Diffie Hellman (or the
SKG used in this thesis) which are important goals for security protocols [127].
3.2.4 Proximity detection
The IoT is becoming an important part in human machine interaction. Its applicability
varies from healthcare [171] to mass-market applications [172]. A vital feature that will
help enable such applications is indoor localisation. Particularly, IoT indoor localisation-
based services are expected to operate without human intervention [173]. Localisation
techniques can be divided into two groups: database-matching methods and geometri-
cal methods [174]. Database-dependent methods rely on pre-stored location information,
which is treated as a fingerprint map of the area. The localisation process is based on
a real-time comparison between the collected information to the pre-stored one. This
type of methods determines the fingerprint, within the map, in which the user belongs.
Geometrical methods are based on real-time computation of the user’s location. The
location is determined by measuring distances or angles. Some of the widely used geo-
metrical methods are: time-of-flight, multilateration, multiangulation and proximity de-
tection [173, 174].
While time-of-flight, multilateration and multiangulation are capable of accurate lo-
calisation they usually require high complexity operations or high cost equipment. On the
other hand, proximity detection has the lowest computational complexity, and could be
easily implemented with the equipment already present in smartphones today. Proximity
detection is a distance based method which does not provide exact location, instead it
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Beacon
User
Figure 3.2: Proximity detection
can be used to estimate the distance to a transmitting beacon [175]. As illustrated in Fig.
3.2 by using this method one could measure the distance to a nearby beacon but cannot
determine the direction to it.
Due to its simplicity and ease of implementation proximity detection is used for the
purpose of the study within this chapter as a soft authentication mechanism along with
PUFs. A widely adopted technique to obtain the distance to a user (the radius in Fig.
3.2) is by using the RSS. However, numerous factors could negatively impact the wireless
communication in an indoor scenario. Such are reflection, diffraction, scattering, slow
and fast fading. All of the above have direct impact on the RSS. To overcome these issues
one must use a filtration algorithm to treat noisy measurements. A popular filter applied
for localisation is the, so called Kalman filter [176]. It works by the assumption that the
current state xi has relation to the previous one xi−1, and this relation is expressed as
follows:
xi = Axi−1 + Bui−1 + wi−1, (3.2)
where A is a transition matrix which links the current state with the previous one, B is a
control matrix which relates the control vector u to the state and w is an i.i.d. normally
distributed process noise such that w ∼ N(0, IσQ), which represents factors such as
velocity change, wind etc. Following that, the measurements of the current state are given
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by:
zi = Gxi + vi, (3.3)
where G is the observation matrix used to translate each state into a measurement and
v is an i.i.d. normally distributed measurement noise such that v ∼ N(0, IσR), which
denotes the noise present in the measurements, due to fading, path-loss etc. Given the
above, the recursive process of the filter is presented on Fig. 3.3. It is based on two main
steps: prediction and correction (time and measurement update, respectively). During
the time update step: i) the next state is updated based on the previous one; and, ii) the
error covariance matrix Pe is updated based on the previous one. In the above x̂ī and
Pei¯are a priori estimated state and a priori error covariance matrix, i.e., predictions,
which are estimated based on the previous instant. In fact the error covariance matrix is
a measure of uncertainty of the estimated state x̂ī , due to process noise. Next, during the
measurement update step the filter uses the a priori estimates calculated in the prediction
step and updates them to find their a posteriori values: i) the so called Kalman gain KG
is computed such that it minimizes the a posteriori error covariance, i.e., it determines the
weight of the measurement zi and the a priori estimate x̂ī , such that if the measurement
noise is low the measurement will contribute more for the calculation of the a posteriori
state, while if the the error in the a priori estimate is low it will be trusted more during
the measurement update step; ii) using the Kalman gain estimates x̂i and Pe,i are updated
following the equations from the measurement update step given in Figure 3.3.
Finally, it has been shown that the characteristics of a fading channel follow a log-
normal distribution and a commonly used path loss model demonstrated through mea-
surements is [177–180]:
RSSI(d) = RSSI0 − 10n log
Ç
d
d0
å
+Xσ, (3.4)
where RSSI(d) is the path-loss (average received signal strength) at distance d, RSSI0
represents the average received signal strength at some reference distance d0, n is an
attenuation factor that gives the relation between distance and received power, its values
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Pe,i¯= APei−1A
T + σQ
x̂ī = Ax̂i−1 + Bui−1
Time update
Pe,i = (I−KGiG)Peī
x̂i = x̂ī + KGi(zi −Gx̂ī )
KGi = P̄e,iG
T (GP̄e,iG
T + σR)
−1
Measurement update
Figure 3.3: Kalman filter steps
ranges from 2 to 6, Xσ is a zero mean Gaussian random variable which captures the
variations in the received power with standard deviation (smaller the deviation higher the
precision of the model). Typical values of n and and the standard deviation of Xσ for
different indoor environment are summarised in [87]. To simplify the model, typically,
the reference distance d0 is chosen to be 1m, hence Eq. (3.4) becomes:
RSSI(d) = RSSI0 − 10n log(d) +Xσ. (3.5)
To conclude, using the Kalman filter presented on Fig. 3.3 and the path-loss model 3.5,
one can build a proximity detection mechanism. Such a mechanism later in this chapter
as part of an authentication process.
3.2.5 Security verification
Security protocols are used to ensure properties such as forward secrecy, anonymity, un-
traceability, etc. To avoid possible threats the designing process of such protocols must
be infallible. Moreover, all security flaws cannot be identified through testing, since some
may happen only in the presence of adversary [181]. Therefore, security verification is es-
sential step before protocol deployment. The work within this chapter is verified through
both BAN logic [182] and Tamarin prover [42]. For the sake of presentation the introduc-
tion to Tamarin is given in Appendix A.
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BAN logic
The secrecy evaluation of security protocols ensures that an adversary cannot obtain or
alter secret parameters. In this regards, the logic proposed by Burrows, Abadi and Need-
ham (BAN) [182] is widely used secrecy verification tool. However, some weaknesses
were identified and several works, such as [183–186] proposed extended and more reli-
able versions. For the purpose of security verification of protocols this thesis assumes the
usage of Mao and Boyd (MB) logic [186].
Formal proofs are deduced using set of initial beliefs and rules and are based upon
the message exchange within the protocol. The protocol analysis using MB logic consists
of 3 steps: i) the protocol definition is converted to idealised form which includes syntax
and logic interpretation; ii) the idealised version of the protocols must follow several
definitions and rules, which will be described later; and, iii) the manipulation begins
with set of initial assumptions that specify the protocol and are used to derive set of
conclusions. As an example when analysing a key-distribution protocol, one may aim
for the conclusion A k↔B. The meaning of this expression is: k is a good shared secret
between A and B. The full notation of MB logic is described later in this section.
The protocol message idealisation is used to interpret the implicit context-dependent
information into explicit protocol specification. As mentioned, messages and interactions
within a protocol should be idealised using several definitions and rules:
Definitions:
1. Atomic message: a piece of data within the protocol that constructs a message
without using any of the following symbols: “, ”, “|”, “R”, “()”, “{}”.
2. Challenge: a non timestamp atomic message that is sent by an agent (its originator)
on one line within the protocol specification and received by the same agent on
different line.
3. Replied challenge: a challenge that appears in a line intended to the challenge’s
originator.
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4. Response: a non timestamp atomic message and a replied challenge sent together.
5. Nonsense: a non timestamp, challenge or response atomic message.
Rules:
1. Nonsenses are removed.
2. Atomic messages that appear to be a challenge and a response in the same line is
considered to be a response.
3. Challenges which are separated by comma are combined using “|” operator.
4. Responses which are separated by comma are combined into a combined response
using “|” operator.
5. Challenge and its response are combined using “R” operator.
6. Message and a corresponding timestamp are combined using “R” operator.
In order to illustrate the meaning of the definitions above a simple example of 2-party
communication is considered here:
1. Alice→ Bob : IDA,m, nonceA, TSA
2. Bob→ Alice : IDB, nonceB, {nonceA, TSB, k2}k1
3. Alice→ Bob : {nonceB}k2
Note that {·}k defines encryption using key k. In the example above, nonceA is a challenge
in the first message and it is a replied challenge in the second. Similarly, nonceB takes
the role of a challenge in the second message and the role of a replied challenge in the
third. Next, k2 is a response to challenge nonceA. Finally, TSA and TSB are timestamps,
whereas, m is a nonsense within this example. Following the rules, the idealised version
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A |≡ X A believes X is true
A
k
/m A sees m using key k, if not encrypted A/m
A
k
|∼m A encrypts m using key k
#(m) m is of type fresh
A
k↔B k is a good shared key between A and B
A / ||m m is not available to A
sup(S) S is a super-principal
Figure 3.4: Notation of the MB logic for protocol analysis.
of the communication protocol defined above is given as:
1. Alice→ Bob : IDA, nonceARTSA
2. Bob→ Alice : IDB, nonceB, {k2RnonceARTSB}k1
3. Alice→ Bob : {nonceB}k2
The following differences can be seen in the idealised version compared to the initial one:
the nonsense m is removed from the first message; again in the first message nonceA is
combined with the corresponding timestamp TSA using the “R” operator; in the second
message the operator “R” combines the response k2 with its corresponding challenge
nonceA which on the other side is combined with the timestamp TSB.
Following the above rules and definitions security properties are modelled through
inference rules using the notation in Fig. 3.4. Furthermore denoting: principals as A,B;
messages as m; keys as k; formulas as X and Y ; the inference rules used for the purpose
of this thesis are:
Authentication rule: A|≡A
k↔B∧A
k
/m
A|≡B
k
|∼m
meaning, if k is a good shared key between A and B
(i.e., it has not been leaked) and A uses key k to decrypt m, then A can believe that
B is the one who encrypted m.
Confidentiality rule: A|≡A
k↔B∧BC/||m∧A
k
|∼m
A|≡(A∪B)C/||m meaning, if k is a good shared key between
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A and B and the complement of set B cannot see m and A used k to encrypt m,
then A believes that the complement of the union between A and B cannot see m,
resulting in m can be seen only by A and B.
Fresh rule: A|≡#(m)∧A/nRm
A|≡#(n) meaning, if m is of type fresh and n is a response to m
follows that n is also of type fresh.
Good-key rule: A|≡{A,B}
C/||k∧A|≡#(k)
A|≡A k↔B
meaning if A and B are the only agents that can see
k and k is of type fresh, follows that k is a good shared key between A and B.
Nonce verification rule: A|≡#(n)∧A|≡B
k
|∼n
A|≡B|≡A k↔B
meaning if B used the key k in the current pro-
tocol run follows that B believes k is a good shared key.
Super-principal rule: A|≡B|≡X∧A|≡sup(B)
A|≡X meaning A unconditionally trusts B beliefs, in
this example X , and this is true as far as A thinks B is the super principal w.r.t. X .
Belief axiom 1: A|≡X∧A|≡Y
A|≡(X∧Y ) meaning A believes X and A believes Y , therefore, A be-
lieves the set of functions (X, Y ).
Belief axiom 2: A|≡X∧A|≡X/Y
A|≡Y meaning A believes X and A believes X implies Y , there-
fore A believes Y .
3.3 Employed methods and system model
Having now presented the necessary background material, the rest of this chapter proposes
a full authentication solution based on a range of basic primitives. Each of these primitives
is introduced below together with a summary of the methods used to analyse and optimise
the solution. The system model assumed in this chapter consists of two legitimate parties
Alice and Bob, where Alice refers to a resource-constrained IoT device and Bob to a
resourceful server.
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BobAlice
Phase 1
BobAlice
Phase 2
Figure 3.5: Enhanced proximity detection - phase 1: Alice and Bob perform proximity
detection; phase 2: Alice performs two additional measurements at different locations.
Proximity detection
It is expected that future IoT devices will be able to obtain, or even generate a map of an
indoor premise by simply entering the environment [187, 188]. This ability will enhance
the performance of methods such as: signal level prediction, on-the-fly location estimation
and numerous mobile applications [187, 189]. Furthermore, many mobile IoT devices in
scenarios such as smart home, industry and robotics are stored in a specific location while
not in use. Following from the above, this work proposes an authentication protocol
that relies upon a proximity detection (discussed in Section 3.2.4) to add a second factor
of authenticity. Before executing the authentication procedure, Alice and Bob roughly
estimate each others location. On one hand, Bob (static server) checks whether Alice
is within a expected area, while on the other hand Alice (mobile IoT node) performs an
enhanced proximity detection as illustrated in Fig. 3.5. The procedure comprises of two
phases: 1) This phase is based on a pre-defined distance threshold ζ . Before running the
authentication procedure both parties compare ζ to online measured distance and confirm
whether the other party is within the expected area or has been compromised and moved.
Given the above, the verification mechanism can be built as follows:
Position =
 Legitimate, if distance ≤ ζCompromised, otherwise. (3.6)
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Figure 3.6: Measured RSSI data (dashed) and filtered data using Kalman filter (solid)
for three different distances: TOP 1 meter, MIDDLE 3 meters, BOTTOM 6 meters. The
measurement noise variance is set to σR = 0.1.
2) Assume that a mobile IoT device begins to move in a unpredictable manner that an
adversary cannot foresee. The IoT device performs two additional RSS measurements
using a downloaded map of the premise in order to confirm the position of the server. The
additional measurements are performed to prevent the IoT from impersonation attacks.
Next, to validate the practicality of the proposed method, a set of experiments were
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performed in an indoor environment using a Bluetooth low energy (BLE) beacon that
transmits with power of −4 dBm and a smartphone to collect the signals and measure the
RSS (which in the BLE protocol is denoted as received signal strength indicator (RSSI)).
As described in Section 3.2.4, to ensure the received signal is reliable, noise and variations
introduced of the wireless channel are filtered using a Kalman filter. Due to the fact the
RSSI is a scalar variable the process does not contain matrices. Therefore, the parameters
of the filter are as follows: initial prediction of the RSSI value x̂i−1, initial prediction of
the error variance Pe,i−1 = 0.1, since the process is controlled, the variance of the process
noise is assumed to be nearly zero σQ = 106; the measurement noise varies from environ-
ment to environment, hence σR must be adjusted depending upon the environment; since
no any control signals are used, u equals zero; the obtained RSSI values are in dBm and
do not need to be converted implying G = 1; furthermore, since the measurements in the
specific scenario are for a static position the transition matrixA = 1. Following from this,
the measurements collected during three different experiments are illustrated on Fig. 3.6.
The experiments differ by the distance between the two devices - 1 m (TOP graph), 3 m
(MIDDLE graph) and 6 m (BOTTOM graph). Each graph illustrates the RSSI values with
dashed line and the resulting filtered values with solid line. The measurement noise vari-
ance for all three experiments was estimated as σR = 0.1. It should be noted that during
the experiment the line of sight between the two devices was not always present due to
people moving in the area, additionally there were other Bluetooth and wifi devices work-
ing in the vicinity which causes further interference. To show how quickly the filter will
find the pattern of the data the initial prediction is set at x̂i−1 = −60 for all three experi-
ments. It can be seen in Fig. 3.6 that the filter quickly converges to the desired value (by
about the third sample). The filtered output was found to be stable after convergence in
all tested scenarios, showing that the filter successfully eliminates the noise present in the
measurements. Based on the results in Fig. 3.6, three regions for the filtered RSSI values,
were identified: [−62,−59]dBm when at 1 m; [−70,−67]dBm at 3 m; [−72,−76]dBm at
6m. This allows the enhancement of the proximity detection discussed in Section 3.2.4.
Note that the results show that there is a relation between RSSI and distance, however,
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the proposed method in its current form cannot provide high accuracy, therefore, further
experimental validation needs to be performed before employing the method in a real sys-
tem setting.
Finally, the novelty within this method can be summarised as follows: 1) proposing the
usage of proximity detection as a soft, second factor, authentication method 2) develop-
ment of an enhanced proximity detection mechanism that can be performed by mobile IoT
nodes; 3) promising experimental results of the proposed method in a real-life setting.
PUF authentication
Before establishing a shared secret key, Alice and Bob must be sure they are communi-
cating with a trusted party. This work assumes the usage of a PLS method, and more
specifically PUF authentication. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, many PUF authentica-
tion protocols have been proposed in the literature, with even a few commercially avail-
able [190, 191]. Furthermore, by eliminating the need of non-volatile memory the usage
of PUFs could greatly reduce the complexity compared to existing authentication alter-
natives. This work does not look into developing a new PUF architecture, instead, it
proposes a new fast PUF-based authentication protocol that relies on existing PUF archi-
tectures. Finally, the contributions in relation to this method are: 1) development of a new
PUF-based lightweight authentication protocol; 2) using PUF in conjunction with PHY
SKG.
Fuzzy extractor
In a PUF setting, a fuzzy extractor (FE) can be used to correct discrepancies in a re-
produced responses. The FE allows authentication of a device, equipped with PUF, by
comparing a generated key from a response, Ri, to a key generated from a noisy version
of the response, R′i, as follows:
Gen(Ri) = (hdR,i,kR,i) (3.7)
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Rep(R′i,hdR,i) = kR′,i (3.8)
By confirming the condition kR,i
?
= kR′,i one can confirm that the responses Ri and
R′i were generated from the same PUF. Generally, the Gen function is executed on the
server and Rep on a remote device equipped with the PUF. However, the Rep function
is more computationally complex than the Gen and consequently a reverse FE has been
proposed [192]. In reverse FE, the more complex operation is performed on the resource-
ful device (Bob) instead on the resource constrained device. Furthermore, this can help
the prevention of a helper data manipulation attack, i.e. in the reverse FE, it is the server
that observes the helper data and is thus better placed to detect a manipulation of the data
than a resource constrained IoT device [193]. The use of FE in a PUF setting is not a
novel approach, however, FE is a necessary tool to eliminate the noise present in PUF
measurements. Therefore, FEs are used throughout this chapter.
Secret key generation
To ensure that their communication is private, after authenticating each other, Alice and
Bob have to encrypt / decrypt the exchanged data. For this work, it is assumed the use
of symmetric encryption where the same key is used for both operations. In order to
obtain a shared key this work proposes to use SKG which consists of three standard steps:
i) advantage distillation; ii) information reconciliation; and, iii) privacy amplification;
each of these steps are explained in more detail in Section 2.2.1. This works assumes
short block-length communication in an additive white Gaussian noise AWGN channel.
Therefore, an initial contribution in regards to this method is the derivation of the closed
form expression for the SKG rate at the finite block-length. The derived information
theoretic bound was used by my colleague, Dr. Mahdi Herfeh, to compare different short
block-length Slepian Wolf key reconciliation approaches. While the numerical results,
which are illustrated in Fig. 3.7, were produced by Mahdi, all derivation below was the
work of the author of this thesis and is included here and in Appendix B.
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For the purpose of the derivation the channel model from Section 2.2.1 is assumed:
xi = hi + zi (3.9)
where zi ∼ N(0, 1) is noise variable and hi represents the received symbols which has
variance P . Following this model, the maximum secret key rate over which Alice and
Bob agree on with probability greater than 1− ε is [194]:
S(n, ε) = CSKG −
 
V
n
Q−1(ε) +O(
√
n). (3.10)
with terms as described below. Here, Alice and Bob observe blocks xA and xB, respec-
tively, of length n, hence, the SKG capacity is (as derived in Section 2.2.1):
CSKG = I(xA, xB) = log
(
1 +
Pσ2
2 + 1
Pσ2
)
, (3.11)
where unit noise variance is assumed. The dispersion of the channel is given as:
V = Var
ñ
log
Pr(xA, xB)
Pr(xA)Pr(xB)
ô
. (3.12)
Finally, Q−1(·) is the inverse of the Gaussian Q function, ε is the average block error rate,
and O(
√
n) comprises the remainder terms of order
√
n which is negligible w.r.t. to the
other terms. For the purpose of this study, the closed-form of the dispersion V is evaluated
resulting into
V =8aP (aP + a+ bP + b) + 2b2P (P + 1) + 4a2 + b2 (3.13)
with:
a =
Ä
−
√
P + 1−
√
P + 1P + 1 + 2P
ä
2 (1 + 2P )
√
P + 1
, (3.14)
b =
P
1 + 2P
. (3.15)
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of FER performance over the reconciliation rate of different
coding schemes to the upper bound given in Eq. (3.10) using the derivation of the channel
dispersion as in Eq. (3.13).
All steps of the derivation from Eq. (3.12) to Eq. (3.13) can be found in Appendix B.
Next, Fig. 3.7 compare different reconciliation coding techniques used today with the
estimated bound. Overall, it can seen that most of these coding techniques do not perform
well for short block length and are away from the bound. It can be seen that, classical
polar codes and LDPC codes do not perform well in the short block length, however,
their performance can be significantly improved by using them with list and iterative list
decoding, respectively. Note that, to better utilise the spectrum, future IoT technologies
are expected to exchange short messages, and therefore, research in the area of short block
length communication is sufficient.
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Finally, the novel ideas in regards to this method are: 1) the use of SKG in conjunction
with PUFs and building a full solution for lightweight authentication; 2) the development
of a PHY-based resumption protocol; 3) derivation of a closed form expression for the
SKG rate at the finite block-length.
Re-authentication
In Section 3.2.2 it was discussed that using PUF authentication can greatly reduce the
computational overhead of a system. Authentication of new keys is required at the start
of communication and at each key renegotiation. However, the number of challenges
that can be applied to a single PUF is limited. Therefore, to further develop the hybrid
crypto-system this work proposes a solution in the form of resumption protocol. The
proposed re-authentication approach exploits the use of resumption secrets as used in the
0-RTT authentication mode in the transport layer security (TLS) 1.3 protocol. Instead of
performing full authentication before sending data encrypted with a new key, this study
proposes a new method which allows Alice (Bob) to authenticate subsequent keys using
a lightweight scheme anchored by the initial authentication process. In this physical layer
0-RTT, given that a node identifier state would be required for link-layer purposes, the
session cache places little comparative load and thus is the mechanism proposed here for
(re-)authentication. Another strong motivation for developing this mechanism is that it is
forward secure in the scenario used in this thesis [127]. As discussed earlier, employing
the properties of the wireless channel to built a resumption protocol is a novel approach,
to the best knowledge of the author of this thesis.
Employed security primitives
In addition, to eliminate the possibility of tampering attacks, this work uses a set of secu-
rity primitives:
SKG scheme (as described in Section 2.2.1) is denoted by G : C→ K×S, accepting
as input the fading coefficients (modelled as complex numbers), and generating as outputs
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binary vectors k and sA in the key and syndrome spaces, of sizes |k| and |sA|, respectively,
G(h) = (k, sA) , (3.16)
where k ∈ K denotes the key obtained from h after privacy amplification and sA is Alice’s
syndrome.
Symmetric encryption algorithm (as described in Section 3.2.1, e.g., AES GCM, de-
noted by Es : K ×M → CT where CT denotes the ciphertext space with corresponding
decryption Ds : K × CT →M, such that
Es(k,m) = c, (3.17)
Ds(k, c) = m, (3.18)
for m ∈M, c ∈ CT .
Pair of message authentication code MAC algorithms (as described in 3.2.1), e.g., in
HMAC mode, denoted by Sign : KMAC ×M → T , with a corresponding verification
algorithm Ver : KMAC ×M× T → (yes, no), such that
Sign(kMAC,m) = t, (3.19)
Ver(kMAC,m, t) =

yes , if integrity verified
no, if integrity not verified
(3.20)
Security analysis
Finally, to verify the security properties of the proposed protocol, this work concludes
with a security analysis using BAN logic and Tamarin prover.
Following from the above the system model for this study can be seen on Fig. 3.8.
The model provides a PHY-based multi-factor mutual authentication mechanism between
Alice (IoT device) and Bob (resourceful device). As discussed, combining SKG in con-
junction with PUFs is a novel approach that is used here to build a secure and lightweight
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Figure 3.8: System model of the proposed multi-factor authentication scheme, where
Alice is a resource constraint IoT device and Bob is a resourceful server.
solution. The figure illustrates that after the link establishment (i.e., pilot exchange) both
parties can use the channel parameters as a wireless fingerprint, which allows for prox-
imity detection and SKG. Furthermore, Alice is equipped with a PUF that identifies her
hardware fingerprint. The combination of wireless and hardware fingerprints gives the
full authentication mechanism.
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3.4 Authentication protocol
This section presents a lightweight authentication scheme, consisting of two phases: en-
rollment phase and authentication phase. First the enrolment, authentication / SKG and
resumption schemes will be presented with little justification, this is followed by both an
informal and formal security analysis.
3.4.1 Enrollment phase
The enrollment is one-time operation performed between Alice (denoted here as A) and
Bob (denoted here as B). This phase is carried on a secure channel (i.e., by using a
time-based one time password algorithm [195]). The steps taken during enrollment are
summarised in Fig. 3.9 and are performed as follows:
1. In order to establish the link between them, both devices need to exchange pilot
signals. During this exchangeA andB measure the RSS. FurthermoreA downloads
(or creates) a map of the premises which contains the location of B.
2. After establishing the connection, Alice sends her ID A with a request for registra-
tion Request.
3. Upon receiving the request, B first checks if the received ID has already been reg-
istered. If B finds the ID within his database the request is rejected. If A has
not been registered Bob links the ID A with the computed proximity threshold ζ .
Next, B generates two initial PUF challenges C1, C2 and an initial one-time alias
ID AID,1. These challenges will be used during subsequent authentication and
will be updated with each run of the protocol. Next, B generates sets of emer-
gency challenges and one-time alias IDs Cemerg and AID,emerg, respectively, such
that |Cemerg| = |AID,emerg|. The emergency sets are used only in a case of de-
synchronisation between the devices and have multiple entries to allow for multiple
recoveries. Finally, Bob sends the message {C1, C2, AID,1, (Cemerg,AID,emerg)}
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Figure 3.9: Enrollment phase (note using a secure channel)
to Alice. Note that the two emergency sets are linked such that each element has a
corresponding one in the other set.
4. After receiving the message, Alice excites her PUFA with C1, C2 and all chal-
lenges from the set Cemerg, producing responses R1, R2 and Remerg, respectively.
Next, she uses R1 and Remerg as inputs to her fuzzy extractor to generate the
pairs (hdR,1,kR,1) and (hdR,emerg,KR,emerg). Afterwards, Alice stores the parame-
ters: {AID,1,kR,1, (KR,emerg,AID,emerg)} and sends the following message to Bob
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{R2,Remerg,kR,1,KR,emerg}.
5. To finalise the registration process B stores the following elements that correspond
to the ID A in his database: proximity threshold ζ , initial authentication param-
eters (AID,1,kR,1), (C2, R2) and emergency authentication parameters in case of
de-synchronisation (Cemerg,Remerge), (KR,emerg,AID,emerg).
3.4.2 Authentication phase
Once the enrollment is finished both devices can use the established parameters for later
authentication. The steps taken during authentication are summarised in Fig. 3.10 and are
performed as follows:
1. First, in order to estimate the channel and establish connection both devices ex-
change pilot signals. The following parameters are measured during this phase: i)
A and B estimate the CSI. Both parties quantise their CSI measurements into bit
string rA and rB, respectively. ii) Alice and Bob measure the RSS of the received
signals.
2. Next, Alice performs the enhanced proximity detection mechanism to confirm the
location of Bob. If the detection does not succeed she stops the authentication
process. If it succeeds, she performs an SKG process obtaining syndrome sA and
key k. The key will be used later as a session key if the authentication is successful.
Then, A sends her request for authentication which contains a one-time alias ID
AID,i and a fresh random nonce N1.
3. Upon receiving above, Bob first confirms whether Alice is at the expected distance
by using the measured RSS and compares against that saved in his database prox-
imity threshold ζ . If the check fails, he rejects the authentication request. If it
succeeds he accesses the database and loads the parameters that corresponds to the
ID, i.e., CRP (C2, R2) and key kR,1. Then he generates a fresh random nonce NB
and breaks kR,1 into two parts as follows: kR,1 = (kR1,1,kR1,2). Then uses the first
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Figure 3.10: Multi-factor authentication protocol
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part to encrypt {A,B,C2, N1, NB}, resulting in cipher textMB and uses the second
part to sign MB as: TB = Sign(kR1,2,MB). Finally, he sends the cipher text MB
and the signed message TB to Alice.
4. By using her stored key kR,1, A verifies the authenticity of Bob and the integrity of
the message MB. If one of the verification checks fail Alice rejects the message’s
claim to authenticity. If the verification succeeds she accepts and excites her PUF
with the received challenge: R′2 = PUFA(C2). Next, by using the principles of the
fuzzy extractor, A uses her noisy response R′2 and produces two bit strings, (one in
the helper data space and one the key space) as follows: Gen(R′2) = (hdR′,2,kR′,2).
Afterwards, she generates a new fresh random nonceNA and calculates the next two
challenges as follows: C3 = Hash(C2||NA) and C4 = Hash(C3||NB). Next, she
excites her PUF to produce R3 and R4. In order to generate the key that will be
used in subsequent running of the authentication protocol A performs the function
Gen(R3) = (hdR,3,kR,3). Next, she calculates the one-time alias ID for upcoming
run of the protocol as: AID,2 = Hash(A||NB||R3) which due to the randomness
of NB and R3, cannot be linked to AID,1. The pairs (C4, R4) and (kR,3, AID,2)
will be used in subsequent connection with Bob. Next, Alice breaks her key kR′,2
into two parts kR′,2 = (kR′2,1,kR′2,2). Similarly, to the previous step she uses half
of the key to encrypt the message MA = {A,B, sA, NA, R3, R4}. Then, A uses the
second half of the key to sign the cipher text as follows: TA = Sign(kR′2,2,MA).
Finally, Alice sends MA, TA and hdR′,2 to Bob and stores the pair (kR,3, AID,2).
5. Upon receiving the preceding message, Bob uses the stored R2 (from the enroll-
ment phase) and the received helper data hdR′,2 in order to verify the condition
Rep(R2,hdR′,2)
?
= kR′,2 by . If the verification fails, B rejects the claim to au-
thenticity. If the claim is accepted, he verifies the integrity of MA using the signed
cipher text TA. Next, using R3 and the principles of the fuzzy extractor Bob per-
forms Gen(R3) = (hdR,3,kR,3). He calculates AID,2 = Hash(A||NB||R3). Fol-
lowing that, he stores the pairs (kR,3, AID,2), (C4, R4) which will be used during
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the next round of the protocol. Finally, using the received syndrome sA, B cor-
rects the discrepancies in his observation rB to obtain rA and calculates the session
key using the privacy amplification method described in Section 2.2.1 as follows:
k = Hash(rA).
6. After the authentication process finishes A and B enter the secure communication
stage with session key k. During this stage, both use the channel properties to
generate a shared resumption secret z. Instead of performing full authentication
in subsequent sessions, the secret can be used as a parameter to quickly “resume”
sessions within 0-RTT.
3.4.3 Resumption protocol
This section presents a novel physical layer resumption protocol that allows Alice to send
encrypted data within a 0-RTT. During the secure communication stage of the authenti-
cation protocol in Fig. 3.10, B sends to A a look-up identifier kl. Then, both derive a
resumption secret z that is identified by kl (as discussed in Section 3.2.3). Note, z and
session keys have the same length |k|. The usage of a resumption secret for authentication
helps avoiding man-in-the-middle attacks in the scenario assumed here. Given the above,
the resumption protocol follows the steps:
1. As before, in order to establish the link both devices perform pilot exchange pro-
cedure. Alice and Bob obtain channel observations and generate the sequences rA
and rB, respectively. Furthermore, both parties measures the RSS.
2. Following the above, Alice performs the enhanced proximity detection mechanism
to verify whether Bob is at the expected location. If the verification fails, she aborts
the connection. If the verification succeeds she generates a fresh random nonce N1
and reads the resumption secret z. Next, she obtains r∗ = z⊕ rA. Then, using her
Slepian Wolf decoder she calculates the syndrome s∗, that corresponds to r∗, and
generates the session key as k∗ = Hash(r∗). She also calculates the one-time alias
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Update z
Store: AID,i+1
Sign(k∗2, c) = t
Es(k∗1,m) = c
Break: k∗ = (k∗1,k
∗
2)
AID,i+1 = Hash(A||rA)
Obtain: s∗, k∗ = Hash(r∗)
Perform SKG using r∗:
r∗ = z⊕ rA
Read: Resumption secret z
Generate: N1
Estimate: rA
Enhanced proximity detection
Bob ID-B
Server
Estimate: rB
Proximity detection
Store: AID,i+1
AID,i+1 = Hash(A||rA)
rA = r
∗ ⊕ z
Ver(k∗2,m, t)
k∗
′ ?
= k∗
k∗
′
= Hash(r∗)
Finish SKG: (r∗′ , s∗) = (r∗)
r∗
′
= z⊕ rB
Read: Resumption secret z
Verify: A is at the expected distance
Figure 3.11: Resumption protocol
ID that will be used for subsequent session as: AID,i+1 = Hash(A||rA). Alice
breaks her key into two parts k∗ = (k∗1,k
∗
2) and uses the first part to encrypt the
early 0-RTT data m as Es(k∗1,m) = c. The second part she uses to sign the cipher
text Sign(k∗2, c) = t. Finally, she sends s
∗, AID,i, N1, c, t and stores AID,i+1.
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Note that the key k∗ can only be obtained if both the physical layer generated key
and the resumption key are valid and this method can be shown to be forward se-
cure [127].
3. Upon receiving that, B first verifies if A is at the expected distance. Then, reads
the resumption secret z and obtains r∗′ = z ⊕ rB. Using that and the received
syndrome s∗, Bob finishes the SKG process and obtains k∗ = Hash(r∗). He uses
the condition k∗′ ?= k∗ to verify the authenticity of Alice and the integrity of the
message. If the above succeed he calculates rA = r∗ ⊕ z and stores AID,i+1 =
Hash(A||rA).
4. After the resumption process finishes the two devices enter the secure communica-
tion stage using k∗ as a session key. During the secure communication stage, they
use the channel and session properties to generate a new shared resumption secret
that could be used in subsequent resumptions.
3.5 Security analysis
This section provides security analysis of the lightweight authentication protocol illus-
trated in Fig. 3.10. The security proofs consider a Dolev-Yao [196] type of adversary,
who has control over the wireless channel between A and B. Furthermore: 1) the ad-
versary can send any type of messages and queries using its knowledge gained through
observation; 2) all functions and operations performed by the legitimate users during the
execution of the protocol are public except for PUFA(·) and the entire enrollment phase;
3) the adversary can launch a DoS attack and block parts of the protocol in order to de-
synchronise the connection between A and B. For simplicity, the work assumes a rich
Rayleigh multipath environment where the adversary is more than a few wavelengths
away from each of the legitimate parties. This forms the basis of our hypothesis that the
measurements of Alice and Bob are uncorrelated to the adversary’s measurements. Fi-
nally, the security analysis build upon the fact that the enrollment phase is carried out on
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a secure channel. This is a realistic assumption for numerous systems where an initial
bootstrapping is required to set up a new device within an existing network [197, 198].
Following that, first an informal, descriptive, analysis will be presented, this will be fol-
lowed by a formal analysis.
3.5.1 Informal security analysis
Mutual authentication: The proposed protocol uses a set of factors to achieve mutual
authentication. It uses enhanced proximity detection as a first factor of authentication.
This verifies whether both parties are at the expected position. Next, Alice authenticates
Bob by verifying whether the correct key is used for creating MB and TB. On the other
hand, Bob authenticates Alice by first confirming the validity of the received one-time
alias ID AID,i and second by verifying whether she produced a valid response to Ci. The
second condition is confirmed only if Alice uses the correct key to generate the pair MA,
TA.
Untraceability and Anonymity: During the execution of the authentication proto-
col, Alice must posses a valid one-time alias ID AID for each session. The one-time
alias identity cannot be used twice and there is not direct relationship between conse-
quent aliases. Thus, no one except Bob would know what is the origin of the message.
Furthermore, in case of de-synchronisation the device can use the set of emergency IDs
AID,emerg. After using an emergency ID it has to be deleted from Alice’s and Bob’s mem-
ory. This approach provides privacy against eavesdroppers and ensures user’s anonimity
and identity untraceability properties.
Perfect forward secrecy: Assuming an attacker compromises A and obtains all
stored secrets, i.e., (kR, AID), he cannot obtain previous keys or one-time alias IDs.
First, each kR is generated using a CRP and CRPs are randomly generated and indepen-
dent. Hence, by obtaining kR,i an adversary cannot learn kR,i−1. Next, one-time alias IDs
are generated using a one-way hash function of unique parameters for each session; if
an adversary obtains AID,i, he can not inverse the hash function. Furthermore, using the
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randomness of the wireless channel ensures that session keys are unique and independent
for each session. Therefore, the proposed authentication protocol ensures perfect forward
secrecy property.
Protection against replay attack: If an adversary intercepts previous communication
between A and B, he can replay the same messages and try to pass the authentication
process. In the protocol presented on Fig. 3.10 none of the parameters in the initial request
are allowed to be sent twice, hence, if an attacker resends the same message toB the attack
will be detected and the request will be rejected. Next, if the adversary tries to re-send
MB to A, he will be detected, since the key used to encrypt MB is changed with every
session. Similarly, if the adversary tries to re-sendMA, he will be detected and the request
will be rejected because the key used to encrypt MA is changed every session. The above
proves that the proposed protocol provides resistance against replay attacks.
Protection against impersonation attack: A successful impersonation attack will
allow the adversary to be authenticated as a legitimate user. Following from above, an
adversary cannot perform a replay attack, which limits his options to perform an imper-
sonation attack. Following from that, in order to impersonate A he must generate 1) a
valid one-time alias ID and 2) a valid message MA 3) be at the expected distance from S.
However, due to the unclonability properties of the PUF and the fact that the connection
between a device and its PUF is secure, (i.e., system on chip) the adversary cannot gener-
ate a valid message MA, hence cannot impersonate Alice. Next, in order to impersonate
Bob the adversary must posses a valid key kR,1 and generate a valid message MB. To ob-
tain the key an adversary must compromise A (an example of such a scheme vulnerable
to this attack can be found in [199]). However, even if A is compromised by performing
the enhanced proximity detection Alice will detect the attack. The above proves that our
multi-factor authentication protocol provides resistance against impersonation attacks.
Resistance to DoS attack: To ensure security against DoS and de-syncronisation
attacks, the authentication protocol uses unlinkable one-time alias IDs and pairs of sets
with emergency parameters (Cemerg,Remerge) and (KR,emerg,AID,emerg). If an adversary
manages to block a message from a legitimate party, such that it does not reach its intended
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receiver, the authentication process will stop and the used AID,i will not be updated.
To overcome that A can use one of her emergency IDs from the set AID,emerg. Bob
will then read the corresponding KR,emerg from the set KR,emerg and use it to encrypt
a message containing an emergency challenge Cemerg from the set Cemerg. Next, both
parties can continue the authentication process as usual and setup a new one-time alias ID.
In order to prevent replay attacks all used emergency parameters must be deleted from the
corresponding set. This approach provides resiliency against DoS to de-synchronisation
attacks.
Protection against cloning attacks: A successful cloning attack allows the adver-
sary to use a captured device in order to obtain secrets stored on an another device. In
the proposed protocol each device posses a unique pair (kR, AID). Furthermore, all de-
vices have unique PUFs and will produce a unique response to a challenge. Hence, the
adversary cannot use secrets derived from one device in order to clone another.
Protection against physical attacks: Successful physical attack could be performed
by physical tampering on the IoT device in order to change its behavior. However, by
changing its behavior, the PUF will not produce the desired response and therefore B will
detect the attack. Therefore, the proposed protocol is resistant against physical attacks.
Session key agreement: It is a common practice in literature to use nonces as part
of the session key generation process [153, 199, 200]. However, note that even if NA
and NB are good shared secrets (the next section gives a formal proof for the secrecy
of NA and NB) between A and B the low entropy of pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG) modules may provoke set of attacks, such as side-channel and prediction at-
tacks [201, 202], and lead to information leakage. Furthermore, it has been shown that
true-random number generators (TRNGs) can greatly increase the time complexity in a
resource limited systems making the generation time infeasible [203]. Therefore, the role
of the nonces in the proposed scheme is limited to only a source of freshness. On the
other hand, the randomness already present in the wireless channel allows for secure and
lightweight key generation process. The SKG procedure presented in section 2.2.1 can
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produce a uniform random key with size as much as [12]:
|k| ≤ H(xA)− I(xA; xE)− H(xA|xB)− r0, (3.21)
where H(xA) represents the entropy of the measurement, I(xA; xE) represents the mutual
information between Alice’s and an eavesdropper’s observations, the entropy revealed
during information reconciliation is H(xA|xB) – which in our scheme is zero due to the
encryption of the syndrome sA, and r0 > 0 is an extra security parameter that ensures
uncertainty on the key at an eavesdropper’s side. For details and estimation of these
parameters in a practical scenario please see [114]. Finally, we note that if the session key
somehow gets compromised, the authentication process remains secure as the adversary
cannot obtain the PUF response using the session key.
3.5.2 Formal security analysis using BAN logic and Tamarin prover
Secrecy proofs Using BAN Logic
As discussed in Section 3.2.5 secrecy evaluation is a vital step to ensure security of pro-
tocols. In this sense, the BAN logic [182] is widely used verification tool. However,
several weaknesses of the logic were identified throughout the years. Therefore, for the
verification purposes the authentication protocol in Fig. 3.10 an improved and and more
reliable version of BAN logic, i.e., MB logic [186] is used in this section. Further details
about MB logic are given in Section 3.2.5. The first step of MB logic is to obtain the
idealised version of the protocol and to define the initial beliefs. Based on the set of rules
and definitions defined in Section 3.2.5, the protocol in Fig. 3.10 is idealised as follows:
1. A→ B : A,N1
2. B → A : {NBRN1}kR,1
3. A→ B : {R3|R4RNARNB}kR′,2
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Table 3.1: Inference rules adopted from Mao and Boyd logic
Notation Description
A|≡A k↔B∧A
k
/m
A|≡B
k
|∼m
Authentication rule
A|≡A k↔B∧BC/||m∧A
k
|∼m
A|≡(A∪B)C/||m Confidentiality rule
A|≡#(m)∧A/nRm
A|≡#(n) Fresh rule
A|≡{A,B}C/||k∧A|≡#(k)
A|≡A k↔B
Good-key rule
A|≡#(n)∧A|≡B
k
|∼n
A|≡B|≡A k↔B
Nonce verification rule
A|≡B|≡X∧A|≡sup(B)
A|≡X Super-principal rule
A|≡X∧A|≡Y
A|≡(X∧Y ) Belief axiom 1
A|≡X∧A|≡X/Y
A|≡Y Belief axiom 2
where R denotes the relation between parameters, as defined in Section 3.2.5. Next,
denoting principal as A,B, messages as m,k and formulas as X the main properties of
MB logic are recalled here for clarity: A |≡ X denotesA believesX is true; Ak/m denotes
A sees m using key k, if m is not encrypted this simplifies to A/m; A
k
|∼m denotes A
encrypts m using key k; #(m) denotes m is of type fresh; A k↔B denotes k is a good
shared key between A and B; A/ ||m denotes m is not available to A; sup(B) denotes B
is a super-principal, i.e., B is the legitimate source of a specific message. Following that,
the inference rules, defined in [186], and used in this section are given in Table 3.1.
Given the above, the initial beliefs are denoted as follows:
A1 A |≡ AkR,1↔B and B |≡ AkR,1↔B – Bob stores CRP (C1, R1) with the corresponding
ID A in its memory i.e. following a correct enrolment phase. The key kR,1 can
be generated using a fuzzy extractor only from the respective R1 and only A can
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generate R′1 such that D(R1, R
′
1) ≤ t.
A2 A |≡ A
kR′,2↔ B and B |≡ A
kR′,2↔ B – Bob stores CRP (C2, R2) with the corresponding
ID A in its memory. The key kR′,2 can be generated using a fuzzy extractor only
from the respective R′2 such that D(R2, R
′
2) ≤ t.
A3 B |≡ A |≡ AC / ||R3|R4RNARNB – the information within message 3 can be
accessed only if kR′,2 is used as the decryption key.
A4 B |≡ sup(A) – A is super-principal w.r.t. R3, R4 and NA.
A5 B
kR′,2
/ R3|R4RNARNB – B can access the information within message 3 of the
idealised protocol only if using kR′,2 as decryption key.
A6 A
kR′,2
|∼ R3|R4RNARNB – A uses kR′,2 to encrypt message 3 of the idealised proto-
col.
A7 A |≡ BC / ||R3|R4RNARNB – A believes that no one can see the information
within message 3 unless they posses kR′,2.
A8 A |≡ #(N1), A |≡ #(NA), A |≡ #(R3), A |≡ #(R4) – A generates fresh random
N1, NA, R3, R4 with each run of the protocol.
A9 A
kR,1
/ NBRN1 – A can see the information within message 2 only if using kR,1.
A10 A |≡ B |≡ BC / ||NB and B |≡ #(NB) – NB is generated by B and is a fresh
parameter each time when the protocol is executed.
A11 A |≡ sup(B) – B is super-principal w.r.t. NB.
A12 B |≡ AC / ||NBRN1 – B believes that no one can see the information within
message 2 unless they posses kR,1.
A13 B
kR,1
|∼ NBRN1 – B uses kR,1 to encrypt message 2 of the idealised protocol.
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A |≡ AkR,1↔B ∧ A
kR,1
/ NB
A |≡ B
kR,1
|∼ NB
(a)
A |≡ A
kR′,2↔ B ∧B
kR′,2
/ NA
B |≡ A
kR′,2
|∼ NA
(b)
Figure 3.12: Proof of authentication (a) B to A (b) A to B.
The authentication property of the initial run of the protocol can be verified using the
authentication rule as shown on Fig. 3.12. The authentication of B to A can be achieved
by the fact A |≡ B
kR,1
|∼ NB, i.e., A believes that B sent NB using kR,1 to encrypt the
message. As seen in Fig. 3.12, two facts imply authentication 1) A |≡ AkR,1↔B meaning
A believes that kR,1 is a good shared secret between A and B; 2) A
kR,1
/ NB ,i.e., A used
kR,1 as a decryption key to see NB. Following from the fact that the enrollment stage is
performed on a secure channel, both of these statements are part of the initial beliefs of
the protocol, hence, the authentication of B to A is directly established as shown on Fig.
3.12 a). The authentication of A to B is identical following from Fig. 3.12 b).
Next, follows the proof of secrecy for the parameter R3 (the proofs for secrecy of NA
and R4 are identical) which could be used as initial belief for the next run of the protocol.
First, by combining the confidentiality rule and two axioms from Table 3.1 one can derive
the following rule:
A |≡ B
k
|∼m ∧ A |≡ B |≡ A k↔B ∧ A |≡ B |≡ BC / ||m
A |≡ B |≡ {A ∪B}C / ||m
. (3.22)
Given that, the security proofs on Fig. 3.13 (a) and (b) show that both parties A and B
agree that R3 is a good shared secret (identically one can show the property holds for
R4). Given that and using the fuzzy extractor properties [157, 163] it can be concluded
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B|≡#(NB)∧B
kR′,2
/ R3RNB
B|≡#(R3)
∧B|≡A
kR′,2↔ B∧B
kR′,2
/ R3
B|≡A
kR′,2
|∼ R3
B|≡A|≡A
kR′,2↔ B
∧B|≡A|≡Ac/||R3∧B|≡A
kR′,2
|∼ R3
B|≡A|≡{B∪A}c/||R3
∧B|≡sup(A)
B|≡{B∪A}c/||R3
∧B|≡#(R3)
B|≡A
R3↔B
(a)
A|≡A
kR′,2↔ B∧A|≡Bc/||R3∧A
kR′,2
|∼ R3
A|≡{A∪B}c/||R3
∧A|≡#(R3)
A|≡A
R3↔B
(b)
Figure 3.13: Secrecy proofs: (a) B believes R3 is a good shared secret between A and B
(b) A believes R3 is a good shared secret between A and B
A|≡#(N1)∧A
kR,1
/ NBRN1
A|≡#(NB)
∧A|≡A
kR,1↔ B∧A
kR,1
/ NB
A|≡B
kR,1
|∼ NB
A|≡B|≡A
kR,1↔ B
∧A|≡B|≡Bc/||NB∧A|≡B
kR,1
|∼ NB
A|≡B|≡{A∪B}c/||NB
∧A|≡sup(B)
A|≡{A∪B}c/||NB
∧A|≡#(NB)
A|≡A
NB↔B
(a)
B|≡A
kR,1↔ B∧B|≡Ac/||NB∧B
kR,1
|∼ NB
B|≡{B∪A}c/||NB
∧B|≡#(NB)
B|≡A
NB↔B
(b)
Figure 3.14: Secrecy proofs: (a) A believes NB is a good shared secret between A and B
(b) B believes NB is a good shared secret between A and B
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1 theory PUF_protocol
2 begin
3 builtins: symmetric-encryption, hashing
4 functions: break1/1, break2/1, mac/2, vermac/3, true/0, fuzzyk/1,
5 fuzzyhd/1, rep/2, SKG/2, puf/1 [private]
6 equations: vermac(x.1, x.2, mac(x.1, x.2)) = true,
7 rep(puf(x.1), fuzzyhd(puf(x.2))) = fuzzyk(puf(x.2))
Figure 3.15: Example of protocol definition in Tamarin
that kR,3 and kR,4 are good shared keys between A and B. Next, Fig. 3.14 (a) and (b)
illustrates that A and B agree that NB is a good shared secret. As a consequence of the
above and by using the properties of universal hash functions [204] we can conclude that
AID,2 is also a good shared secret, as it is derived from a hash of (A||NB||R3).
Security Verification Using Tamarin-prover
The security properties of the authentication protocol given in Fig. 3.10 were verified
using the formal verification tool, Tamarin-prover. Tamarin was used to prove: secrecy
of parameters, aliveness, weak agreement, non-injective agreement, injective agreement,
untraceablity, and, anonymity. This section gives a model of the authentication protocol
using in Tamarin syntax. Next, it provides formal proofs for the security properties of the
protocol.
Protocol definition: As discussed in Appendix A a protocol definition within Tamarin
begins with calling built-in functions, defining new functions and equations. These are il-
lustrated in Fig. 3.15. The built-in functions used to define the protocol are symmetric-
encryption and hashing. Note, the notation f/2, defines function with arity 2.
By simply calling symmetric-encryption Tamarin defines the functions senc/2
and sdec/2 which are related through the equation sdec(senc(m,k),k)=m; call-
ing hashing defines the one-way hash function h/1. The manually defined functions
are as follows: break1/1, break2/1 used by the two parties to break their keys into
two parts as discussed in Section 3.4; mac, vermac and true are used to define the
MAC mechanism used throughout the protocol, these parameters are related through the
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1 rule Enrollment:
2 let
3 R_2=puf(˜C_2old)
4 in
5 [ Fr(˜K_R1), Fr(˜A_ID), Fr(˜C_2), Fr(˜C_2old)]
6 --[Once(),Secure(˜C_2),Secure(R_2),Secure(˜K_R1),Secure(˜A_ID)]->
7 [A0($A, $B, <˜K_R1, ˜A_ID>), B0($B, $A, <˜K_R1, ˜A_ID, ˜C_2, R_2>)]
Figure 3.16: Enrollment phase modelled in Tamarin
equation on line 6 in Fig. 3.15, which can be interpreted as:
vermac(kMAC,m,mac(kMAC,m)) = true. (3.23)
Next, fuzzyk/1 and fuzzyhd/1 define the fuzzy extractor Gen function, which for
the purpose of the definition here is divided into two functions, one for key generation
and one for helper data generation, respectively. The Rep FE function is defined as
rep/2. The SKG procedure is defined as skg/2. Next, the PUF at Alice is defined as
puf/1 [private], where the addition [private], defines that this function cannot
be executed by an adversary. Finally, the equation defined on line 7 can be interpreted as
follows:
Rep(R′1,hdR1) = kR1 (3.24)
Following from the above, the first rule that models the enrollment phase is given in Fig.
3.16; the premise (line 5) is used to define fresh random variables that correspond to
kR1, AID and C2. As the Tamarin functions produce identical outputs if using the same
input multiple times two challenges are defined within the premise. This is done to model
the measurement noise within the PUF, i.e., C 2old is used to produce R 2 which is
stored in the server database and C 2 will be used later to produce a noisy version of R 2.
Action facts Once and Secure will be used later to define that the enrollment phase is
performed only once and it is performed on a secure channel. Finally the conclusion (line
7) defines the states of Alice A0 and Bob B0 after the enrollment. The states are used to
define the knowledge of each party at the beginning and at the end of each rule.
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1 rule Init_A:
2 [ Fr(˜id), Fr(˜r_A), A0(A, B, <K_R1, A_ID>)]
3 --[ Initialise(A, ˜id), Role(’A’)]->
4 [ A1(A, B, <K_R1, A_ID, ˜r_A>), !KeyA(A, K_R1)]
5
6 rule Init_B:
7 [ Fr(˜id), Fr(˜r_B), B0(B, A, <K_R1, A_ID, C_2, R_2>)]
8 --[ Initialise(B, ˜id), Role(’B’)]->
9 [ B1(B, A, <K_R1, A_ID, C_2, R_2, ˜r_B>), !KeyB(B, <K_R1, R_2>)]
Figure 3.17: Link establishment between Alice and Bob in Tamarin
1 rule Compromise_Alice:
2 [!KeyA(A, K_R1)]
3 --[CompromiseA(A)]->
4 [Out(K_R1)]
5
6 rule Compromise_Bob:
7 [!KeyB(B, <K_R1, R_2>)]
8 --[CompromiseB(B)]->
9 [Out(<K_R1, R_2>)]
Figure 3.18: Defining compromising action in Tamarin
Next, the rules illustrated in Fig. 3.17 initialise the authentication protocol and define
the establishment of the link between the two parties. The premises of the two rules define:
1) a session ID, i.e., id; 2) using the properties of the wireless channel Alice and Bob
obtain bit sequences rA and rB, respectively; 3) the knowledge of states A0 and B0 are
imported within the two premises. The action facts Initialise and Role are used
to define authentication properties and to relate actions to their executant. Finally, the
conclusion of the two rules define the knowledge of Alice and Bob at this stage through
facts A1 and B1, respectively. Furthermore, the two facts !KeyA and !KeyBwill be used
to define a compromised agent, i.e., if Alice is compromised the attacker will obtain kR1;
if Bob is compromised the attacker will obtain kR1 and R2. The compromising action is
modelled using the rules in Fig. 3.18. As illustrated in the figure, whenever action fact
CompromiseA appears on the trace of the protocol, kR1 will be send in the network
(given by fact Out), and will become visible to the adversary. Similarly, whenever action
fact CompromiseB appears on the trace of the protocol, kR1 and R2 will be send in the
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1 rule Alice_sends1:
2 let
3 K_R11=break1(K_R1)
4 K_R12=break2(K_R1)
5 m_1=<A_ID,˜N_1>
6 in
7 [A1(A, B, <K_R1, A_ID, r_A>), Fr(˜N_1)]
8 --[A1_OUT(m_1), Role(’A’)]->
9 [Out(m_1), A2(A, B, <˜N_1, K_R11, K_R12, r_A>)]
10
11 rule Bob_receives_sends1:
12 let
13 K_R11=break1(K_R1)
14 K_R12=break2(K_R1)
15 m_1=<A_ID,N_1>
16 m_B=senc{B, C_2, ˜N_B, N_1}K_R11
17 in
18 [B1(B, A, <K_R1, A_ID, C_2, R_2, r_B>), In(m_1), Fr(˜N_B)]
19 --[SendB(B, m_B), B1_IN(N_1, m_1), B1_OUT(m_B),
20 Genuine(A), Genuine(B), Role(’B’), Involved(B, A, <’init’>)]->
21 [Out(<m_B, mac(K_R12,m_B)>), B2(B, A, <˜N_B, C_2, R_2, K_R11, r_B>)]
Figure 3.19: Message exchange between Alice and Bob in Tamarin. Alice sends authen-
tication request to Bob and he replies with a challenge.
network, and will become visible to the adversary. The two action factions are used later
to define security properties.
The two rules in Fig. 3.19 define the initial message exchange within the between
Alice and Bob, i.e., Alice sends a request to Bob and he replies with a challenge. The
premise of Alice sends1 rule calls the knowledge of the previous state using fact A1
and generates a fresh random nonce N 1. The lines between let - in are used to define
local formulas. In the first rule this is used to define that Alice breaks her key into two
parts (i.e., K R11, K R12), and her first message that contains AID and N1 is denoted by
m 1. Next, the action fact A1 OUT is used to relate subsequent rules through the, so called
source lemmas. It has a corresponding B1 IN fact in the Bob receives sends1 rule.
As mentioned earlier, Role facts are used throughout the protocol definition to identify
the agent responsible for the actions. Finally, in the conclusion of the rule Alice updates
her state to A2 and sends m 1 using the fact Out.
Next, the premise of the Bob receives sends1, calls Bob’s knowledge from state
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B1; models the receiving of message m 1 using In fact and generates the fresh random
nonce N B. Then, Bob breaks his key into two parts and use the first to encrypt the message
m B, defined within the let - in space. The action facts B1 OUT and Role are used
here for identical purposed as the action facts from the previous rule. The purpose of
action facts SendB, Genuine and Involved will be defined later, when used as part
of security properties. Finally, within the conclusion of the rule, Bob updates his state and
sends message m B to Alice, which contains B,C2, NS andN1 encrypted using key kR1,1.
He also sends the signed message denoted here as mac(K R12,m B). Both the message
and the signed message are sent using the Out fact within the conclusion of the rule.
The last two rules used to define the protocol are given in Fig. 3.20. Within, the
premise of the rule Alice receives sends2, 1) Alice calls the state A2; 2) receives
the message m B and the signed message; 3) generates a fresh random nonce N A; 4)
generates the syndrome s A that corresponds to r A. Note that, the action fact Eq denotes
equality, i.e., Alice uses this to verify the signature of the received message. Following
from that the rule models he following: Alice runs the received challenge C2 on her PUF,
uses her FE to generate helper data (line 4) and key (line 5); generates the new challenges
and corresponding responses R3 (line 6) and R4 (line 7); breaks her key into two parts
(lines 8− 9); generates the her new one time alias identity (line 10); encrypts the message
m A using the first part of the key (line 11); and generates the session key (line 12). Finally,
within the conclusion of the rule, she sends to Bob the message m A, the signed message
denoted as mac(KR 22e, m A) and the helper data hd 2e. She also updates her state
to A3 which now contains the session key. Similarly to the previous rules, some of the
action facts are used relate consequent rules (line 15). The purpose of the other action
facts will be defined later.
The premise of the last rule of the protocol definition Bob receives2 calls Bob’s
state B2 and models the receiving of the message, the signed message and the helper
data from Alice (using In fact). Within the let - in space Bob uses his FE, the
stored response during the enrollment R 2 and the received helper data to reproduce the
key KR 2e (line 23); next he breaks the key into two parts (line 24 − 25); uses the first
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1 rule Alice_receives_sends2:
2 let
3 m_B=senc{B, C_2, N_B, N_1}K_R11
4 hd_2e=fuzzyhd(puf(C_2))
5 KR_2e=fuzzyk(puf(C_2))
6 R_3=puf(h(<C_2,˜N_A>))
7 R_4=puf(h(<h(<C_2,˜N_A>),N_B>))
8 KR_21e=break1(KR_2e)
9 KR_22e=break2(KR_2e)
10 A_ID_new=h(<A, N_B, R_3>)
11 m_A=senc{A, ˜s_A, ˜N_A, R_3, R_4}KR_21e
12 sess_key=h(r_A)
13 in
14 [A2(A, B, <N_1, K_R11, K_R12, r_A>), In(<m_B,sig>), Fr(˜N_A), Fr(˜s_A)]
15 --[ReceiveA(A,m_B), A1_IN(N_B,m_B), SendA(A, m_A), A2_OUT(m_A),
16 Secret(sess_key), Genuine(A), Genuine(B), Commit(A, B, <’init’>),
17 Role(’A’), Involved(A, B, <’resp’>), Eq(vermac(K_R12,m_B,sig),true),
18 AuthenticB(B, m_B)]->
19 [Out(<m_A, mac(KR_22e, m_A), hd_2e>), A3(A, sess_key)]
20
21 rule Bob_receives2:
22 let
23 KR_2e=rep(R_2, hd_2e)
24 KR_21e=break1(KR_2e)
25 KR_22e=break2(KR_2e)
26 A_ID_new=h(<A, N_B, R_3>)
27 m_A=senc{A,s_A,N_A, R_3, R_4}KR_21e
28 r_A=SKG(s_A, r_B)
29 sess_key=h(r_A)
30 in
31 [B2(B, A, <N_B, C_2, R_2, K_R11, r_B>), In(<m_A, sigm_A, hd_2e>)]
32 --[B2_IN(N_A, m_A), ReceiveB(B,m_A), Secret(sess_key), Genuine(B),
33 Genuine(A), Role(’B’), Eq(vermac(KR_22e,m_A,sigm_A),true),
34 Commit(B, A, <’resp’>), AuthenticA(A, m_A)]->
35 [B3(B, sess_key)]
Figure 3.20: Message exchange between Alice and Bob in Tamarin. Alice receives the
challenge from Bob and sends MA in response.
part to decrypt the message from Alice (line 26) and the second the verify the signature
(using action fact Eq); then using received syndrome s A and the generated sequence
r B he performs the skg procedure to obtain the session key (line 29). Finally, within the
conclusion of the rule Bob updates his knowledge to B3 which now includes the session
key. This concludes the protocol definition.
Restrictions: Before introducing the security properties, a set of restrictions are de-
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1 restriction Equality:
2 "All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @i ==> x = y"
3
4 restriction Enrollment_is_performed_once:
5 "All #i #j. Once( ) @ i & Once( ) @ j ==> #i = #j"
6
7 restriction Enrollment_is_secure:
8 "not(Ex m #i #j. Secure(m) @ #i & K(m) @ #j)"
Figure 3.21: Restrictions within the protocol definition.
1 lemma executable: exists-trace
2 "Ex A B m #i #j.
3 SendA(A,m) @i & ReceiveB(B,m) @j & i < j"
Figure 3.22: Lemma used to prove executability property of the protocol definition.
fined in Fig. 3.21. The restriction Equality defines that, if an action fact Eq(x,y)
appears on the trace of the protocol, it implies x = y. This action fact is used to ver-
ify the signatures of Alice and Bob within the protocol definition. The restriction En-
rollment is performed once defines that if the action fact Once( ) appears on
the trace at moments i and j, follows that i = j. Usually, in Tamarin, the adversary
can execute each rule unlimited number of times, taking different roles each execution.
Therefore, by adding this restriction, the rule which contains the fact Once( ) can be
executed only once, which here is the Enrollment rule. Finally, the restriction En-
rollment is secure defines that, each parameter within the action fact Secure is
secret of the adversary. This fact is used within the Enrollment rule and it defines that
the parameters exchanged during the enrollment phase are secret from the adversary.
Security properties: The following defines the set of security properties used to ver-
ify the proposed protocol.
Executability: As discussed in Appendix A security properties are modelled as lem-
mas. Therefore, to ensure executability property of the defined protocol, this section
begins with a sanity check of the model. The lemma used to prove the executability of the
defined model is given in Fig. 3.22. The lemma contains the keyword exists-trace
defining that, it might not hold for all traces, however, it returns a true statement if possible
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in just one or few traces. The lemma contains the action facts SendA and ReceiveB,
which are part of the last two rules, illustrated in Fig. 3.20. It can be interpreted as fol-
lows: there exists a trace such that Alice sends a message at time instant i, Bob receives
it at time instant j, such that i happens before j. The proof of the lemma is given in 3.23,
note, in the final, printed thesis, this diagram will be printed as a fold out A3 sheet.
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Figure 3.23: Proof for executability of the protocol definition.
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1 lemma aliveness:
2 "All A B t #i.
3 Commit(A,B,t)@i
4 ==> (Ex id #j. Initialise(B,id) @ j)
5 | (Ex C #r. CompromiseA(C) @ r & Genuine(C) @ i)"
Figure 3.24: Lemma used to prove aliveness property of the protocol definition.
1 lemma weak_agreement:
2 "All A B t1 #i.
3 Commit(A,B,t1) @i
4 ==> (Ex t2 #j. Involved(B,A,t2) @j)
5 | (Ex C #r. CompromiseB(C) @ r & Genuine(C) @ i)
6 | (Ex C #r1. CompromiseA(C) @ r1 & Genuine(C) @ i)"
Figure 3.25: Lemma used to prove weak agreement between Alice and Bob within the
protocol definition.
Authentication: The authentication specifications are modelled using the hierarchy
defined in [205]. The hierarchy of the specifications from the weakest to the strongest is:
aliveness, weak agreement, non-injective agreement, injective agreement.
Aliveness
A protocol guarantees to the initiating partyA aliveness of another partyB if,A completes
a run of the protocol apparently with B, then B has previously completed a run of the
protocol, but not necessarily with A. The property is modelled as in Fig. 3.24.
Weak agreement
A protocol guarantees to the initiating party A weak agreement with a responding party
B if, whenever A completes a run of the protocol apparently with B, therefore, B has
previously completed a run of the protocol, apparently with A. However, B may not been
acting as a responder. This property is modelled as illustrated in Fig. 3.25. It can be
interpreted as follows: For the initiating party A, denoted by action fact Commit, there
exists a responding party B, denoted by action fact Involved or someone who claims
to be a genuine party (either Alice or Bob) has been compromised.
Non-injective agreement
A protocol guarantees to A a non-injective agreement with B on a message t if, whenever
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1 lemma non_injective_agreement:
2 "All A B t #i.
3 Commit(A,B,t) @i
4 ==> (Ex #j. Involved(B,A,t) @j)
5 | (Ex C #r. CompromiseB(C) @ r & Genuine(C) @ i)
6 | (Ex C #r. CompromiseA(C) @ r & Genuine(C) @ i)"
Figure 3.26: Lemma used to prove non-injective agreement between Alice and Bob within
the protocol definition.
1 lemma injective_agreement:
2 "All A B t #i.
3 Commit(A,B,t) @i
4 ==> (Ex #j. Involved(B,A,t) @j
5 & j < i
6 & not (Ex A2 B2 #i2. Commit(A2,B2,t) @i2
7 & not(#i2 = #i)))
8 | (Ex C #r. CompromiseB(C)@r & Genuine(C) @i)
9 | (Ex C #r. CompromiseA(C)@r & Genuine(C) @i)"
Figure 3.27: Lemma used to prove injective agreement between Alice and Bob within the
protocol definition.
A completes a run of the protocol apparently with B (who has a defined role), therefore,
B has previously completed a run of the protocol, apparently with A and was acting in
the defined role and the parties agreed on message t. However, the property does not
guarantee full relation between the runs of protocols by A and B, i.e., A may think that
he ran the protocol twice, but B was involved only in one run. This property is modelled
in Fig. 3.26.
Injective agreement
Finally, a protocol guarantees to A an injective agreement with B on a message t if,
whenever A completes a run of the protocol apparently with B (who has a defined role),
therefore, B has previously completed a run of the protocol, apparently with A and was
acting in the defined role and the parties agreed on message t. Furthermore, there is a
unique matching partner for each run of the protocol, i.e., for each Commit by a party,
there is a corresponding and unique Involved by the other party. This addition guaran-
tees there is freshness with each run of the protocol, used to prevent replay attacks. The
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1 lemma message_authentication_m_A:
2 "All a m #i.
3 AuthenticA(a,m) @i
4 ==> (Ex #j. SendA(a,m) @j & j<i)
5 | (Ex B #r. CompromiseB(B)@r & Genuine(B) @i & r < i)"
6
7 lemma message_authentication_m_S:
8 "All b m #i.
9 AuthenticB(b,m) @i
10 ==> (Ex #j. SendB(b,m) @j & j<i)
11 | (Ex B #r. CompromiseA(B)@r & Genuine(B) @i & r < i)
12 | (Ex B #r. CompromiseB(B)@r & Genuine(B) @i & r < i)"
Figure 3.28: Lemmas used to prove message authentication of MA and MS , respectively.
injective agreement property is modelled in Fig. 3.27.
Message authentication The two lemmas in Fig. 3.28 are used to prove the authentic-
ity of the signed messages from Alice and Bob, i.e., MA and MS , respectively. The first
lemma can be interpreted as follows: There exist a time instants j and i such that Alice
sends the message to Bob at i and she is still authentic user after that at time j (i.e., j<i,
or Bob has been compromised. This results from PUF unclonability property and that
fact that, if Alice is compromised the adversary will obtain only the key used to sign the
first MS and not MA. However, if Bob is compromised the adversary will first obtain R2
and then the key used to sign MA. On the other hand, the authenticity of MS , proved by
message authentication m S, requires that none of the parties is compromised.
Privacy properties: The term privacy combines set of properties: while security pro-
vides soundness, privacy provides protection against unauthorised access or linking iden-
tities [206]. Privacy properties are: anonymity and untraceability. The former ensures
that an adversary cannot determine which user is involved within a run of a protocol;
the latter ensures that an adversary cannot determine whether the same user is involved
into two separate authentication sessions [207]. Privacy is a vital feature for numerous
applications, such as healthcare [208], anonymous conferences [209], e-voting [210], e-
cash [211].
In Tamarin both properties are modelled using observation equivalence. Observa-
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tion equivalence assumes two systems (i.e., two instances of the protocol) and it is used
to prove that an adversary cannot distinguish the systems. This can be specified using
the operator diff by simply adding it to the preferred rules. To build the two sys-
tems the following is added to the rule Alice receives sends2 defined in Fig.
3.20: 1) in the premise a new fresh random variable Random variable is gener-
ated 2) Out(diff(A ID new, Random variable) 3) the rules for compromising
an agent (i.e., 3.18) are removed from the protocol definition. Following the above, during
the first run of the protocol the left parameter A ID new will be send out, then during the
second run of the protocol the right parameter Random variable will be sent out. If
an adversary can distinguish the new one-time alias ID of Alice from a random variable
it implies that privacy is not satisfied.
Figure 3.29 shows that, the privacy of Alice is preserved unless one of the parties
is compromised. As shown in the figure, regardless of which parameter the adversary
observes the final result is equality, i.e., cannot be distinguished. Therefore, the proposed
protocol satisfies the privacy properties.
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Figure 3.29: Proof for observational equivalence: TOP: Using left parameter; BOTTOM:
using the right parameter.
Secrecy properties: Due to the fact that the secrecy of most of the parameters was
proved using MB logic, Tamarin is used here to prove perfect forward secrecy of the pro-
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1 lemma PFS_session_key_Alice:
2 "All x #i.
3 Secret(x) @i & Role(’A’) @i==>
4 (not(Ex #j. K(x)@j)) "
5
6 lemma PFS_session_key_Bob:
7 "All x #i.
8 Secret(x) @i & Role(’B’) @i==>
9 (not(Ex #j. K(x)@j)) "
Figure 3.30: Lemmas used to prove perfect forward secrecy of the session key, from
Alice’s and Bob’s, perspective.
1 /* All well-formedness checks were successful. */
2 =======================================================================
3 summary of summaries:
4
5 aliveness (all-traces): verified (12 steps)
6 weak_agreement (all-traces): verified (29 steps)
7 noninjective_agreement (all-traces): verified (29 steps)
8 injective_agreement (all-traces): verified (65 steps)
9 message_authentication_m_S (all-traces): verified (8 steps)
10 message_authentication_m_A (all-traces): verified (58 steps)
11 PFS_session_key_Alice (all-traces): verified (8 steps)
12 PFS_session_key_Bob (all-traces): verified (14 steps)
13 types (all-traces): verified (33 steps)
14 executable (exists-trace): verified (11 steps)
Figure 3.31: Verification of all modelled properties.
tocol in regards to the session key. The lemmas used to prove this property are illustrated
in Fig. 3.30. Note that, each run of the protocol both parties generate a new session key
that is extracted from the randomness of the wireless channel. Therefore, the perfect for-
ward secrecy of the session key is preserved even if both parties get compromised by an
attacker.
Verification of all properties
This section concludes with the verification of all properties. This is illustrated in Fig.
3.31. As it can be seen all of the discussed properties of the protocol have been success-
fully verified.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of existing PUF-based solutions for authentication
Ref. Privacy
preserving
Location
factor
Correct noisy
PUF responses
Two authentica-
tion keys (two
parties)
Update CRPs:
not all stored in
a database
Session key
do not rely on
PRNG
[154, 169] No No No No Yes No
[216, 217] No No No No No No
[162, 218] Yes No Yes - FE No Yes No
[159, 219] Yes No Yes - reverse FE No Yes No
[153] Yes Yes No No Yes No
This thesis Yes Yes Yes - reverse FE Yes Yes Yes
3.6 Brief discussion
This work proposed a fast and lightweight authentication solution for resource constrained
systems. While, existing techniques used in IoT systems, such as the extensible au-
thentication protocol-transport layer security (EAP-TLS), could be used as an authen-
tication mechanism, these are computationally intensive and can lead to significant la-
tency [212,213]. Measurements performed on current public key operations within EAP-
TLS on common devices (such as IoT) give average authentication and key generation
times of approximately 160 ms in static environments and this can reach up to 336 ms in
high mobility conditions [214].
Therefore, the motivation for using a PUF authentication scheme in conjunction with
SKG is to exclude all of the computationally intensive operations required by EAP-TLS,
which use modulo arithmetic in large fields. In general, PUF authentication protocols
have very low computational overhead and require overall authentication times that can
be less than 10 ms [153,215]. However, the proposed PUF-based schemes in literature do
not provide a full solution (as illustrated in Table 3.2). Most of the protocols rely on PUFs
as a single security factor and this can expose the system to a variety of threats, especially
in an IoT scenario [128]. Therefore, combining two or more independent credentials is
essential. As an example, the work within this chapter combines PUFs, location factor
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and channel characteristics in order to built a secure multi-factor authentication proto-
col. Next, it can be seen that other existing schemes cited in Table 3.2 propose to reuse
the same authentication key in order to authenticate both parties. However, if the key
gets leaked the adversary could impersonate both Alice and Bob, therefore, the scheme
proposed within this chapter assumes that each party is authenticated through a unique
key. Finally, adding the key generation scheme, proposed in Section 2.2.1 and extended
in this thesis, obviates the need of using PRNG in the session key generation process.
Furthermore, the SKG implies a negligible penalty in terms of latency, as it requires just a
hashing operation and (syndrome) decoding. Hashing mechanisms such as SHA-256 per-
formed on an IoT device require less than 0.3ms [215, 220]. Regarding the decoding, if
it assumes the usage of standard LDPC or BCH error correcting mechanisms, even in the
worst-case scenario with calculations carried out as software operations, the computation
is trivial compared to the hashing and requires less computational overhead [221].
3.7 Summary
This chapter presented a full mutual authentication mechanism which can be used for
secure session establishment. The security properties of the proposed solution were vali-
dated proving its resistance to numerous types of attacks. Additionally, a novel resump-
tion protocol was developed that can allow for data transmission within 0-RTT. Finally,
a closed form expression of the information theoretic bound for SKG within short block-
length was derived, allowing for fair comparison of existing SKG mechanisms.
The novel ideas in regards to the SKG procedure within this chapter are mostly related
to expanding its applicability. Therefore, Chapter 4 will explore the SKG in more detail
and will optimise the process for the scenarios of a loose and stringent delay constrained
systems.
82
Chapter 4
Optimised key generation for
delay-constrained wireless systems
This chapter introduces a physical layer security mechanism that jointly optimises phys-
ical layer SKG and traditional encrypted data channel (using the key from SKG). The
solution gives optimal power and subcarrier allocation.
Part of this chapter was presented as an invited poster presentation at the “Munich Work-
shop on Coding and Cryptography (MWCC) 2018” [43]. Some of the results given
in this chapter were presented at the “The International Wireless Communications and
Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC 2019)” [13]. Further set of results from this
chapter were presented at the “IEEE Global Communications Conference (Globecom
2019)” [14]. Finally, after further improvements part of the work presented in this chap-
ter was published in the special issue “Physical Layer Security Solutions for 5G-and-
Beyond” within the “Springer EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Net-
working” [12].
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0-RTT
Chapter 3
AE SKG
Chapter 4
authentication
PUF
SKG allocation
Resource
Figure 4.1: Roadmap from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4.
4.1 Introduction
Building on the results presented in Chapter 3, this study focuses on optimising the SKG
process. As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, this chapter investigates a fast implementation of an au-
thenticated encryption (AE) SKG and proposes a pipelined (parallel) scheduling method
for optimal resource allocation at the PHY. The utilised AE primitive [222–224] jointly
optimises data rates and key generation rates. The motivation behind this approach is la-
tency reduction; data could be immediately transmitted whenever they become available,
which can be critical in latency sensitive applications such as V2X, URLLC and haptic
communication systems [225–227].
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
1. Proposal of a fast implementation of the AE SKG based on pipelining of key gen-
eration and encrypted data transfer.
2. Identifying the optimal resource allocation for the parallel approach in a three dif-
ferent scenarios:
• Under power and security constraints;
• Under power, security and rate constraints;
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• Under power, security, rate and delay constraints;
3. Proposal of a heuristic algorithm of linear complexity that finds the near-optimal
subcarrier allocation with negligible loss in terms of efficiency.
4. Numerical evaluation of the achievable sum data rate for short and long term power
constraints.
5. Numerical comparison of the efficiency of the proposed parallel approach with a
sequential approach where SKG and data transfer are performed sequentially. This
comparison is performed in two delay scenarios:
• When a relaxed quality of service (QoS) delay constraint is in place;
• When a stringent QoS delay constraint is in place.
Note that the work presented in this chapter assumes that Alice and Bob have authen-
ticated, e.g. by using the method introduced in Chapter 3. Following from the above
they can use the SKG solutions presented in this chapter as a rekeying technique. Next,
Chapter 5 will discuss the optimal strategies of Alice and Bob in the presence of an active
attacker who tries the interrupt the SKG process.
4.2 Respective background
4.2.1 Optimisation methods
A set of optimisation methods are used throughout the present chapter. These include:
convex optimisation and combinatorial optimisation (Knapsack problem).
Convex optimisation
Convex optimisation is a field in mathematics that studies minimisation (and maximisa-
tion) of convex (and concave) functions. The applicability of convex optimisation ranges
from finance and statistics [228] to communication systems and signal processing [229].
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Convex optimisation problem is a problem with convex (concave) objective function with
convex (concave) feasible set Scvx. In this regard, a function f defined on the set Scvx,
such that f : Scvx → R, is convex if:
f((1− λ)(x1) + λx2) ≤ (1− λ)f(x1) + λf(x2), (4.1)
and concave if:
f((1− λ)(x1) + λx2) ≥ (1− λ)f(x1) + λf(x2), (4.2)
where ∀x1, x2 ∈ Scvx and ∀λ ∈ [0, 1] [230]. Following from the above, a standard convex
optimisation problem can be defined as:
min
x
f0(x) (4.3)
subject to fconvex,i(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, . . . ,m, (4.4)
faffine,j(x) = 0 j = 1, . . . , n, (4.5)
where x ∈ R is the parameter of interest (optimisation variable), f0 is the objective func-
tion and fconvex, faffine represent the set of constraints. Note that functions f0 and fconvex, are
convex and satisfy Eq. (4.1), and functions faffine are affine. Overall, Eq. (4.3) defines the
problem of finding the value of x that minimises function f0, such that constraints (4.4),
(4.5) are satisfied (similarly, using a max argument one can optimise concave functions).
A well-known method used for solving convex optimisation problems is the Lagrange
multipliers method [231]. The Lagrangian function of the problem in Eq. (4.3) is formed
as:
Lx = f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifconvex,i(x) +
n∑
j=1
vjfaffine,j(x), (4.6)
where λi is called Lagrange multiplier and it is associated with the i-th fconvex,i(x) ≤
0 constraint; and vj is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the j-th faffine,j(x) = 0
constraint. Next, to identify the optimal solution of Eq. (4.3), which is denoted by x∗, the
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following set of conditions must be satisfied (also known as Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions [232, 233]):
1. Stationary condition - the gradient of (4.6) should vanish at x∗, i.e.,:
∇f0(x∗) +
m∑
i=1
λ∗i∇fconvex,i(x∗) +
n∑
j=1
v∗j∇faffine,j(x∗) = 0 (4.7)
2. Primal feasible condition at x∗:
fconvex,i(x
∗) ≤ 0 i = 1, . . . ,m, (4.8)
faffine,j(x
∗) = 0 j = 1, . . . , n. (4.9)
3. Dual feasible condition:
λ∗i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m (4.10)
4. Complementary slackness:
λ∗i fconvex,i(x
∗) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m (4.11)
The value x∗ that satisfies the above conditions minimisesLx over x. Furthermore, for any
convex optimisation problem that has a differentiable objective function and constraints,
all points that satisfy the KKT conditions are optimal [230]. Convex optimisation is used
as a tool in Chapter 4 to identify the optimal resource allocation policy of Alice and Bob
during the SKG process.
0 – 1 Knapsack optimisation
Knapsack problem is a problem defined within the premise of combinatorial optimisa-
tion [234]. Assuming a set of items, each with weight and value, by solving the problem
one can identify the optimal combination of items such that the sum of the weights is less
or equal than a specific threshold and the sum of the values is as high as possible [235].
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The 0 – 1 Knapsack problem follows the above description but also limits the copies of
each items to either zero or one. Assuming a set of items i = 1, . . . , n, a 0 – 1 Knapsack
problem can be formulated as follows:
max
xi∈{0,1}
n∑
i=1
vixi (4.12)
subject to
n∑
i=1
wixi ≤ Wth (4.13)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, (4.14)
where the subscript i denotes the specific item, xi denotes the number of copies of each
item, vi denotes the value of each item, wi denotes the weight of each item and Wth
defines the threshold that defines the maximum weight. The problem can be solved recur-
sively [235] by finding the maximum value of:
V [i, y] = max {V [i− 1, y], V [i− 1, y − wi] + vi} , y = 1, . . . ,W, (4.15)
where V [i, y] determines the profit of each combination of items, i = 1, . . . , n, and y =
1, . . . ,W is a positive integer. In the present chapter, 0 – 1 Knapsack optimisation is
used in the form of a subset-sum Knapsack problem where the weights and values of the
item are equal. In the particular problem the Knapsack items refer to a set of available
subcarriers and the solution gives optimal subcarrier allocation.
4.2.2 Effective capacity
One of the major requirements of an IoT application is to keep the delay below a certain
threshold, according to which the QoS guarantees should be satisfied. In this thesis a flex-
ible delay QoS model was employed using the theory of large deviations (Gärtner-Ellis
theorem [236,237]) that allows defining the metric of the effective capacity on block fad-
ing additive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channels. The theory of large deviations
and Gärtner-Ellis theorem are well established and widely employed mechanisms, espe-
88
4.2 RESPECTIVE BACKGROUND
cially in the context of effective bandwidth and effective capacity. Therefore, for more
details on these concepts the readers are referred to [236–239].
The effective capacity [240] denotes the maximum constant arrival rate that can be
served by a given service process, while guaranteeing a required statistical delay provi-
sioning and is closely related to the concept of the effective bandwidth [241, 242].
Theory of effective bandwidth considers that the distribution of the queue length
has an exponential tail. In fact, the effective bandwidth of a time-varying source is the
minimum amount of bandwidth required to satisfy specified QoS requirments, or it could
be represented as the source rate with which the packet loss rate decays exponentially.
Therefore, for an arrival process with variable rate one can use the Gartner-Ellis theorem
to characterise the probability that this source will behave like a constant rate source of
rate α for a time t (note, A(0, t) denotes the number of packets in t time instances), such
that, if:
Λ(θ) = lim
t→∞
1
t
lnE[eθA(0,t)], ∀θ ∈ R, (4.16)
exists and it is everywhere differentible then the effective bandwidth function is [241]:
a∗(θ) =
Λ(θ)
θ
. (4.17)
The effective bandwidth α∗, defines that the probability of the queue length exceeding a
certain threshold, θ, decays exponentially fast as θ increases. The parameter θ indicates
the exponential decay rate of the QoS violation probability. A smaller θ corresponds to
a slower decay rate, which implies that the system can only provide looser QoS (long
delay) and a higher θ, corresponds to a more stringent delay constraint.
The effective capacity is the dual function of the effective bandwidth. While, the ef-
fective bandwidth is the minimum constant service rate required by a given arrival process
for which θ is fulfilled, the effective capacity is the maximum constant arrival rate that a
given service process supports in order to guarantee θ [243–245]. Assuming the sequence
Ri, i = 1, 2, ..., N denotes a discrete-time stationary and ergodic stochastic service pro-
cess and C =
∑N
i=1Ri is a sum of the service process. Therefore, if the Gartner-Ellis
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limit of C expressed as:
ΛC(θ) = − lim
t→∞
1
θt
ln(E{e−θC}) ∀θ ∈ R, (4.18)
exists and is everywhere differentiable. Then the effective capacity of the service process,
denoted by EC(θ) is given by:
EC(θ) = −
ΛC(−θ)
θ
= − lim
t→∞
1
θt
ln(E{e−θC}). (4.19)
Note that, if Ri, i = 1, 2, ..., N are uncorrelated, the effective capacity EC(θ) reduces to:
EC(θ) = −
1
θ
ln(E{e−θRi}). (4.20)
As it can be seen above, similarly to the effective bandwidth, smaller θ implies looser QoS
guarantee and larger θ corresponds to stringent delay requirements. Note that, the theory
of effective capacity is based on the assumption of infinite buffer length, and therefore, it
could give only probabilistic guarantee on the achievable rates. However, it can provide a
good intuition on how a real system will behave given a specific delay constraint.
4.3 Employed methods and system model
Having now presented the necessary background material, the rest of this chapter proposes
a new technique for optimising AE SKG based on the combination of several methods.
These methods are described below where the novelty that each one brings to the overall
solution is identified. Finally, as in Chapter 3, the system model assumes a commonly
used adversarial model with an active man-in-the-middle attacker (Eve) and a pair of
legitimate users (Alice and Bob). Furthermore a rich Rayleigh multipath environment is
assumed, where the legitimate parties communicate over a BF-AWGN channel.
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Secret key generation
As in the previous chapter, to ensure privacy after authenticating each other, Alice and
Bob obtain a shared secret key following the three-step SKG procedure, described in
Section 2.2.1, i.e., i) advantage distillation; ii) information reconciliation; and, iii) privacy
amplification. Next, both parties encrypt / decrypt the exchanged information using the
shared secret key. The novelty in regards to this method is the combination of the second
phase of the SKG process (information reconciliation) with data exchange.
Authenticated encryption SKG
To eliminate the possibility of tampering attacks this work builds on the SKG process
to introduce a new AE SKG method. AE can simultaneously guarantee confidentiality
and message integrity. In the proposed AE SKG method, side information and encrypted
data transfer are pipelined. Throughout this work this is referred the parallel transmission
method, described in further detail in the next item. This is a novel AE approach entirely
based on the physical layer SKG process.
Pipelined transmission
Unlike traditional sequential methods, where key generation and data exchange are sep-
arated in subsequent frames, in the proposed parallel method, the key generation is
pipelined with the encrypted data transfer, i.e., side information and data encrypted with
the key that corresponds to the side information are transmitted over the same 5G resource
block(s) (i.e., in (multiple) frames of 12 OFDM subcarriers, some of the subcarriers are
used for data transmission and the others to transmit the side information.) The proposed
mechanism achieves optimal power and subcarrier allocation within each frame, in cer-
tain scenarios this is a modified water-filling solution. This is an innovative technique
that improves the performance of wireless networks – the work is supported by numerical
evaluation.
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Joint PHY/MAC delay analysis
To analyse the performance of the proposed parallel scheduling two methods are used:
i) maximisation of the long-term average data rate between Alice and Bob when delay
requirements are not specified; ii) maximisation of the effective data rate between Alice
and Bob while meeting a probabilistic delay constraint. The latter is based on the theory
of effective capacity [240] and analyses the scheme’s effective rate. This allows to identify
the optimal resource allocation while satisfying a delay-outage probability constraint.
Optimisation methods
Finally, to optimise the pipelined transmission, this study takes into consideration prac-
tical wireless aspects such as the impact of imperfect CSI measurements and formulate
several optimisation problems to find the optimal strategy for Alice and Bob. To formulate
and solve the optimisation problem set of techniques are employed, such as, combinato-
rial optimisation (Knapsack), order statistics and convex optimisation. The study does not
look into improving these methods, instead it uses them as a tool to identify the optimal
solution.
The PHY system model, depicted in Fig. 4.2, assumes two legitimate parties, referred
to as Alice and Bob, who wish to establish a symmetric secret key using as a source of
shared randomness the wireless fading coefficients. Throughout this work a rich Rayleigh
multipath environment is assumed, such that the fading coefficients rapidly decorrelate
over short distances [37]. Furthermore, Alice and Bob communicate over a BF-AWGN
channel that comprises N orthogonal blocks (e.g., in the frequency domain), which, for
simplicity, will be referred to as subcarriers. Without loss of generality the model assumes
a unit AWGN variance in all links. The fading coefficients, denoted by hj, j = 1, . . . , N ,
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) zero-mean circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables hj ∼ CN (0, σ2h), such that after the pilot
exchange Alice and Bob obtain observations xA,j, xB,j , respectively, on the j-th subcarrier
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Figure 4.2: Secret key generation between Alice and Bob.
that can be expressed as:
xA,j =
√
Phj + zA,j, (4.21)
xB,j =
√
Phj + zB,j, (4.22)
j = 1, . . . , N , where zA,j, zB,j denote zero-mean, unit variance circularly-symmetric
complex AWGN random variables, (zA,j, zB,j) ∼ CN (0, I2), and
√
P denotes the trans-
mit power during the pilot exchange.
Note, irrespective of whether SKG or data transfer is performed, Alice and Bob need
to exchange pilot signals to obtain estimates of their reciprocal CSI. These CSI estimates
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can be subsequently used to either conduct the secret key generation or be used to opti-
mally allocate the available power to maximise the data transfer rate using a waterfilling
algorithm. In further detail, after obtaining the channel observations, if SKG is to be per-
formed on a specific subcarrier, then it is necessary for Alice (or Bob) to further transmit
side information as part of the “information reconciliation” phase; e.g., the syndrome (sA
in Fig. 4.2) of the Slepian-Wolf decoder output if block codes are used. Note that, as
discussed in Section 2.2.1, the final step of the SKG process – privacy amplification – in
which a common key is extracted at both Alice and Bob is performed locally without any
further information exchange. If on the other hand, a given subcarrier is chosen for data
transfer, then the estimated CSI will be used to optimise the power allocation. Bearing
this in mind, this study assumes an initial authentication and SKG are performed (e.g.
by using the method presented in Chapter 3) to generate the first keys to be used for the
encryption of the first set of data.
Under the system model in Fig. 4.2, the SKG rate on any subcarrier is (note that the
noise variances are here normalised to unity for simplicity) [37, 74]:
RSKG,j = log2
(
1 +
Pσ2
2 + 1
Pσ2
)
, (4.23)
while the corresponding minimum necessary reconciliation rate has been show to be
H(hB,j|hA,j) [36]. The following sections will focus on optimising the allocation of re-
sources (frequency and power) in multicarrier systems in which keys are generated at the
physical layer.
4.4 Authenticated encryption protocols using SKG
To develop robust protocols that can withstand tampering attacks, standard symmetric
key block ciphers and message authentication (MAC) schemes can be used in conjunc-
tion with SKG. As a sketch of such a protocol, let us assume a system with three parties:
Alice and Bob, who wish to exchange messages with confidentiality and integrity, and
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Figure 4.3: Pipelined SKG and encrypted data transfer between Alice and Bob.
Eve, that can act as a passive and active attacker. Alice wishes to transmit over a wireless
multipath channel a secret message m with size |m| to Bob. The following algorithms
are employed: the SKG scheme, a symmetric encryption algorithm denoted by Es with
corresponding decryption Ds and a MAC denoted by Sign with a corresponding verifi-
cation algorithm Ver. Using the above, a hybrid crypto-PLS system for AE SKG can be
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built as follows:
1. The SKG procedure is launched between Alice and Bob generating a key and a
syndrome G(h)=(k, sA).
2. Alice breaks her key into two parts k = {ke,ki} and uses the first to encrypt the
message as c = Es(ke,m). Subsequently, using the second part of the key she
signs the ciphertext using the signing algorithm t = Sign(ki, c) and transmits to
Bob the extended ciphertext [sA‖c‖t], as it is depicted in Fig. 4.3.
3. Bob checks first the integrity of the received ciphertext as follows: from sA and
his own observation he evaluates k = {ke,ki} and computes Ver(ki, c, t). The
integrity test will fail if any part of the extended ciphertext was modified, including
the syndrome (that is sent as plaintext); for example, if the syndrome was modified
during the transmission, then Bob would not have evaluated the correct key and the
integrity test would have failed.
4. If the integrity test is successful then Bob decrypts m=Ds(ke, c).
The following, will focus on multicarrier systems in which keys are generated at the
physical layer and used in authentication/encryption protocols at upper layers as described
above.
4.5 Pipelined SKG and encrypted data transfer
As explained in Section 4.3, if Alice and Bob follow the standard sequential SKG process
they can exchange encrypted data only after both of them have distilled the key at the end
of the privacy amplification step. This section proposes a method to pipeline the SKG and
encrypted data transfer. Alice can unilaterally extract the secret key from her observation
and use it to encrypt data transmitted in the same “extended” message that contains the
side information (see Fig. 4.3). Subsequently, using the side information, Bob can distill
the same key k and decrypt the received data in one single step.
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Section 2.2.1 discussed how Alice and Bob can distill secret keys from estimates of
the fading coefficients in their wireless link and Section 4.4 showed how these can be
used to develop an AE SKG primitive. At the same time CSI estimates are a prerequisite
in order to optimally allocate power across the subcarriers and achieve high data rates1.
As a result, a question that naturally arises is whether the CSI estimates (obtained at the
end of the pilot exchange phase), should be used towards the generation of secret keys or
towards the reliable data transfer, and, furthermore, whether the SKG and the data transfer
can be inter-woven using the AE SKG principle.
This study is interested in answering this question and shed light into whether follow-
ing the exchange of pilots Alice should transmit reconciliation information on all sub-
carriers, so that she and Bob can generate (potentially) a long sequence of key bits, or,
alternatively, perform information reconciliation only over a subset of the subcarriers and
transmit encrypted data over the rest, exploiting the idea of the AE SKG primitive. Note
here that the data can be already encrypted with the key generated at Alice, the sender
of the side information, so that the proposed pipelining does not require storing keys for
future use. The former approach is denoted as a sequential scheme, while the latter is
referred to as a parallel scheme. The two will be compared in terms of their efficiency
with respect to the achievable data rates.
As discussed in Section 4.3, the assumed physical layer system model consists of
Alice and Bob who exchange data over a Rayleigh BF-AWGN channel withN orthogonal
subcarriers. Without loss of generality the variance of the AWGN in all links is assumed
to be unity. During channel probing, constant pilots are sent across all subcarriers [37,74]
with power P . Using the observations (4.21), Alice estimates the channel coefficients as
ĥj = hj + h̃j, (4.24)
for j = 1, . . . , N where h̃j denotes an estimation error that can be assumed to be Gaus-
1As an example, despite the extra overhead in URLLC systems, advanced CSI estimation techniques are
employed in order to be able to satisfy the strict reliability requirements [246, 247].
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sian, h̃j ∼ CN (0, σ2e) [248]. Under this model, the following rate is achievable on the
j-th subcarrier from Alice to Bob when the transmit power during data transmission is
pj [248]:
Rj = log2
Ç
1 +
gjpj
σ2eP + 1
å
= log2(1 + ĝjpj), (4.25)
where gj = |hj|2 and ĝi = gjσ2j,eP+1 , to denote the estimated channel gains. The metric, Rj ,
measures the average rate on the subcarriers devoted to data transmission assuming Shan-
non’s capacity is achievable. This measure is the maximal achievable rate for a specified
maximal error probability while assuming infinite code-word length [249, 250]. This is a
very optimistic assumption since no code-word can be designed to ensure that. An alter-
native measures are the outage capacity and the rate for finite block lengths. The former
is defined as the achievable rate of transmission under a given error probability [251,252],
and the latter defines the achievable rates taking into account factors such as code-word
size, probability of error and channel dispersion [253, 254]. Overall, outage capacity and
achievable rate for finite block lengths gives a more accurate solution, and therefore, must
be considered in practical implementations. However, for the purpose of the present thesis
Shannon’s capacity is used as an indicative metric. Although this is an optimistic mea-
sure for the achievable rates, it reflects the overall performance based on different system
parameters. As a result, the channel capacity is defined as C =
∑N
j=1Rj under the short
term power constraint:
N∑
j=1
pj ≤ NP, pj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (4.26)
is achieved with the well known waterfilling power allocation policy pj =
[
1
λ
− 1
ĝj
]+
,
where the water-level λ is estimated from the constraint (4.26). In the following, the esti-
mated channel gains ĝj are – without loss of generality – assumed ordered in descending
order, so that:
ĝ1 ≥ ĝ2 ≥ . . . ≥ ĝN . (4.27)
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Figure 4.4: Parallel approach
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the advantage distillation phase of the SKG process
consists of the two-way exchange of pilot signals during the coherence time of the chan-
nel. On the other hand, the CSI estimation phase can be used to estimate the reciprocal
channel gains in order to optimise data transmission using the waterfilling algorithm. In
the former case, the shared parameter is used for generating symmetric keys, in the latter
for deriving the optimal power allocation. In the parallel approach the idea is to inter-
weave the two procedures and investigate whether a joint encrypted data transfer and
key generation scheme as in the AE SKG in Section 4.4 could bear any advantages with
respect to the system efficiency. While in the sequential approach the CSI across all sub-
carriers will be treated as a source of shared randomness between Alice and Bob, in the
parallel approach it plays a dual role.
4.5.1 Parallel approach
In the parallel approach, after the channel estimation phase, the legitimate users decide
on which subcarrier to send the reconciliation information (e.g., the syndromes) and on
which data (i.e., the SKG process here is not performed on all of the subcarriers). This
approach is illustrated in Fig. 4.4. The total capacity has now to be distributed between
data and reconciliation information bearing subcarriers. As a result, the overall set of
orthogonal subcarriers comprises two subsets; a subset D that is used for encrypted data
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transmission with cardinality |D| = D and a subset D̆ with cardinality |D̆| = N − D
used for reconciliation such that, D ∪ D̆ = {1, . . . , N}. Over D the achievable sum data
transfer rate, denoted by CD is given by
CD =
∑
j∈D
log2(1 + ĝjpj), (4.28)
while on the subset D̆, Alice and Bob exchange reconciliation information. As stated
in Section 4.3 the fading coefficients are assumed to be zero-mean circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables.
Following from the above, the SKG rate can be expressed as [37, 74]:
CSKG =
∑
j∈D̆
RSKG,j =
∑
j∈D̆
log2
Ñ
1 +
Pjσ
2
2 + 1
Pjσ2
é
. (4.29)
Finally, the efficiency of the proposed parallel method – measured as the ratio of the
long-term data rate versus the average capacity – is evaluated as:
ηparallel =
E [CD]
E[C]
. (4.30)
This efficiency quantifies the expected back-off in terms of data rates when part of the
resources (power and frequency) are used to enable the generation of secret keys at the
physical layer.
4.5.2 Sequential approach
In the sequential approach encrypted data transfer and secret key generation are two sep-
arate events; first, the secret keys are generated over the whole set of subcarriers, leading
to a sum SKG rate given as
CSKG = NRSKG = N log2
(
1 +
Pσ2
2 + 1
Pσ2
)
. (4.31)
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Figure 4.5: Sequential approach
This is illustrated in Fig. 4.5. To estimate the efficiency of the scheme, the necessary
resources for the exchange of the reconciliation information need to be identified. An
estimate of the number of transmission frames that will be required for the transmission
of the syndromes can be obtained as the expected value of the reconciliation rate (i.e., it’s
long-term value). For example, in Fig. 4.5 this is only frame 1, however, depending on
the scenario more frames might be needed to establish a long enough key. Therefore, the
the efficiency of the sequential method is then calculated as:
ηsequential =
L
L+M
, (4.32)
where M denotes the average number of frames needed for reconciliation and L denotes
the average number of frames with encrypted data before a new key establishment needs
to take place. Both of this parameters will be precisely defined later in this chapter.
4.6 Optimal power and subcarrier allocation
This section will identify the optimal power and subcarrier allocation for Alice and Bob
under three different scenarios. The study begins with a simplified version of the opti-
misation problem. This initial version assumes power and security constraints, where the
reconciliation rate is roughly approximated to the SKG rate [13]. After solving this sim-
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plified problem, a more realistic scenario was investigated where the rate of transmitting
reconciliation information is explicitly accounted and differentiated from the SKG rate.
Finally, this study was extended by taking into account delay requirements. In detail, it
investigates the optimal resource allocation for Alice and Bob, when their communication
has to satisfy specific delay constraints.
4.6.1 Optimal allocation under security and power constraints
The study within this section evaluates only the performance of the parallel approach.
Once having a good understanding of the problem, the parallel approach will be compared
to the sequential in the next sections.
As discussed in Section 4.5.1 the achievable sum rates for data transfer and SKG
are denoted by CD and CSKG, respectively, where data is transferred over the subset of
subcarriers D and keys are generated over the subset D̆. Depending on the exact choices
of the cryptographic suites to be employed, it is possible to reuse the same key for the
encryption of multiple blocks of data, e.g., as in the AES Galois/Counter Mode, that is
being considered for employment in the security protocols for URLLC systems [21]. In
practical systems, a single key of length 128 to 256 bits can be used to encrypt up to
gigabytes of data. As a result, a realistic assumption is that for a particular application it
is possible to identify the ratio of key to data bits, which in the following we will denote
by β. As noted, in practical systems, this ratio might reach values in the order of 10−5, i.e.,
a single key of length of 256 bits could be used to encrypt large amount of data. On the
other hand, some applications which require higher level of security will apply a higher
value for β, i.e., secret keys will be updated more often. In fact, the case β = 1 would
correspond to a one-time-pad, i.e., the generated keys could be simply x-ored with the
data to achieve perfect secrecy without the need of any cryptographic suites. Therefore,
the following security constraint should be met
CSKG ≥ βCD, 0 < β ≤ 1, (4.33)
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where, depending on the application, the necessary minimum value of β can be identified.
Following from the above, the initial problem discussed in this chapter finds the op-
timal trade-off between data transmission and SKG in terms of subcarrier allocation and
power allocation, under the short-term power constraint (4.26). To this end, the following
optimisation problem is formulated:
max
pi,i∈D
∑
i∈D
log2(1 + ĝipi), s.t. (4.26) and (4.33). (4.34)
To solve the problem, the optimisation methods described in Section 4.2.1 are used. In
fact i) the optimal power allocation is calculated through convex optimisation, based on
the Lagrangian approach; ii) the optimal subcarrier allocation is identified numerically
through MATLAB simulation using a dynamic programming approach, in the form of
Knapsack optimisation. Further details regarding the formulation of these problems are
given later in this chapter. First, the following two Lemmas are stated.
Lemma 4.1. In order to maximise CD the strongest D subcarriers – in terms of SNR –
are used for data transmission and the rest, N −D, for SKG.
Proof. Assume that D∗ is the subset of subcarriers indices which maximises CD and
Dord = {1, 2, . . . , D} the subset of the first D ordered subcarrier indices. Then, after
fixing a subcarrier power level pd > 0, ∀ d ∈ D∗ with d /∈ Dord it follows that a better
index exists, i.e., ∃ d′ ∈ Dord with d′ /∈ D∗, s.t.,
log2(1 + ĝdpd) < log2(1 + ĝd′pd). (4.35)
As a consequence of Bellman’s principle [255] the optimal sum rate in (4.34) has to
consist of optimal subcarrier rates, (4.35) contradicts this fact and hence, D∗ = Dord =
{1, 2, . . . , D}. 
Consequently, the following fact is used in later derivations
D∗ = {1, 2, . . . , D}. (4.36)
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The optimality of this approach, i.e., choosing the worst subcarriers for SKG and best for
data transmission is confirmed through MATLAB simulation using the dynamic program-
ming approach, described in Sec. 4.2.1 in the form of 0-1 Knapsack optimisation. The
problem is formulated as in Eq. (4.12) and (4.13) where vi = wi denote the achievable
rate of the i-th subcarrier and Wi is chosen such that constraint (4.33) is satisfied. The
problem is solved using the iterative approach given in Eq. 4.15. Numerical results on the
achievable versus different values of β and different subcarrier allocation are presented
later in this chapter.
The next question is: how the available power for SKG should be used? We first
assume that the overall power expended for SKG can be expressed as
Ps = (N −D)ps, (4.37)
where ps denotes the average SKG power and Ps the overall SKG power. Given (4.37),
and by taking the first and the second derivative of RSKG(ps), it is straightforward to see
it is a monotonic function in ps and it is convex if ps < 1√2σ2 and concave if ps >
1√
2σ2
.
Lemma 4.2. If ps > 1√2σ2 the set D̆ comprises the weakest N −D subcarriers – in terms
of SNR – and the power allocation is equal on all of them, so that:
CSKG = (N −D) log2
Ñ
1 +
psσ
2
2 + 1
psσ2
é
. (4.38)
Consequently the overall power allocation vector takes the form:
p = {p1, p2, . . . , pD, ps, ps, . . . , ps}, (4.39)
where the number of elements equal to ps is N −D.
If ps < 1√2σ2 the set D̆ consists of a single subcarrier on which the full power available
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for SKG is allocated, so that:
CSKG = log2
(
1 +
Psσ
2
2 + 1
Psσ2
)
. (4.40)
Proof. Note that when multiple subcarriers are to be used the power should be equally
distributed to them. To prove this the definition of a concave function is applied together
with Jensen’s inequality [256], [257]:
RSKG
(
N−D∑
i=1
δixi
)
>
N−D∑
i=1
δiRSKG(xi). (4.41)
Substituting δi = 1/(N −D) and xi = Ps/bi with
∑N−D
i=1 δi = 1, results in:
RSKG
(
N−D∑
i=1
Ps
(N −D)bi
)
>
N−D∑
i=1
1
N −D
RSKG
Ç
Ps
bi
å
⇔
(N −D)RSKG
(
1
N −D
N−D∑
i=1
Ps
bi
)
>
N−D∑
i=1
RSKG
Ç
Ps
bi
å
(4.42)
From the RHS of (4.42) it can be seen that the power allocation on each subcarrier is
Ps/bi, therefore the the following power constraint
∑N−D
i=1 Ps/bi ≤ Ps is added. The fact,
RSKG is monotonically increasing function with Ps, implies:
(N −D)RSKG
Ç
Ps
N −D
å
≥ (N −D)RSKG
(
1
N −D
N−D∑
i=1
Ps
bi
)
⇔
(N −D)RSKG
Ç
Ps
N −D
å
>
N−D∑
i=1
RSKG
Ç
Ps
bi
å
. (4.43)
Equation (4.43) proves that in order to maximise the sum rate RSKG the legitimate users
have to distribute their power equally when multiple subcarriers are used.
Next, it is proved that all the subcarriers have to be used. Recalling the definition of a
concave function for a single δ on the interval [0, b] results in:
RSKG((1− δ)0 + δb) > (1− δ)RSKG(0) + δRSKG(b), (4.44)
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with δ = a/b for f(0) > 0, and 0 < a < b, implies:
RSKG
ÅÅ
1− a
b
ã
0 +
a
b
b
ã
>
Å
1− a
b
ã
RSKG(0) +
a
b
RSKG(b)⇔
RSKG(a) > RSKG(0)
b− a
b
+
a
b
RSKG(b) ≥
a
b
RSKG(b)⇔
RSKG(a)
a
>
RSKG(b)
b
. (4.45)
Setting a = x/v and b = x/u gives:
uf
Åx
u
ã
< vf
Åx
v
ã
(4.46)
for 0 < u < v and x > 0. Given that when ps > 1√2σ2 , i.e., when RSKG(ps) is concave,
results in:
RSKG ((N −D)ps) < 2RSKG
Ç
N −D
2
ps
å
< . . .
. . . < (N −D − 1)RSKG
Ç
N −D
N −D − 1
ps
å
< (N −D)RSKG(ps), (4.47)
which shows that all available subcarriers have to be used.
On the other hand, when ps < 1√2σ2 , i.e., RSKG(ps) is convex and by the definition of
a convex function results in:
RSKG((1− δ)0 + δb) < (1− δ)RSKG(0) + δRSKG(b), (4.48)
which is equivalent to:
RSKG ((N −D)ps) > 2RSKG
Ç
N −D
2
ps
å
> . . .
. . . > (N −D − 1)RSKG
Ç
N −D
N −D − 1
ps
å
> (N −D)RSKG(ps), (4.49)
which shows that in this case it is optimal to use a single subcarrier for SKG. Lemma 4.2
follows. 
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As a result of Lemma 4.2, the following two cases, Case 1 for RSKG concave and
Case 2 for RSKG convex are explored.
Case 1: ps > 1√2σ2
Theorem 4.1. When ps > 1√2σ2 the optimal power allocation for data transmission and
SKG on each subcarrier are:
p∗i =
ñ
1− βµ
λ ln(2)
− 1
ĝi
ô+
, i = 1, . . . , D (4.50)
p∗s =
Q±√Q2 − F 2
4σ2√
8
F
+ , (4.51)
where:
[x]+ , max(x, 0), (4.52)
Q = 2σ4µN − 2σ4µD − 3σ2λ ln(2), (4.53)
F =
√
8λσ2 ln(2). (4.54)
For the feasibility of (4.50) and (4.51) we have:
µ <
1
β
, (4.55)
µ ≥ λ ln(2)(3 +
√
8)
2σ2(N −D)
, (4.56)
λ > 0. (4.57)
Proof. Following the results drawn in Lemma 4.2, if ps > 1√2σ2 (i.e., the function RSKG
is concave and the size of the set |D̆| = (N − D) ) the optimisation problem (4.34) can
be re-written as:
max
pi
D∑
i=1
log2(1 + ĝipi) (4.58)
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s.t. (4.26) and
β
(
D∑
i=1
log2(1 + ĝipi)
)
= (N −D) log2
Ñ
1 +
psσ
2
2 + 1
psσ2
é
. (4.59)
The optimisation problem (4.58) is solved using the Lagrangian method described in Sec.
4.2.1. Note that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are satisfied, only if Eq.
(4.55)-(4.57) are satisfied. Next, to obtain the optimal power allocation the Lagrangian is
formulated, as:
Lp =
D∑
i=1
log2(1 + ĝipi)− λ
(
N∑
i=1
pi +NP
)
−
µ
Ñ
β
(
D∑
i=1
log2(1 + ĝipi)
)
− (N −D) log2
Ñ
1 +
σ2ps
2 + 1
σ2ps
éé
(4.60)
which after a few algebraic manipulations takes the form:
Lp =
(
D∑
i=1
log2(1 + ĝipi)
)
(1− µβ)− λ
(
N∑
i=1
pi +NP
)
+ µ
Ñ
(N −D) log2
Ñ
1 +
σ2ps
2 + 1
σ2ps
éé
, (4.61)
where λ and µ are the dual Lagrange multipliers, that correspond to (4.26) and (4.59),
respectively. Solving the problem based on the stationary condition given in (4.7), i.e.,
setting the gradient of Eq. (4.61) to zero, and solving for p gives the optimal power alloca-
tion. In fact, the problem (4.58) has concave objective and constraint functions, and as a
result the optimal power allocation is given in (4.50) and (4.51) is the unique solution. 
Case 2: ps < 1√2σ2
Theorem 4.2. When ps < 1√2σ2 a single random subcarrier with index j > D can be
used for SKG and without loss of generality we can set j = D + 1. The optimal power
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allocation for data transmission and SKG is then expressed as:
p∗i =
ñ
1− βµ
λ ln(2)
− 1
ĝi
ô+
, i = 1, . . . , D, (4.62)
P ∗s =
Q′ ±√Q′2 − F ′2
4σ2√
8
F ′
+ , (4.63)
where:
Q′ = 2µσ4 − 3σ2λ ln(2) (4.64)
F ′ =
√
8λσ2 ln(2). (4.65)
For the feasibility of (4.62) and (4.63) we have:
µ <
1
β
, (4.66)
µ ≥ λ ln(2)(3 +
√
8)
2σ2
, (4.67)
λ > 0. (4.68)
Proof. Similarly to Theorem 4.1 the results drawn in Lemma 4.2 are used. If ps < 1√2σ2
(i.e., the function RSKG is convex and the size of the set |D̆| = 1), therefore, Eq. (4.33)
takes the form:
β
(
D∑
i=1
log2(1 + ĝipi)
)
= log2
(
1 +
Psσ
2
2 + 1
Psσ2
)
. (4.69)
Following the approach in Theorem 4.1 and by using the KKT conditions it is straight-
forward to see that the optimal power allocation for each subcarrier is presented in (4.62)
and (4.63). 
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Number of SKG Subcarriers
Figure 4.6: Case 1: Achievable sum rate CD averaged over 10, 000 simulations for differ-
ent values of β, defined in (4.33), number of subcarriers used for data transmission and
for SKG. Parameters: (p1 + · · ·+ pD)/D = 5, σ2 = 1, N = 100.
Numerical evaluation
By applying (4.28) and using the modified water-filling solution of the maximisation prob-
lem given in (4.34) the achievable data rates can be simulated (See Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7).
In Fig. 4.6 the dependence of the achievable sum rate on β and D easily can be seen.
While varying β the achievableCD changes and due to its concavity the unique maximum,
achieved with the optimal D and power allocation, can always be identified. For small
values of β it can be seen that the fewer SKG subcarriers that are used the greater sum
rate can be achieved. When β increases the optimal subcarrier allocation changes, and a
larger number of subcarriers are needed to meet the security constraint.
As expected, in Case 2, varying β directly affects the achievable sum rate. In agree-
ment with intuition, from Fig. 4.7 we see that the smaller the β, the greater rate we
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Figure 4.7: Case 2: Achievable sum rate CD averaged over 10, 000 simulations for differ-
ent values of β, defined in (4.33). Parameters: N = 100, D = 99, (p1 + · · · + pD)/D =
5, σ2 = 1.
achieve.
Long-term Issues with the Short-term Policy
Characterising the distribution of the fading coefficients is important to understand the
channel properties. Having a short-term power constraint allows to optimally allocate the
subcarriers and the available power. However, the optimal short-term solution suggests
that the weakest subcarriers should be used for SKG. If this policy is applied in the long-
term, it is obvious that it will have an impact on the actual statistical properties and the
distribution of the coefficients used for SKG. This effect is investigated in the present
section.
As discussed in Section 4.3, the fading coefficients are assumed to be zero-mean circu-
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Figure 4.8: Case 1: Achievable sum rate CD for different values of β, defined in (4.33),
number of subcarriers used for data transmission and for SKG. Parameters: (p1 + · · · +
pD)/D = 5, σ
2 = 1, N = 10.
larly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables. It has been shown that the weakest
N −D subcarriers should be used for SKG, where D depends on the system parameters
as well as the exact fading realisations. Therefore, the distribution of the channel gains of
the SKG subcarriers for j = {D + 1, . . . , N} can then be expressed as [258]:
p(gj) =
N !
σ2(N − j)!(j − 1)!
Å
1− e−
gj
σ2
ãN−j Å
e−
gj
σ2
ãi
(4.70)
where σ2 = 4σ4h is the variance of channel gains. As a result, choosing the weakestN−D
subcarriers for SKG in the long-term will impact the variance of each of them, which is
now given by:
σ2j = σ
2
N∑
q=j
1
q2
, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (4.71)
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Figure 4.9: Case 2: Achievable sum rate CD for different values of β, defined in (4.33).
Parameters: N = 10, D = 9, (p1 + · · ·+ pD)/D = 5, σ2 = 1.
As an example, the variance of the weakest of N subcarriers is scaled with a factor N−2.
This effect has high impact on the SKG rate which is now given as:
CSKG =
∑
j∈D̆
RSKG,j =
∑
j∈D̆
log2
Ñ
1 +
Pσ2j
2 + 1
Pσ2j
é
. (4.72)
where σj is given in Eq. 4.71. This effect is specifically accounted in the next figures.
Fig. 4.8 and 4.9 compare the rates that are achievable for Case 1 and 2, respectively,
in the short-term and in the long-term with the proposed short-term policy. It can be seen
that for small values of β the incurred penalty for both cases is small. However, when β
increases a higher reduction of the sum rates is observed.
To summarise this work investigated the possibility of jointly performing data trans-
fer and SKG in a Rayleigh BF-AWGN environment. This initial simplified approach
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investigated the maximisation of the data transfer rate under two constraints: a security
constraint, and, a short-term overall power constrain, where the information reconcilia-
tion rate was roughly approximated to the SKG rate. The analysis demonstrated that in
this scenario the strongest subcarriers – from an SNR point of view – should be allocated
to data transfer and the weakest to SKG. Accordingly, the optimal power allocation for
the data transfer has been shown to be expressed in the waterfilling form while the power
allocation for the SKG subcarriers depends on the overall available power and might not
be unique. Furthermore, the impact of utilising the optimal short-term policy in the long-
term was investigated. The use of order statistics revealed that systematically choosing
the weakest subcarriers for SKG can result, in the worst case, in a scaling inversely pro-
portional to the square of N , the number of subcarriers, for the SKG variance. However,
for small values of N and β the incurred penalty is small.
Based on the results presented within this section, the next sections will account for
the exact rate of transmitting reconciliation information. Furthermore, it will be confirmed
whether the policy of using the strongest subcarriers for data transmission is still optimal
when the full optimisation problem is considered, including the communication cost for
reconciliation.
4.6.2 Optimal allocation under security, power and rate constraints
As discussed in Section 4.5.2 in the parallel approach, the legitimate users decide on
which subcarrier to send the reconciliation information and on which data – the total
capacity has now to be distributed between data and reconciliation information bearing
subcarriers. In the previous section the reconciliation rate was roughly approximated to
the SKG rate. Therefore, this section accounts for the exact rate on the subset |D| = D
that is used for encrypted data transmission and subset |D̆| = N −D used for reconcilia-
tion. Over D the achievable sum data transfer rate, denoted by CD is given by
CD =
∑
j∈D
log2(1 + ĝjpj), (4.73)
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while on the subset D̆, Alice and Bob exchange reconciliation information at rate
CR =
∑
j∈D̆
log2(1 + ĝjpj). (4.74)
As discussed in Section 4.3, the minimum rate necessary for reconciliation has been
theoretically derived in [36]. Here, alternatively, a practical design approach is employed
in which the rate of the encoder used is explicitly taken into account. Noting that in a rate
k
n
block encoder the side information is n−k bits long, i.e., the rate of syndrome to output
key bits after privacy amplification is n−k
k
. Therefore, a parameter κ = n−k
k
– the inverse
of the encoder rate, is defined here. The parameter reflects the ratio of the reconciliation
rate to the SKG rate, for example, for a rate k
n
= 1
2
encoder, κ = 1, for k
n
= 1
3
, κ = 2,
while for k
n
= 1
4
, κ = 3. Note, in practice κ needs to be chosen depending on the scenario
and the channel characteristics. Based on this discussion, the minimum requirement for
the reconciliation rate is captured through the following expression:
CR ≥ κCSKG, (4.75)
where the achievable SKG rate CSKG is given in Eq. 4.72.
Accounting for the reconciliation rate and security constraints in (4.75) and (4.33) the
following maximisation problem is formulated:
max
pj ,j∈D
∑
j∈D
Rj (4.76)
s.t.
N∑
j=1
pj ≤ NP (4.77)
CR ≥ κCSKG, (4.78)
CSKG ≥ βCD, 0 < β ≤ 1, (4.79)∑
j∈D
Rj +
∑
j∈D̆
Rj ≤ C. (4.80)
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Constraint (4.79) can be integrated with (4.78) to the combined constraint
∑
j∈D
Rj ≤
∑
j∈D̆
Rj
κβ
. (4.81)
The optimisation problem at hand is a mixed-integer convex optimisation problem with
unknown entities being both the sets D, D̆, as well as the power allocation policy pj, j ∈
{1, . . . , N}. These problems are typically NP hard and addressed with the use of branch
and bound algorithms and heuristics.
Based on the result from the previous section, this work proposes a simple heuris-
tic to make the problem more tractable by reducing the number of free variables. In the
proposed approach, it is assumed that the constraint (4.80) is satisfied with equality. The
only power allocation that allows this is the water-filling approach that uniquely deter-
mines the power allocation pj and also requires that the constraint (4.77) is also satisfied
with equality. Thus, following that approach, the power allocation vector can be uniquely
determined and can be used to combine the remanining constraints (4.80) and (4.81) into
a single one as: ∑
j∈D
Rj ≤
C
κβ + 1
. (4.82)
The new optimisation problem can be re-written as
max
xj∈{0,1}
N∑
j=1
Rjxj (4.83)
s.t.
N∑
j=1
Rjxj ≤
C
κβ + 1
. (4.84)
The problem in (4.83)-(4.84) is a subset-sum problem from the family of 0 − 1 Knap-
sack problems, that is known to be NP hard [259]. However, these type of problems
are solvable optimally using dynamic programming techniques in pseudo-polynomial
time [235, 259]. Furthermore, it is known that greedy heuristic approaches are bounded
away from the optimal solution by half [260].
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Algorithm 1 Heuristic Greedy Algorithm for (4.83)-(4.84)
1: procedure HEURISTIC(start, end, Rj)
2: j ← 1, R0 ← 0, RN+1 ← 0
3: while j ≤ N − 1 and ∑Nj=1Rjxj ≤ C1+κβ do
4:
∑N
j=1Rjxj ←
∑N
j=1Rj−1xj−1 +Rjxj
5: if ∑Nj=1 Rjxj ≤ C1+κβ then
6: xj ← 1; j ← j + 1
7: else do xj ← 0; j ← j + 1
8: end if
9: end while
10: end procedure
This work proposes a simple greedy heuristic algorithm of linear complexity, as fol-
lows.2 The data subcarriers are selected starting from the best – in terms of SNR – until
(4.84) is not satisfied. Once this situation occurs the last subcarrier added to set D is re-
moved and the next one is added. This continues either to the last index N or until (4.84)
is satisfied with equality. The algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
The performance of Algorithm 1 and the optimal solution achieved by solving the
Knapsack problem 4.83 were evaluated. Furthermore, the parallel method (described in
Section 4.5.1) was compared the sequential approach (described in Section 4.5.2) in terms
of efficiency. For ease of reading the efficiencies of both methods are re-called here:
ηparallel =
E
ñ∑
j∈D
Rj
ô
E[C]
, (4.85)
ηsequential =
L
L+M
, (4.86)
where the average number of frames needed for reconciliation is computed as:
M =
κCSKGE[CR]
, (4.87)
2Without loss of generality, the algorithm assumes that the channel gains are ordered in decreasing
order as in (4.27), and, consequently, the rates Rj are also ordered in descending order. The ordering is
a O(N logN) operation and required in common power allocation schemes such as the waterfilling, and,
therefore does not come at any additional cost.
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Figure 4.10: Efficiency comparison for N = 12, the transmit SNR=10 dB and κ = 2.
where dxe denotes the smallest integer that is larger than x; the average number of the
frames that can be sent while respecting the secrecy constraint is:
L =
 CSKG
βE[C]
, (4.88)
where bxc denotes the largest interger that is smaller than x.
Numerical evaluation
This section provides numerical evaluations of the efficiency that can be achieved with
the presented methods (i.e., sequential and parallel) for different values of the main pa-
rameters. With respect to the parallel approach, the section provides numerical results of
the optimal dynamic programming solution of the subset-sum 0 − 1 knapsack problem,
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Figure 4.11: Efficiency comparison for N = 64, the transmit SNR=10 dB and κ = 2.
as well as of the greedy heuristic approach presented in Algorithm 1. Furthermore, two
methods are compared through their efficiencies, i.e. ηparallel and ηsequential given in (4.85)
and (4.86), respectively.
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the efficiency of the methods for N = 12, and N =
64, respectively, while κ = 2 and P = 10. Note that the proposed heuristic algorithm
has a near-optimal performance (almost indistinguishable from the red curves achieved
with dynamic programming). Due to this fact (which was tested across all scenarios
that follow) only the heuristic approach is shown in subsequent figures for clarity in the
graphs. It can be seen, in Fig. 4.10, that when there are a small number of subcarriers
(N=12, typical for NB-IoT) and small β the efficiency of both the parallel ηparallel and the
sequential ηsequential approaches are very close to unity, a trend that holds for increasing N .
While the efficiency of the sequential and parallel methods coincide almost until around
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Figure 4.12: Efficiency vs κ, for N = 24, SNR=10 dB.
β = 0.01 with increasing β, due to the fact that more frames are needed for reconciliation
in the sequential approach (i.e., M increases), the parallel method proves more efficient
than the sequential.
This trend can also be seen for higher number of subcarriers, i.e., N = 64 in Fig.
4.11. Furthermore, for N = 64 the crossing point of the curves moves to the left and the
efficiency of the two methods coincide until around β = 0.001. This trend was found to
be consistent across many values ofN , only two of which are shown here for compactness
of presentation.
Next, in Fig. 4.12 the efficiency of the parallel ηparallel and the sequential ηsequential
methods are shown for two different values of κ ∈ {2, 3} where SNR = 10 dB and
N = 24. It is straightforward to see that they both follow similar trends and when κ
increases the efficiency decreases. On the other hand, regardless of the value of κ they
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Figure 4.13: Size of set D for different SNR levels and σ2e when N = 24.
both perform identically until around β = 0.001.
Finally, Fig. 4.13 and 4.14, focus on the parallel method. The figures illustrate the
average size of set D, the data channels, for different values of σ2e and SNR levels, Fig.
4.13, and κ, Fig. 4.14, when N = 24. As expected, it can be seen that when the SNR
increases the size of the set increases, too. This is due to the fact that more power is used
on any single subcarrier and consequently a higher reconcilliation rate can be sustained.
Regarding the estimation error σ2e of the CSI, it only slightly affects the performance at
high SNR levels. Hence more subcarriers have to be used for reconciliation, and fewer
for data.
The SNR level in the Fig. 4.14 is set to 10 dB. The figure shows that when increasing
κ the size of set D decreases. This result can be easily predicted from inequality (4.78),
meaning, when κ increases more reconciliation data has to be sent, hence fewer subcarri-
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Figure 4.14: Size of set D for different values of κ when N = 24.
ers can be used for data. In both figures when β increases the size of set D decreases; this
effect is a consequence of constraint (4.84) as the data rate is decreasing with β.
This work studied the maximisation of the data transfer rate under power, security
and rate constraints, captured through the following system parameters: a factor β, rep-
resenting the minimum ratio of the SKG to the data rate, and, a factor κ representing
the maximum ratio of the SKG rate over the reconciliation rate. The proposed parallel
method, in which SKG and data transfer are inter-weaved, was shown to perform equally
well or better than a sequential approach in which the two operations were separated. Fur-
thermore, a significant result is that although the optimal subcarrier scheduling is a 0− 1
knapsack problem, with a potentially high bound on complexity, it can be solved in linear
time using a simple heuristic algorithm with virtually no loss in performance.
The next section extends this study by taking into account delay requirements.
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4.6.3 Optimal allocation under security, power, rate and
delay constraints
The previous section investigated the optimal power and subcarrier allocations strategy
of Alice and Bob in order to maximise their long-term average data rate and proposed a
greedy heuristic algorithm of linear complexity. Here, this work is extended and takes
into account delay requirements. In detail, it investigates the optimal resource allocation
for Alice and Bob, when their communication has to satisfy specific delay constraints. To
this end, the theory of effective capacity [240] is used. It gives a limit for the maximum
arrival rate under delay-bounds with a specified violation probability.
This section studies the effective data rate for the proposed pipelined SKG and en-
crypted data transfer scheme; the effective rate is a data-link layer metric that captures the
impact of statistical delay QoS constraints on the transmission rates. As background, refer
to Section 4.2.2. As showed in [261], the probability of a steady-state queue length pro-
cess Q(t) exceeding a certain queue-overflow threshold x converges to a random variable
Q(∞) as:
lim
x→∞
ln(Pr[Q(∞) > x])
x
= −θ, (4.89)
where θ indicates the asymptotic exponential decay-rate of the overflow probability. For
a large threshold x, (4.89) can be represented as Pr[Q(∞) > x] ≈ e−θx. Furthermore, the
delay-outage probability can be approximated by [240]:
Proutdelay=Pr[Delay>Dmax]≈Pr[Q(∞)>0]e−θζDmax , (4.90)
where Dmax is the maximum tolerable delay, Pr[Q(∞) > 0] is the probability of a non-
empty buffer, which can be estimated from the ratio of the constant arrival rate to the
averaged service rate, ζ is the upper bound for the constant arrival rate when the statistical
delay metrics are satisfied.
Using the delay exponent (θ) and the probability of non-empty buffer, the effective
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capacity, that denotes the maximum arrival rate, can be formulated as [240]:
EC(θ) = − lim
t→∞
1
θ
lnE[e−θS[t]](bits/s), (4.91)
where S[t] =
∑t
i=1 s[i] denotes the time-accumulated service process, and s[i], i = 1, 2, ...
denotes the discrete-time stationary and ergodic stochastic service process. Therefore, the
delay exponent θ indicates how strict the delay requirements are, i.e., θ → 0 corresponds
to looser delay requirements, while θ → ∞ implies exceptionally stringent delay con-
straints. Assuming a Rayleigh block fading system, with frame duration Tf and total
bandwidth B, we have s[i] = TfBR̃i, with R̃i representing the instantaneous service rate
achieved during the duration of the ith frame. In the context of the investigated data and
reconciliation information transfer, R̃i, is given by:
R̃i =
1
F
∑
i∈D
log2(1 + piĝi), (4.92)
where F is the equivalent frame duration, i.e., the total number of subcarriers used for data
transmission, so that for the parallel approach we have F = |D| while for the sequential
approach F = N(L+M)L−1.
Under this formulation and assuming that Gärtner-Ellis theorem [236,237] is satisfied,
the effective data rate3 EC(θ) is given as:
EC,D(θ) = −
1
θTfB
ln
(
E
[
e−θTfBR̃i
])
. (4.93)
By setting α = θTfB
ln(2)
and inserting (4.92) into (4.93):
EC,D(θ)=−
1
ln(2)α
ln
(
E
[
e− ln(2)αF
−1∑
i∈Dlog2(1+piĝi)
])
,
3Since part of the transmission rate is used for reconciliation information, and part for data transmission
the terms “effective syndrome rate” and “effective data rate” are introduced instead of the term “effective
capacity”, for rigour. Note that the information data and reconciliation information are accumulated in
separate independent buffers within the transmitter.
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EC,D(θ)= −
1
α
log2
(
E
[∏
i∈D
(1 + piĝi)
−αF−1
])
. (4.94)
Assuming i.i.d. channel gains, by using the distributive property of the mathematical
expectation, (4.94) becomes [262]:
EC,D(θ)= −
1
α
log2
(∏
i∈D
E
[
(1 + piĝi)
−αF−1
])
. (4.95)
After further manipulations and using the log-product rule:
EC,D(θ) = −
1
α
∑
i∈D
log2
(
E
[
(1 + piĝi)
−αF−1
])
. (4.96)
Similarly, the effective syndrome rate can be written as:
EC ˘,D(θ) = −
1
α
∑
i∈D̆
log2
Å
E
ï
(1 + piĝi)
−αF̆−1
òã
, (4.97)
where the size of F̆ here is |N −D|.
Using that, the maximisation problem given in (4.76) is now reformulated by adding
a delay constraint. The reformulated problem can be expressed as follows:
max
pj ,j∈D
EC,D(θ), (4.98)
s.t.
N∑
j=1
pj ≤ NP, (4.99)
∑
j∈D
Rj ≤
∑
j∈D̆
Rj
κβ
, (4.100)
EC,D(θ) + EC,D̆(θ) ≤ E
opt
C (θ), (4.101)
where EoptC (θ) represents the maximum achievable effective capacity for both key and
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data transmission for a given value of θ over N subcarriers:
EoptC (θ)=max
pi,i=1,2,...N
{
− 1
α
log2
(
E
[
N∏
i=1
(1 + piĝi)
−αN−1
])}
. (4.102)
The proposed approach, assumes that the constraint (4.101) is satisfied with equality.
Given that, the optimisation problem in (4.98) can be evaluated as two sub-optimisation
problems: i) finding the optimal long term power allocation from (4.99) and (4.102); ii)
finding the optimal subcarrier allocation that satisfies (4.100). The first problem that gives
the optimal power allocation can be solved using convex optimisation tools. Next, as in
Section 4.6.2 two methods are used to solve the subcarrier allocation problem, i.e., by
formulating a subset-sum 0 – 1 knapsack optimisation problem or through a variation of
Algorithm 1. The efficiency of both methods will be again compared numerically to the
sequential method.
Now, following the same steps from (4.94) to (4.96) and using the fact that maximis-
ingEC(θ) is equivalent to minimising−EC(θ) (this is due to log(·) being a monotonically
increasing concave function for any θ > 0) the following minimisation problem is formu-
lated:
min
pi,i=1,2,...N
N∑
i=1
(
E
[
(1 + piĝi)
−αN−1
])
, (4.103)
s.t. (4.99).
where F = N in this case as the full set of subcarriers is concerned. Next the the La-
grangian function L is formed as:
L =
(
E
[
(1 + piĝi)
−αN−1
])
+ λ
(
N∑
i=1
pi −NP
)
. (4.104)
By differentiating (4.104) w.r.t. pi and setting the derivative equal to zero [230] results
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into:
∂L
∂pi
= λ− αĝi
N
(ĝipi + 1)
− α
N
−1 = 0. (4.105)
Solving (4.105) gives the optimal power allocation policy:
p∗i =
1
g
N
α+N
0 ĝ
α
α+N
i
− 1
ĝi
, (4.106)
where g0 = Nλα is the cutoff value which can be found from the power constraint. The
expression of EoptC (θ) can be found by inserting p
∗
i in EC(θ):
EoptC (θ) = −
1
α
N∑
i=1
log2
(
E
[Ç
ĝi
g0
å− α
α+N
])
(4.107)
When θ → 0 the optimal power allocation is equivalent to water-filling and when θ →∞
the optimal power allocation transforms to total channel inversion.
Now, fixing the power allocation as in (4.106) the optimal subcarrier allocation that
satisfies (4.100) easily can be identified. As in Section 4.6.2, to do that first a subset-sum
0 – 1 knapsack optimisation problem is formulated, which is solved using the standard
dynamic programming approach. Furthermore, the performance of the heuristic algorithm
presented in Algorithm 1 is also evaluated.
Numerical evaluation
Inspired by the good performance of Algorithm 1, in the case where long-term average
rate is the metric of interest, here, the investigation continues with a variation of Algorithm
1, with the following differences: at lines 3 and 5 instead of (4.82) the constraint (4.100)
is used and the power allocation is fixed as in (4.106). The performance of the system is
again compared with a sequential method and the metric of interest here is the effective
data rate. The comparison is performed by taking into account the following parameters:
signal to noise ration (SNR); number of subcarriers N ; ratio of the reconciliation rate to
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Figure 4.15: Effective data rate achieved by the parallel heuristic approach and the se-
quential approach when, SNR= 10 dB and κ = 2 and N = 12.
the SKG rate κ; delay exponent θ; and, the ratio of key bits to data bits β.
Figures 4.15 - 4.18 illustrate three-dimensional plots showing the dependence of the
achievable effective data rate EC,D(θ) on β and θ. Figures 4.15 and 4.17 compare the
parallel heuristic approach and the sequential approach for high SNR levels, whereas Fig.
4.16 and 4.18 compare their performance for low SNR level. In Fig. 4.15 and 4.16
N = 12 while in Fig. 4.17 and 4.18 the total number of subcarriers is N = 64. All graphs
compare the performance of the heuristic parallel approach and the sequential approach
for κ = 2.
As discussed earlier in this section, when the delay exponent θ increases, the optimal
power allocation transforms from water-filling to total channel inversion. Consequently,
the rate achieved on all subcarriers converges to the same value, hence when having a
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Figure 4.16: Effective data rate achieved by the parallel heuristic approach and the se-
quential approach when, SNR= 0.2 dB and κ = 2 and N = 12.
small number of subcarriers (such as N = 12 in Fig. 4.15) and small values of β then
using a single subcarrier for reconciliation data will use more capacity than needed and
most of the rate on this subcarrier is wasted. Devoting a whole subcarrier for sending
the reconciliation data for the case of N = 12 and β = 0.0001 is almost equivalent of
losing 1/12 of the achievable rate. This effect can be seen in both Fig. 4.15 and 4.16
where N = 12. When the SNR is high (See Fig. 4.15, as discussed, this effect is mostly
noticeable for large values of θ and small values of β4, whereas for small values of β and
θ both algorithms perform nearly identically. A similar trend can be seen at the low SNR
regime in Fig. 4.16. However, at a low SNR the sequential approach has a lower effective
data rate. This happens because at high SNR levels each reconciliation frame will contain
4i.e that the ratio of reconciliation information to data is small as seen from Eq. (4.100))
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Figure 4.17: Effective data rate achieved by the parallel heuristic approach and the se-
quential approach when, SNR= 10 dB and κ = 2 and N = 64.
more information and hence more data frames will follow. Therefore, at the low SNR
regime, the reconciliation information received will decrease, hence less data can be sent
afterwards. This does not affect the parallel approach. However, in both scenarios with
high and low SNR, when β increases, regardless of the value of θ, the parallel approach
always achieves higher effective data rate EC,D(θ).
In the next case, when the total number of subcarriers is N = 64, illustrated in Fig.
4.17 and 4.18, it can be seen that the penalty of devoting a high part of the achievable
effective capacity EoptC (θ) to reconciliation disappears and the heuristic parallel approach
always achieves higher or identical effective data rateEC,D(θ) compared to the sequential
approach. This trend repeats for high and low SNR levels as given in Fig. 4.17 and 4.18,
respectively.
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Figure 4.18: Effective data rate achieved by the parallel heuristic approach and the se-
quential approach when, SNR= 0.2 dB and κ = 2 and N = 64.
Now, taking to take a closer look some specific cases from the 3d plots are transformed
to two-dimensional graphs. Figures 4.19 – 4.22 show the achieved effective data rate
EC,D(θ) given in (4.96), for different values of N and θ while the SNR=5 dB and κ = 2.
Fig. 4.19 gives the achieved effective rate on set D for N = 12 and θ = 0.0001 (relaxed
delay constraint). Similarly to the case of long term average value of CD it can be seen
that for small values of β the sequential approach achieves slightly higher effective data
rate. As before, the increase of β results in more reconciliation frames M required in
the sequential case. This effect is not seen in the parallel case and for high values of β it
performs better.
Fig. 4.20 illustrates the case when N = 12 and θ = 100 (very stringent delay con-
straint). It can be seen that for small values of β the sequential approach performs better
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Figure 4.19: Effective data rate achieved by parallel and sequential approaches when
N = 12, SNR= 5dB, κ = 2 and θ = 0.0001.
than the parallel. As discussed, the efficiency loss is caused by the fact that the devoted
part of the total achievable effective capacityEoptC (θ) to reconciliation (syndrome commu-
nication) is more than what is required. However, a higher β leads to an increase in the
reconciliation information that needs to be sent, and the rate of the subcarriers in set D̆
will be fully or almost fully utilised and the parallel approach shows better performance
for these values.
Next, Fig. 4.21 and 4.22 show the performance of the two algorithms for higher value
ofN = 64. It is easy to see that regardless of the value of θ and β both algorithms perform
identical or the parallel is better. In the previous case ofN = 12 increasing θ might reduce
the effectiveness of the parallel approach, however when N = 64 increasing θ does not
incur such a penalty and the parallel is either identical to the sequential or outperforms it.
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Figure 4.20: Effective data rate achieved by parallel and sequential approaches when
N = 12, SNR= 5dB, κ = 2 and θ = 100.
This can be seen in both cases, i.e., θ = 0.0001, in Fig. 4.21, and θ = 100, in Fig. 4.22.
Another interesting fact from Figures 4.19 – 4.22 is that looking at the parallel ap-
proach, it can easily be seen that in all cases the heuristic approach almost always per-
forms as well as the optimal knapsack solution. The case of small values of θ is similar to
the one when long term average rate was used and choosing the best subcarriers for data
transmission works as well as the optimal Knapsack solution. Interestingly, Algorithm
1 works well for high values of θ, too. This can be explained by the fact that when θ
increases the rate on all of the subcarriers becomes similar and switching the subcarriers
in set D does not incur high penalty.
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Figure 4.21: Effective data rate achieved by parallel and sequential approaches when
N = 64, SNR= 5dB, κ = 2 and θ = 0.0001.
4.7 Summary
This work explored the possibility of pipelining encrypted data transfer and SKG in a
Rayleigh BF-AWGN environment. It investigated the maximisation of the data transfer
rate in parallel to performing SKG. The work took into account imperfect CSI measure-
ments and the effect of order statistics on the channel variance. Three scenarios were
differentiated in this study: i) the optimal data transfer rate was found under power and
security constraints – represented by the system parameters β, which represents the min-
imum ratio of SKG rate to data rate; ii) the optimal data transfer rate was found under
power, security and rate constraint – represented by the system parameters κ, which rep-
resents the maximum ratio of SKG rate to reconciliation rate; iii) by adding a delay con-
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Figure 4.22: Effective data rate achieved by parallel and sequential approaches when
N = 64, SNR= 5dB, κ = 2 and θ = 100.
straint, represented by parameter θ, the optimal effective data rate was found. The latter
shows the first study introducing the theory of effective capacity with SKG.
The study was finalised by numerical comparisons of the efficiency of the proposed
parallel method, in which SKG and data transfer are inter-weaved and a sequential method
where the two operations are done separately. The results of the two scenarios showed that
in most of the cases the performance of both methods, parallel and sequential, is either
equal or the parallel performs better. As the possible advantage of using the sequential is
small and only applies in particular scenarios, the parallel scheme is recommended as a
universal mechanism for general protocol design, when latency is an issue. Furthermore,
a significant result is that although the optimal subcarrier scheduling is an NP hard 0− 1
knapsack problem, it can be solved in linear time using a simple heuristic algorithm with
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virtually no loss in performance.
Overall this chapter presented a novel SKG approach that can greatly reduce the sys-
tem’s latency through pipelining as the SKG information is sent in parallel with the data.
This allows the data to be decrypted immediately without a further round of SKG trans-
mission. Next, Chapter 5 will discuss what is the optimal strategy of Alice and Bob when
an active attacker tries to interrupt their SKG process.
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Man-in-the-middle and denial of service
attacks in PLS systems
This chapter addresses the problem of active jamming attacks. The chapter presents coun-
termeasures in the form of power allocation strategies. Game theoretic analysis is used
to confirm the optimal solutions. The results in this chapter were presented at the “IEEE
Global Communications Conference (Globecom 2019)” [15].
5.1 Introduction
The SKG process from shared randomness (e.g., from the wireless channel fading reali-
sations), was well investigated in the previous chapters: Chapter 3 showed how the SKG
can be used in authentication protocols and session key agreement schemes; Chapter 4
proposed an improved SKG solution where data and key rates are jointly optimised. The
roadmap from Chapter 4 to this chapter is illustrated in Fig. 5.1. This chapter will in-
vestigate the SKG process accounting for jamming attacks in PLS systems. It will first
investigate the impact of injection and reactive jamming attacks during the “advantage
distillation” phase in SKG (when observations of the shared randomness are obtained at
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Figure 5.1: Roadmap from Chapter 4 to Chapter 5.
the legitimate parties). As an example, an active attacker can act as a man-in-the-middle
(MiM) by injecting pilot signals and/or can mount denial of service attacks (DoS) in the
form of jamming. The optimal strategies of jammer and legitimate users are identified in
a BF-AWGN channel, using a game theoretic formulation.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
1. Proposal of pilot randomisation scheme as a countermeasure to injection attacks.
The scheme reduces injection attacks injection MiM attacks to less harmful jam-
ming attacks.
2. Investigation of the optimal strategy of a reactive jammer who has a fixed sensing
threshold.
3. Identifying the Stackelberg equilibrium that gives the optimal power allocation for
Alice and Bob in the present of a reactive jammer with fixed sensing threshold.
4. Investigation of the optimal strategy for an intelligent reactive jammer who can
strategically choose their sensing threshold.
5. Identifying the Stackelberg equilibrium that gives the optimal power allocation for
Alice and Bob in the present of a reactive jammer when they strategically choose
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their sensing threshold.
5.2 Respective background
SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to DoS attacks in the form of jamming
and to man in the middle attacks implemented as injection attacks. Therefore, this section
introduces the types of jamming attacks and known counter-jamming techniques. The
section concludes with a brief introduction to game theory which is used in this chapter
as a tool to identify the optimal strategies in presence of a jammer.
5.2.1 Jamming attacks
Various types of jamming techniques in wireless communications are presented in [263],
these include:
Noise jamming attack: Theoretically proven as the most harmful attack when the ad-
versary does not have knowledge of the legitimate users’ channel. The goal of the
attack is to increase the noise and interrupt the communication.
Equalisation jamming attack: Instead of jamming the entire signal the goal of this at-
tack is to affect only part of the transmission. An example is a pilot jamming attack
which is concentrated during the pilot exchange. This attack aims to disrupt the
equalisation process.
Injection jamming attack: The adversary injects signals during the advantage distilla-
tion phase between two legitimate users. The signals target each of the legitimate
users and are constructed such that both parties have the same channel observa-
tion. A successful attack will allow the adversary to derive a substantial part of the
generated key.
The efficiency of some of these jamming approaches are numerically evaluated in
[264]. This chapter concentrates on equalisation jamming during the pilot exchange and
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shows how the injection jamming attack can be transformed into a less harmful equalisa-
tion jamming attack.
On the other hand, jammers can be divided based upon their strategy as: active and
reactive jammers. Active jamming is simplistic approach where the adversary aims to
increase the noise / interference level of the channel, regardless if there is ongoing com-
munication. Reactive jamming is a stealthy jamming approach where the jammer first
senses the spectrum and jams only if detects an ongoing transmission. Reactive jamming
attacks are considered as the most harmful [265–269] as the optimise the jamming dy-
namically to maximise the impact. This chapter proposes a set of countermeasures to
both active and reactive jammers
5.2.2 Countermeasures
In [265] - [267] the authors propose reactive jammer detection algorithms assuming the
jammer needs a small period of time (reaction time) in order to detect the transmission
and switch from listening to jamming. As an example, [265] proposes a jamming detector
based on threshold. The detector uses the unjammed bits, transmitted during the jammer’s
switching period, to estimate a threshold and compares following bits to that threshold in
order to detect jamming attacks. A similar approach is taken in [267, 270, 271], where
reactive jamming attacks are detected based on pre-stored non-jammed samples. As an
example, in [271] the variance of pilot signals is used to categorised them as jammed or
non-jammed. The authors of [269] estimate the probabilities of correct and false detection
of the reactive jammers using a game-theoretic analysis. As discussed above, numerous
techniques have been introduced for the detection of reactive jammer. Therefore, the
work presented in this chapter identifies the optimal strategy of the legitimate users in a
presence of a reactive jammer.
An interesting approach to cope with a reactive jammers that employs uniform power
allocation is given in [272]. During the pilot exchange phase between two legitimate users
each of them estimates signal-to-interference-plus-noise (SINR) ratio on each subcarrier.
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Next, both parties determine the received jamming power on each subcarrier and use
only the subcarriers with high SINR ratio for communication. Another perspective of the
jammer’s role in a communication system is given in [273]. The work assumes a scenario
of a single transmitter that has knowledge of the channel, a pair of receivers and a pair
of jammers. While the transmitter is trying to maximise the overall rate, each jammer
aims to help a single user by jamming the other receiver. The work identifies the optimal
power allocations for jammers and transmitter which, in fact, are both modified water-
filling algorithms. Section 5.5.1 investigates the scenario where channel observations are
not yet present at the receiver or transmitter (i.e., during the SKG process) and identifies
the optimal power allocation in such a scenario.
As jamming attacks represent a critical vulnerability for wireless SKG systems, in
[73,74,102,274], the employment of energy harvesting (EH) was investigates as a counter-
jamming approach. In particular, in the case of EH receivers, the existence of a critical
transmission power for the legitimate nodes enabled the complete neutralisation of the
jammer. This thesis has not considered this type of approach, but it would interesting
future work and the author is currently working on topic.
5.2.3 Game-theoretic analysis of active attacks
Game theory is a study of mathematical models which provides a set of tools for analysing
interactive decision problems. It is usually used to model the strategic interaction be-
tween two or more players in situations where a player’s choice have direct impact on
others [275, 276]. The type of games within the theory can be divided as cooperative
games and non-cooperative games. In a cooperative game players form coalitions in or-
der to strengthen their position in a game. In a non-cooperative games each player is
independent and chooses their strategy in order to increase their own benefit. The present
thesis focus on non-cooperative games. More specifically, Section 5.5.1 uses the theory
to evaluate the optimal strategy of a pair of legitimate users in the presence of a jammer.
Game theory has proven a reliable analysis tool for numerous problems in communi-
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cations [15,74,277–279]. A non-cooperative game is framed by 1) identifying the players
and their possible actions; 2) defining the payoffs as a function of the actions; 3) evaluat-
ing equilibria and possible outcomes. The mathematical definition of a non-cooperative
game is described by three elements, G = ({L, J}, {AL,AJ(p)}, {uL, uJ})). First the
players are identified, i.e., player L representing the legitimate users, who are considered
to act as a single player, and player J representing the jammer. Secondly, the action set
of player L and player J are determined as AL and AJ , respectively. Finally the utility
function (payoff) of each player is defined as uL, for player L, and uJ for player J . A
fundamental assumption of the theory is that the players are rational, i.e., each player
chooses the action that optimises his utility knowing that the other players will act like-
wise. The games defined in this chapter belong to the group of zero-sum games. This
is a type of game where the gain of one player equals the loss of the other player, i.e.,
uL = −uJ , hence while maximising their utility function each player minimises the profit
of the others.
In a game-theoretic analysis the saddle point of a game is defined by its Nash or
Stackelberg equilibria. A Nash equilibrium is the profile of strategies where all player
choose simultaneously their best responses to the equilibrium strategies of the other play-
ers [280, 281], such that:
ui(a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(bi, a∗−i), (5.1)
where a∗i ∈ BRi and a∗−i ∈ BR−i define the fixed points of best responses for players i
and all other players in the game, respectively, bi ∈ Ai ∩ BRCi denotes all other actions
that player i can take. On the other hand, Stackelberg games can be distinguished from
Nash games by the fact that in Stackelberg games the players act in specific order in
time, i.e., not simultaneously as in Nash equilibrium games. Therefore, in Stackelberg
games there is a leader who chooses his strategy first and followers who choose their best
response based upon the leader’s action. Section 5.5.1 of the present chapter evaluates
the Stackelberg equilibrium in order to identify the optimal strategy of legitimate users in
presence of reactive jammer.
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5.3 Employed methods and system model
The previous section summarised the necessary background material, the rest of this chap-
ter explores novel work on the jamming attacks on the SKG process and proposes a set of
countermeasures. As discussed in Chapter 4, building semantically secure AE protocols
using the SKG procedure is straightforward, as long as the channel probing phase of the
scheme is robust against active attacks [108], [282]. Therefore, an important next step is
to study MiM and DoS attacks during the channel excitation phase of the SKG protocol,
commonly referred to as “advantage distillation”. The investigations are based on the
methods described below.
Secret key generation
As discussed in the previous chapters, Alice and Bob can obtain a shared secret key fol-
lowing the three-step SKG procedure, (described in Section 2.2.1), i.e., i) advantage distil-
lation; ii) information reconciliation; and, iii) privacy amplification. This chapter provides
countermeasures to existing attacks during the process. This is discussed in detail in the
next items.
Jamming attacks and countermeasures
Firstly, MiM attacks, referred to as “injection” attacks, are investigated: an active adver-
sary tries to control part of the generated secret key by spoofing the channel estimation
phase of the SKG scheme. Existing works have considered jamming attacks and formu-
late these in game-theoretic form [283], [284]. However, they have not considered the
close relationship between injection and jammming. The work in this chapter proposes
an approach of the MiM attack that assumes that the adversary has one additional antenna
with respect to the legitimate users. This is a generous assumption with respect to the
adversary’s capabilities and reveals a critical vulnerability of SKG, that needs to be ad-
dressed. As a countermeasure, this study proposes a concrete pilot randomisation scheme
143
5.3 EMPLOYED METHODS AND SYSTEM MODEL
using QPSK modulated random pilots. This work proves that the source of shared ran-
domness remains Gaussian and that the adversary can no longer mount the MiM attack.
An interesting conclusion of the analysis is that the MiM injection attack is reduced to a
jamming attack when pilot randomisation is employed.
Next, motivated by the above result, DoS in the form of reactive jamming is stud-
ied for BF-AWGN channels – used as an abstraction for orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) modulation systems. The attacker’s optimal strategies are derived.
In the present contribution it is assumed that the legitimate users blindly adopt a uniform
power allocation policy, the level of which is optimally identified. The study demonstrates
that a reactive jammer can have a far more serious impact on the SKG process compared
to a simple active jammer.
Game theory
The optimal strategies within this chapter are identified through game-theoretic analysis
(for more details on game theory please see Section 5.2.3). All of the scenarios, described
in the previous item, are formulated as zero-sum games where legitimate parties and ad-
versary are presented as players with opposite goals. The study within this chapter does
not introduce any novelty in regards to game theory, instead it uses it as a tool to determine
the best actions of all players (i.e., legitimate users and jammer).
The system model, depicted in Fig. 5.2, assumes two legitimate parties, referred to
as Alice and Bob, and a active adversary, referred to as Mallory. This work assumes a
Rayleigh multipath environment, where the legitimate parties communicate over a BF-
AWGN channel, that comprises N subcarriers.
5.4 MiM in SKG Systems: Injection Attacks
MiM in the form of injection attacks constitutes one of the most critical limitations in SKG
systems [285–287]. While jamming attacks aim at interrupting a legitimate communica-
tion, injection attacks may reveal sensitive information, such as secret key bits. Recently,
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Figure 5.2: Alice and Bob are communicating over a Rayleigh fading channel with real-
isation h. A MiM, Mallory, act as an active adversary, trying to interrupt their communi-
cation.
various possible approaches for injection attacks have been published: in [285], the at-
tacker controlled the movement of objects in an indoor wireless network, thus generating
predictable changes in the RSS, (e.g., by obstructing, or not, a line-of-sight). In [286],
whenever similar channel envelope measurements in the links to the legitimate nodes
were observed, the MiM spoofed the SKG process by injecting a strong signal. The fol-
lowing will prove that – even when full CSI is used to extract the keys – it suffices that
the adversary has one additional antenna with respect to the legitimate users to be able to
mount an injection MiM attack.
To capture the main components of injection attacks in SKG systems, the system
model depicted in Fig. 5.3 is employed. It comprises three nodes: a legitimate transmit-
ter, its intended receiver, and a MiM, referred to as Alice, Bob and Mallory, respectively.
Alice and Bob are assumed to have a single antenna each for simplicity, while Mallory
has two transmit antennas.1 The fading channel realisation in the link Alice-Bob is de-
noted by the complex circularly symmetric Gaussian random variable h ∼ CN (0, σ2). To
obtain estimates of h, Alice and Bob exchange pilot signals y with E[|y|2] ≤ P . Further-
more, following [286], it is assumed that Mallory has perfect knowledge of the channel
1It is straightforward to see that the scenario can easily be generalised to a multi-antenna setting in which
Mallory has one more antenna than Alice and Bob.
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Figure 5.3: Alice and Bob have single transmit and receive antennas and exchange pilot
signals x over a Rayleigh fading channel with realisation h. A MiM, Mallory, with mul-
tiple transmit antennas can inject a suitably pre-coded signal PxJ , such that the received
signal at both Alice and Bob coincide w = hATP = hBTP.
vectors in the multiple input single output (MISO) links Mallory-Alice and Mallory-Bob.
The channel coefficients of Mallory-Alice and Mallory-Bob are assumed to be indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), i.e., hA = [hA1, hA2]T ,hB = [hB1, hB2]T with
(hA1, hA2, hB1, hB2) ∼ CN (0, σ2J/2 I4); this assumption is realistic since Mallory can
estimate the channel vectors while Alice and Bob exchange pilot signals, as long as the
channel’s coherence time is respected (a plausible scenario in slow fading, low mobility
environments). The latter is a best case scenario for Mallory.
To mount the attack, Mallory transmits a signal xJ , suitably precoded as PxJ . The
precoding matrix P = [P1, P2]T is chosen such that the same signal is “injected” at both
Alice and Bob, i.e.,
hA
TPxJ = hB
TPxJ ⇒
P1 =
hB2 − hA2
hA1 − hB1
P2, (5.2)
where, due to the i.i.d. assumption and to the continuous distribution of the channels,
hA1 6= hB1 almost surely. As a result, Mallory can select a suitable precoding matrix
(among infinite possibilities). In practice it will be difficult for Mallory to determine the
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correct precoding matrix, but here we assume that Mallory was able to do this. Assuming
a total power constraint E[|PxJ |2] ≤ Γ for Mallory’s transmission, P2 should be chosen
as
P2 ≤
√
Γ∣∣∣hB2−hA2
hA1−hB1
∣∣∣+ 1 . (5.3)
This procedure, illustrated in Fig. 5.3, shows that it is possible to generalise the injec-
tion attack presented in [286], in which an attacker injected a strong signal whenever the
RSS in the Mallory-Alice and Mallory-Bob links were similar. More importantly, the pre-
sented injection attack accounts not only for the RSS but for the full CSI, i.e., it includes
the signal phase.
The observations at Alice and Bob, denoted by xA and xB, are
xA = yh + w + zA (5.4)
xB = yh + w + zB, (5.5)
where w = hATPxJ = hBTPxJ denotes the observed injected signal at Alice and Bob
which is identical at both due the precoding matrix P; and, zA, zB denote zero-mean
unit variance i.i.d. complex circularly symmetric Gaussian random noise variables, i.e.,
zA, zB ∼ CN (0, 1). The secret key rate controlled by Mallory is upper bounded by [282]
L ≤ I(xA,xB; w). (5.6)
Identifying the optimal injection signal w, corresponds to finding the capacity achieving
input signal of the two-look Gaussian channel in (5.4)-(5.5). This signal is known to
be Gaussian [288]; hence, a good choice for xJ is to be constant, so that, the overall
injected signal is an optimal complex zero-mean circularly symmetric Gaussian signal,
w ∼ CN (0, σ2JΓ).
A countermeasure to injection attacks can be built by randomising the pilot sequence
exchanged between Alice and Bob [282], [287]. This study, proposes to randomise the
pilots by drawing them from a (scaled) QPSK modulation, as follows: instead of trans-
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mitting the same probing signal y, Alice and Bob transmit independent, random probe
signals y1 and y2, respectively, drawn from i.i.d. zero-mean discrete uniform distri-
butions U({±r ± jr}), where j =
√
−1, r =
»
P/2, so that, E [y1] = E [y2] = 0,
E [|y1|2] = E [|y2|2] = P and E [y1y2] = 0, i.e., the pilots are randomly chosen QPSK
signals. Alice’s and Bob’s observations xA,xB, respectively, are modified accordingly as
xA = y1h + w + zA, (5.7)
xB = y2h + w + zA. (5.8)
To establish shared randomness in spite of the pilot randomisation, Alice and Bob post-
multiply xA and xB by their randomised pilots, obtaining local observations x̃A and x̃B
(unobservable by Mallory), expressed as:
x̃A = y1xA = y1y2h + y1w + y1zA, (5.9)
x̃B = y2xB = y1y2h + y2w + y2zB. (5.10)
Lemma 5.1. The source of shared randomness, when the pilots are randomised QPSK
symbols, is a circularly symmetric zero mean Gaussian random variable, following the
distribution y1y2h ∼ CN (0, P 2σ2).
Proof. The two orthogonal axes (real and imaginary) are treated independently. Looking
only at the real values of the pilots and of the channel coefficient y1,y2,h denoted here
by y1,R = Re(y1), y2,R = Re(y2) and hR = Re(h), the underlying discrete uniform pdf
expressed as fy1,R(y1) and fy2,R(y2) and the continuous pdf fhR(h) as
fy1,R(y1) =
1
2
δ(y1 − r) +
1
2
δ(y1 + r), (5.11)
fy2,R(y2) =
1
2
δ(y2 − r) +
1
2
δ(y2 + r), (5.12)
fhR(h) =
1√
πσ
e−
h2
σ2 . (5.13)
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The pdf of the product y1,RhR is given as
fy1,RhR(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fy1,R(y1)fhR(x/y1)
1
|y1,|
dy1
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
πσ|y1|
δ(y1 − r)e−
(x/y1)
2
σ2 dy1
+
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
πσ|y1|
δ(y1 + r)e
−(x/y1)
2
σ2 dy1
=
√
2e−
2x2
Pσ2
√
πPσ
(5.14)
by substituting r =
»
P/2 at the last derivation, i.e., y1,RhR ∼ N (0, Pσ
2
4
). A similar result
holds for the products involving also the imaginary parts of y1 and h: y1,IhI, y1,IhR and
y1,RhI, so that y1h ∼ CN (0, Pσ2). Extending this result, it can be fount that y1y2h ∼
CN (0, P 2σ2). 
Furthermore, due to the fact that y1 and y2 are independent and have zero mean,
the variables y1W and y2W are uncorrelated, circularly symmetric zero-mean Gaussian
random variables, and, therefore independent, while the same holds for y1zA,y2zB, i.e.,
(y1W,y2W ) ∼ CN (0, σ2JPΓI2) and (y1zA,y2zB) ∼ CN (0, P I2). Alice and Bob ex-
tract the common key from the modified source of common randomness y1y2h as op-
posed to yh. On the other hand, since y1w,y2w,y1zA,y2zB are i.i.d. complex circularly
symmetric Gaussian random variables, the proposed scheme reduces injection attacks to
uncorrelated jamming attacks, i.e., using Lemma 5.1 follows:
L ≤ I (x̃A, x̃B; w) = 0. (5.15)
Employing the proposed, within this section, mechanism could transform an injection
attacks to a jamming attacks. As discussed earlier, MiM in the form of injection attack
could be far more severe than jamming attacks, therefore, the presented solution is of
great importance for the systems security.
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5.5 Jamming Attacks on SKG
Building on the results of the previous section, this section examines in detail the scenario
in which Mallory acts as a reactive jammer. Reactive jamming is a stealthy jamming
approach in which the jammer first senses the spectrum and jams only when she detects
an ongoing transmission. Due to the effectiveness and difficulty to be detected, reactive
jammers are considered as the most harmful [265,266]. In this context, this work assumes
that Alice and Bob perform SKG over N subcarriers. The notation introduced in Section
5.4 is extended with the introduction of a carrier index i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, i.e., y1,i, y2,i
denote the randomised pilots on the i-th subcarrier, hi denotes the channel coefficient in
the link Alice-Bob, Wi the signal injected by Mallory on the i-th subcarrier and zA,i, zB,i
noise variables. As a reactive jammer, Mallory senses the spectrum and jams a specific
subcarrier only when the power on it exceeds a certain threshold pth. Note that, Alice and
Bob can get an estimate of pth using the methods described in Sec. 5.2.2, in particular
the jamming detector schemes presented in [265] and [271] can be employed: the former
uses a pre-stored sequence of non-jammed bits, which are later compared to the received
signals; the latter is based on estimating the variance of received pilot signals. Therefore,
before the SKG process Alice and Bob can use any of these schemes to estimate the
detection threshold pth of the jammer Malory. For further details regarding these schemes
please see to the corresponding reference. For the purpose of this study, two scenarios are
considered: i) when pth is fixed (determined in essence by the carrier sensing capability
of Mallory’s receiver); ii) when pth is variable (its choice forms part of her strategy).
The expressions of Alice’s and Bob’s local observations on the i-th SKG subcarrier
are reformulated as follows:
x̃A,i = y1,iy2,ihi + y1,iwi + y1,izA,i (5.16)
x̃B,i = y1,iy2,ihi + y2,iwi + y2,izB,i (5.17)
for i = 1, . . . , N with hi ∼ CN (0, σ2), wi ∼ CN (0, σ2Jγi), zA,i ∼ CN (0, 1), zB,i ∼
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CN (0, 1). This work assumes that Alice and Bob use the same power p on all pilots, in
agreement with common practice during the advantage distillation phase. Based on this
assumption it holds that E[|y1,i|2] = E[|y2,i|2] = p with p ∈ [0, P ].
On the other hand, Mallory chooses the power allocation vector to maximise the im-
pact of her attack. The power Mallory uses on the i-th subcarrier is denoted by γi, so that
E[|Wi|2] = σ2Jγi. Denoting the average available power for jamming by Γ and the power
allocation of the jammer by γ = (γ1, . . . , γN), the following short-term power constraint
is assumed:
γ ∈ RN+ ,
N∑
i=1
γi ≤ NΓ. (5.18)
Assuming that hi is uncorrelated with hA,i, hB,i, i = 1, . . . , N and that the pilot ran-
domisation approach proposed in Section 5.4 is employed, the SKG rate RSKG(p, γi) =
I (x̃A,i; x̃B,i) on the i-th subcarrier, can be expressed as a function of p and γi, i =
1, . . . , N as [289]:
RSKG(p, γi) = log2
Ö
1 +
pσ2
2(1 + γiσ2J) +
(1+γiσ2J )
2
pσ2
è
. (5.19)
Note that the rate in (5.19) is independent of the instantaneous realisations of the fad-
ing coefficients; instead, the variations of the channel gains expressed through the vari-
ances σ2, σ2J determine the rate of the secret keys that can be extracted from the wireless
medium. The overall SKG sum-rate can then be simply expressed as follows:
CSKG(p,γ) =
N∑
i=1
RSKG(p, γi). (5.20)
5.5.1 Optimal Power Allocation Strategies
Alice and Bob’s common objective is to maximise CSKG(p,γ) with respect to (w.r.t.) p,
while Mallory wants to minimise CSKG(p,γ) w.r.t. γ. Given the opposed objectives,
a non-cooperative zero-sum game can be formulated to study the strategic interaction
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between the legitimate users and the jammer: G = ({L, J}, {AL,AJ(p)}, CSKG(p,γ)).
The game G has three components. Firstly, there are two players: player L representing
the legitimate users (Alice and Bob are considered to act as a single player) and player
J representing the jammer (Mallory). Secondly, player L has a set of possible actions
AL = [0, P ] while player J’s set of actions is
AJ(p)=

{(0, . . . , 0)}, if p ≤ pth,¶
γ ∈ RN+ |
∑N
i=1 γi ≤ NΓ
©
, if p > pth,
(5.21)
where pth is maximum transmission power from either Alice or Bob that is still unde-
tectable by Mallory. Finally, CSKG(p,γ), denotes the payoff function of player L.
Due to the fact that Mallory first observes the transmit power of the legitimate users
on the subcarriers and then decides which strategy to choose (a consequence of player
J being a reactive jammer), this section studies a hierarchical game in which player L
is the leader and player J is the follower. In this hierarchical game, the solution is the
Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) – rather than Nash – defined as a strategy profile (pSE,γSE)
where player L chooses their optimal strategy first, by anticipating the strategic reaction
of player J (i.e., its best response). This can be rigorously written as:
pSE , arg max
p∈AL
N∑
i=1
RSKG(p,γ
∗(p)), and γSE , γ∗(pSE), (5.22)
where γ∗(p) denotes the jammer’s best response (BR) function to any strategy p ∈ AL
chosen by player L, defined as follows:
γ∗(p) , arg min
γ∈AJ (p)
N∑
i=1
RSKG(p,γ). (5.23)
Note that γ∗i (p) is the i-th subcarrier of γ
∗(p).
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Stackelberg equilibrium with fixed pth
In the following, the SE of the game G is evaluated assuming that the threshold pth is
predefined and fixed. The case P ≤ pth is trivial as γSE = (0, . . . , 0), whereas, the
legitimate users will optimally use the maximum available power so that (pSE = P ).
Indeed, because of the badly chosen threshold or low sensing capabilities of Mallory, the
legitimate transmission will never be detected on any of the subcarriers and hence will
not be jammed. In the following, it is assumed that: P > pth.
Lemma 5.2. The BR of the jammer for any p ∈ AL chosen by the leader defined in (5.23)
is the uniform power allocation, such that:
γ∗(p) ,

(Γ, . . . ,Γ), if p > pth,
(0, . . . , 0), if p ≤ pth.
(5.24)
Proof. Note that RSKG(p, γi) is a monotonically decreasing convex function w.r.t γi, i =
1, . . . , N for any p > 0. First this proof shows that the jamming power should be
equally distributed on all of the subcarriers. First, Jensen’s inequality is applied using
δi > 0,
∑N
i=1 δi = 1, so that RSKG
Ä
p,
∑N
i=1 δixi
ä
≤ ∑Ni=1 δiRSKG(p, xi). Substituting
δi = 1/N , xi = Γ/bi, we get:
RSKG
(
p,
N∑
i=1
Γ
Nbi
)
≤
N∑
i=1
1
N
RSKG
Ç
p,
Γ
bi
å
⇒
NRSKG
(
p,
1
N
N∑
i=1
Γ
bi
)
≤
N∑
i=1
RSKG
Ç
p,
Γ
bi
å
. (5.25)
Applying the power constraint
∑N
i=1 Γ/bi ≤ NΓ on the LHS of (5.25), for any p > pth we
have:
NRSKG (p,Γ)<
N∑
i=1
RSKG
Ç
p,
Γ
bi
å
⇒ CSKG(p, (Γ, . . . ,Γ))≤CSKG(p,γ),
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which shows that in order to minimise CSKG, Mallory has to distribute her power equally
on all subcarriers. 
Note that, the results in Lemma 5.2 define the available actions to Mallory: i) if Alice
and Bob transmit with power greater than the sensing threshold pth, Mallory will jam over
all subcarriers using equal power distribution; ii) if Alice and Bob transmit with power
less than the sensing threshold pth, Mallory will not jam on any of the subcarriers, i.e., the
transmission is not detected and Mallory will stay silent.
In light of this result, the SKG sum rate can have two forms:
CSKG(p,γ
∗(p)) =

NRSKG(p,Γ), if p > pth,
NRSKG(p, 0), if p ≤ pth,
(5.26)
which simplifies the players’ options. Next, this work addresses the question of how Alice
and Bob should choose their power p optimally by considering the actions available to the
players in the game at the key points, i.e., at P and pth.
Theorem 5.1. Depending on the available power P for SKG, playerLwill either transmit
at P or pth on all subcarriers. The SE point of the game is unique when P 6= pth(σ2JΓ + 1)
and is given by
(pSE,γSE)=

{(pth, (0, . . . , 0))}, if P < pth(σ2JΓ+1),
{(P, (Γ, . . . ,Γ))}, if P > pth(σ2JΓ+1).
(5.27)
When P = pth(σ2JΓ + 1), the game G has two SEs, which are expressed as follows:
(pSE,γSE) ∈ {(pth, (0, . . . , 0)), (P, (Γ, . . . ,Γ))}.
Proof. Given the BR in (5.24) and the simplification in (5.26), player L wants to find the
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optimal p ∈ AL that maximises:
RSKG(p, γ
∗
i (p)) =

RSKG(p, 0), if p ≤ pth,
RSKG(p,Γ), if p > pth.
(5.28)
Given that RSKG(p, γ) is monotonically increasing with p for fixed γ, two cases are dis-
tinguished: a) p ∈ [0, pth], b) p ∈ (pth, P ]. The optimal p in each case is given by
a) arg max
p∈[0,pth]
RSKG(p, γ
∗
i (p)) = arg max
p∈[0,pth]
RSKG(p, 0) = pth,
b) arg max
p∈(pth,P ]
RSKG(p, γ
∗
i (p)) = arg max
p∈(pth,P ]
RSKG(p,Γ) = P.
From a) and b), it can be concluded that the overall solution is pSE =
arg max
p∈AL
RSKG(p, γ
∗
i (p)) =

pth, if RSKG(P,Γ) < RSKG(pth, 0),
P, if RSKG(P,Γ) > RSKG(pth, 0),
{pth, P}, if RSKG(P,Γ) = RSKG(pth, 0).
The three possibilities are simplified using the case when transmitting at full power
RSKG(P,Γ) (hence being sensed and jammed) is equal to the case when player L is trans-
mitting at threshold pth (the jammer is silent) i.e.,RSKG(P,Γ) = RSKG(pth, 0). Using this
equality, and by substituting appropriately into (5.19), it can be obtained as a quadratic
equation in P :
P 2(2σ2pth+1)−P (2pth2σ2+2σ2JΓpth2σ2)− (1+σ2JΓ)2pth2 =0,
which has a unique positive root equal to pth(σ2JΓ + 1). Given that, the leading coef-
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Figure 5.4: UP: SE policy compared to always transmitting with either full power or with
pth. DOWN: Functions D and F vs P . In both sub-figures, pth = 2,Γ = 4, N = 10, σ2 =
σ2J = 1.
ficient of (5.29): (2σ2pth + 1) ≥ 0 and that P > 0, it can be said that the inequal-
ities RSKG(P,Γ) > RSKG(pth, 0) and RSKG(P,Γ) < RSKG(pth, 0) are equivalent to
P > pth(σ
2
JΓ + 1) and P < pth(σ
2
JΓ + 1), respectively. 
Some numerical results are presented in Fig. 5.4 for a total number of SKG subcarriers
N = 10 (pertinent to narrowband IoT applications), pth = 2, Γ = 4, and σ2 = σ2J = 1.
The top figure compares the achievable rates of the SE strategy and of two alternative
strategies consisting in transmitting with fixed p = P or p = pth. The bottom figure
depicts the following quantities:
F =
CSKG(p
SE,γSE)− CSKG(P, (Γ, . . . ,Γ))
CSESKG
, (5.29)
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D =
CSKG(p
SE,γSE)− CSKG(pth, (0, . . . , 0))
CSESKG
, (5.30)
where F and D represent the jammer’s gain (or legitimate users’ loss) if player L devi-
ates from the SE point (indeed, if player L transmits at P > pth, the jammer will jam at
γ∗i (P ) = Γ; and if player L transmits at pth the jammer will not detect it and will remain
silent). Both figures show that the SE is the optimal solution for Alice and Bob. Fur-
thermore, deviating from the SE point can decrease their achievable sum-rates by up to
85%.
Stackelberg equilibrium with strategic pth
Finally, this study investigates how Mallory could optimally adjust pth and how her choice
will impact Alice’s and Bob’s strategies. Allowing pth to vary modifies the game under
study as follows Ĝ = ({L, J}, {AL, ÂJ(p)}, CSKG(p,γ, pth)), where:
ÂJ(p) ,

{((0, . . . , 0), pth), pth ≥ 0}, if pth ≥ p,¶
(γ, pth) ∈ RN+1+ |
∑N
i=1 γi ≤ NΓ
©
, if pth < p.
(5.31)
The BR of jammer can then be defined as:
(“γ∗(p),”pth∗(p)) , arg min
(γ,pth)∈ÂJ (p)
CSKG(p,γ, pth). (5.32)
Lemma 5.3. The BR of player J in this case is a set of strategies:
(“γ∗(p),”pth∗(p)) ∈ { ((Γ, . . . ,Γ), ε), ε ∈ [0, p)}. (5.33)
Proof. The problem that the jammer wants to solve is: min
(γ,pth)∈ÂJ (p)
CSKG(p,γ, pth), which
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can be split as follows:
min
pth≥0
min
γ∈ÂJ (p)
CSKG(p,γ(p), pth). (5.34)
The solution of the inner minimisation is already known from (5.24). For the outer prob-
lem the optimal pth ≥ 0 that minimises CSKG(p,“γ∗(p), pth) has to be found. Given that:
min
pth≥0
CSKG(p,“γ∗(p), pth)=

NRSKG(p,Γ, pth), if pth < p,
NRSKG(p, 0, pth), if pth ≥ p,
(5.35)
and that RSKG(p,Γ, pth) < RSKG(p, 0, pth) the jammer can optimally choose any thresh-
old such that pth = ε, ∀ε < p. meaning, any ongoing transmission is sensed and
jammed. 
Having considered the BR of Mallory, we now turn to the optimal strategy for Alice
and Bob considering the response of Mallory.
Theorem 5.2. The game Ĝ has an infinite number of SEs:
(p̂SE,“γSE,”pthSE) ∈ { (P, (Γ, . . . ,Γ), ε), ∀ε < P}. (5.36)
Proof. Given the BR of player J , this proof evaluates the SE of the game Ĝ. The definition
for p̂SE is given as:
p̂SE , arg
p∈AL
maxCSKG(p,“γ∗(p),”pth(p)∗). (5.37)
Since the jammer will act as in (5.33), follows that:
CSKG(p,“γ∗(p),”pth(p)∗) = NRSKG(p,Γ, ε), ∀ε < p, (5.38)
and the fact that RSKG(p,Γ, ε) is monotonically increasing with p results in p̂SE = P . 
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Figure 5.5: Relative gain of player J , evaluated by function E, for strategic pth and fixed
pth = 2 when N = 10, σ2J = 1 and UP: Γ = 4, DOWN: σ
2 = 1.
Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6 illustrate the gain of the jammer (or the loss in SKG rate) when
pth is part of her strategy, with utility function CSKG(p,γ, pth), compared to the case when
it is not, with utility function CSKG(p,γ). This gain is evaluated by:
E =
CSKG(p
SE,γSE)− CSKG(p̂SE,“γSE,”pthSE)
CSKG(pSE,γSE)
. (5.39)
As in Fig. 5.4 the total number of subcarriers is N = 10 and σ2J = 1. The non-strategic
threshold on Fig. 5.5 is set to pth = 2 and the quantity E is evaluated for different values
of σ2 and Γ. The numerical results demonstrate that when pth is part of Mallory’s strategy,
she can be a significantly more effective opponent, compared to the case when pth is fixed,
confirming that reactive jammers can indeed pose a serious threat. This is also confirmed
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Figure 5.6: Relative gain of player J , evaluated by function E, for different values of pth
for N = 10, σ2J = 1 and Γ = 4.
by the results on Fig. 5.6 where the relative gain of the jammer is presented for different
pth. As expected with decreasing the threshold her gain increases. On the other hand, in
order to reduce Mallory’s gain Alice and Bob must equally allocate full power across all
subcarriers. While this is not a surprising result, the investigation above shows that it is
the only optimal solution in the specific scenario considered.
5.6 Summary
To summarise this study, analysed injection and reactive jamming attacks in SKG systems
and optimal power allocation policies were investigated in BF-AWGN channels. It was
shown that pilot randomisation can reduce injection MiM attacks to less harmful jamming
attacks. Next, it has been proven that, an intelligent reactive jammer should optimally jam
with equal power on the whole spectrum. In the case when Mallory has a fixed sensing
threshold the optimal strategy of the legitimate users might not be unique. Depending on
their available power they may benefit transmitting at either low power level and keep-
ing their communication unsensed or transmitting at full power and risk to be jammed.
Finally, a strategically chosen jamming threshold just below the power level used by the
legitimate users, allows the adversary to launch a much more effective attack. In this case,
the legitimate users have no choice but to transmit at full power.
160
Chapter 6
Perspectives
The research on IoT communications is still in its inception and current technologies
cannot offer solutions for some emerging applications that need strict requirements. For
example, a 3GPP report on the security of URLLC systems notes: “for services with
higher speed than 65kbps, the 3GGP Release 15 radio access network (RAN) cannot
fulfil the quality of service (QoS) requirement while enforcing user plane integrity pro-
tection”. Therefore, the research directions that were identified for this thesis were: 1)
resource allocation within a short-block length regime; 2) cross-layer architecture sup-
porting stringent QoS requirements; 3) lightweight and fast security protocols; 4) optimi-
sation techniques reducing the computational complexity. Therefore, relevant problems
investigated within the present thesis are:
Contributions
Lightweight authentication for IoT networks: Using PLS mechanisms such as PUFs,
SKG and localisation the present thesis, Chapter 3 developed a lightweight multi-
factor authentication protocol suitable for resource constrained IoT devices. Fur-
thermore, a fast resumption protocol that can allow for data transmission within
0-RTT was proposed. The proposed mechanisms have the potential to pave the way
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for a new breed of latency aware protocols.
Short block-length transmission: The size of the control information is often neglected
in a system design with long block-length transmission. However, in a short-block
length scenario its size might be equivalent to the data, hence better mathematical
models must be proposed in order to optimally manage the wireless channel re-
sources. In this regards, a contribution within in Chapter 3 uses probability theory
to create a closed form upper-bound on the achievable SKG rate in a short-block
length scenario.
Resource allocation in a cross-layer security design: Utilising optimisation tools such
as convex optimisation, combinatorial optimisation (0-1 subset-sum Knapsack), dy-
namic programming and order statistics, Chapter 4 developed a novel AE SKG prin-
ciple which optimises the resource allocation in a cross-layer setting. This parallel
mechanism inter-weaves data and key information and can be applied to a NB-IoT
frame type 2.
Stringent end-to-end delay constraints: In Chapter 4, using the theory of effective ca-
pacity, the thesis took a further step in the study to examine a pipelined approach
using parallel transmission of SKG and data. This allowed the consideration of sta-
tistical delay QoS requirements within the solution. Using optimisation tools, the
resource allocation that jointly optimises the data rate and the SKG rate was iden-
tified. Furthermore, observing the results helped to develop a novel algorithm that
addresses a critical problem such as computational complexity.
Possible attacks and countermeasures: With high-reliability requirements, attacks at
the physical layer, such as jamming can become a substantial threat to future IoT
networks. To address this problem, using game theory analysis, the present thesis
evaluated the Stackelberg equilibrium that gives the optimal power allocation in the
presence of a reactive and active jammer.
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Lightweight security key agreement for B5G applications: Despite the additional over-
head in services such as URLLC systems, advanced CSI estimation techniques are
employed in order to be able to satisfy the strict reliability requirements. In this
regards, the present thesis, as a whole, showed how the CSI-based SKG mechanism
can be used towards secure communication. In particular, Chapter 3 developed a
fast authentication protocol where the physical layer SKG ensures forward secrecy
of each session. Next, Chapter 4 employed the SKG in an optimised resource allo-
cation mechanism which demonstrates both higher efficiency and lower complexity
compared to alternative SKG solution. Finally, Chapter 5 how the SKG process
could resist injection/jamming attacks providing a secure sesion establishment. To
summarise, the proposed solutions within the present thesis show promising result
and are ready for testing in a practical environment.
Further work
Continuing the research in the areas described above could lead to further major contri-
butions for future IoT networks. Therefore, building on the methods proposed within the
present thesis, the following research directions are proposed as promising next steps:
Flexible numerology: The usage of multiple numerologies within a single framework
opens the door to new concerns in the spectral and scheduling efficiency. The mul-
tiplexing of URLLC and eMBB traffic in the same physical resource introduces
non-orthogonality into the system and increased interference between users. Solu-
tions such as pre-reserving radio resources and preemtive scheduling can lead to the
wastage of radio resources or degraded decoding performance, respectively. Initial
steps towards solving the above problem range from improvements on coding tech-
niques with shorter decoding latency (as opposed to the heavy Turbo codes used in
LTE) and deployment of non-orthogonal optimisation algorithms (such as transfer
and meta learning) to flexible design for control and data channels.
Cross-layer resource control: Due to the hierarchical system architecture achieving low
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latency and high-reliability simultaneously is a complex task. While separately
optimising the physical and MAC layers focuses on improving transmission and
queueing performance, respectively, the ultimate goal is to meet end-to-end strin-
gent QoS requirements. The theory of effective capacity can be a helpful tool in
identifying a fair trade-off between QoS and achievable rates. However, its applica-
tion is limited to a constant service rate and does not guarantee an optimal solution.
Hence, promising techniques that could enable optimised delivery of services are
still sought. In this regard, cross-layer dynamic network slicing may provide the
evolution roadmap to future networks. Finally, establishing efficient cross-layer
optimisation is still a challenge and requires investigation on the fairness metrics
between different network slices and services.
Context-aware optimisation: A further step towards enabling the IoT is building a con-
text aware resource management model. Supporting critical non-scheduled traffic at
the physical layer requires interference-free transmission along with the scheduled
users. The flexible and shorter transmission time interval introduced for 5G will
play an important role in solving this problem, however, its usage raises a set of
further questions, such as: optimal subcarrier allocation and block length; reducing
processing at the UE to avoid retransmission; and, real-time context-aware modi-
fication of the QoS constraints. Additionally, ensuring security for numerous IoT
applications can no longer be a static process. In this sense, context-aware security
can optimise the system performance using situational and application-based infor-
mation. Overall, context-awareness could bring benefits ranging from optimised
user experience to prevention of unauthorised access.
Strong but nevertheless, lightweight security: The present thesis has presented initial
solutions for strong and lightweight security, however, the practical deployment of
AE SKG within the IoT framework remains an open problem. Therefore, further
research into the deployment of PLS solutions, such as the wireless secret key gen-
eration in actual NB-IoT devices and practical PUF authentication could lead to
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major contributions for future networks.
mmWave communications and intelligent UE: Next generation networks could ben-
efit from the employment of increased bandwidth with higher frequencies and a
non-centralised architecture. On one hand, in mmWave communications methods
such as beam selection could greatly improve the end-to-end performance using
advanced channel estimation methods and interference mitigation techniques. Fur-
thermore, short-range communication will empower higher localisation accuracy
and therefore improving trust and flexibility within the network. On the other hand,
systems today are built upon a centralised management architecture. This allows
IoT devices to avoid heavy computation but degrades the network efficiency in
terms of latency and reliability. In this regard, distributed and lightweight AI based
algorithms among edge systems could contribute in aspects such as achieving strin-
gent QoS requirements and enhancing privacy and security.
Closing comment
A simple look at today’s communication systems reveals that the security is strictly con-
centrated in the upper layers of the networking architecture. Features such as authenti-
cation, confidentiality, and privacy rely on the complexity based public-key mechanisms.
However, the continuous advance of wireless networks has brought fundamental prob-
lems making these techniques vulnerable. Furthermore, given the importance of security,
it is now vital to take measures at all layers.
In this sense, the use of physical layer properties has been repeatedly ignored and not
yet considered as a practical source of secrecy. However, this has recently changed and
numerous results in literature suggest that the imperfections of the physical layer can be
used as a valid and inherently secure source of randomness. As a result, this thesis was
entirely devoted to exploring the PLS paradigm. All of the proposed mechanisms could
be directly embedded at the physical layer, within the protocol stack, in a cost-effective
manner and contributing towards the realisation of critical IoT applications.
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APPENDIX A
Introduction to Tamarin prover
Tamarin prover [42, 290, 291] is a verification tool that can analyse security protocols
using symbolic models. Within this thesis Tamarin is used for a formal analysis of the
work presented in Chapter 3. Therefore, this section provides an introduction to its syntax
and main functionalities.
Tamarin assumes a Dolev-Yao [196] (DY) type of adversary. (DY) model is captured
by the following properties:
• The model assumes perfect cryptographic primitives, i.e., the adversary cannot en-
crypt or decrypt a message without knowing the right key.
• The adversary can act as an eavesdropper, can block and modify messages that have
been sent over the network and can inject messages.
• The adversary can inject messages that he/she constructed through eavesdropping
and some initial pre-defined knowledge.
• The adversary can execute the protocol multiple times taking any role in the com-
munication system, hence the roles of the involved agents can be changed, too.
Before beginning with the definitions a quick notation guideline of the Tamarin syntax
is given in Fig. A.1. Next, to familiarise the readers with Tamarin a quick example of
a protocol definition is introduced. The protocol models the scenario: Alice using a
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1 ˜x // x is a fresh random variable - usually used as a key
2 $A // A is public variable - usually used as an agent ID
3 #i // i is temporal variable - usually used to define time-point
4 m // mesage m
5 <x,y> // concatenation of x and y
6 !Fact // persistent fact that is true for all states
7 @i // at time-point i
8 . // such that
9 ==> // implication
10 & // conjunction
11 | // disjunction
12 not // negation
13 All // all elements
14 F // inequality
15 i1 < i2 // temporal variables ordering
16 #i1=#i2 // equality between temporal variables
17 m1=m2 // equality between messages
18 Reveal(A) // Compromised agent (in this case agent A)
19 Fr(˜x) // Fresh variable (it has not been previously used)
20 In(x) // Receipt of message x (it is available to the adversary)
21 Out(x) // Sending of message x (it is available to the adversary)
22 K(x) // Knowledge of the adversary; in this case variable x
Figure A.1: Example of common commands used in the Tamarin environment.
symmetric key k sends an encrypted message m to Bob who also posses the key k. This
is done by defining three sets of parameters: Cryptographic primitives, set of rules and set
of lemmas.
1) Cryptographic primitives that are used in the protocol are defined in Fig. A.2. As
shown every definition of a protocol begins with the keyword theory and name of the
theory given by user’s choice. Next each description of a protocol begins and ends with
keywords begin and end respectively. Tamarim has already builtin message theories
that can be easily included as shown on line 3. The theory symmetric-encryption
models the functions senc/2 and sdec/2 that correspond to symmetric encryption and
decryption, respectively. Note that the notation f/n defines function f with arity n. The
two functions are related thought the equation: sdec(senc(m,k),k)=m, where m is
message and k a symmetric key. Other built in theories that can be used are: hashing,
asymmetric-encryption, signing, xor and more; including any of these will
unlock functions and equations from the corresponding theory to the user. Next, a user
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1 theory Name_of_the_theory
2 begin
3 builtins: symmetric-encryption
4 //functions: summation/2, subtraction/2,
5 // zero/0
6 //equations: subtraction(x.1,x.1)=zero
7 ...
8 end
Figure A.2: Example of message theories in Tamarin
can define own functions and equations. Even though neither functions nor equations are
required for the purpose here, in order to better illustrate the possibilities of Tamarin few
are added to Fig. A.2 as comments. Two functions are given on line 4: summation and
subtraction both with arity 2 (i.e., can take two arguments as input). Finally, the
equation on line 6 represents the following equation x− x = 0.
2) A set of rules are used to represent the state transitions of the protocol, i.e., a
single rule contains a single state (Alice’s or Bob’s). Every rule has 3 components: a
premise, action facts and a conclusion which as illustrated on Fig. A.3, are written in the
form [premise] --[action facts]-> [conclusion]. In order to execute
a specific rule all facts in the premise must be available in the current state; next, the
conclusion contains set of facts that will overwrite the facts of the premise (excluding
persistent facts which are denoted with exclamation mark as !Fact) and will generate
a new state; finally, actions facts are used to relate the rule to a specific restriction or a
property that has to be proven, they do not appear in the state but on the trace. The rules
used to model the example of Alice sending symmetrically encrypted message to Bob are
given in Fig. A.3. It can be seen that this is represented by 3 rules. As mentioned earlier,
in order to execute a specific rule all facts in its premise must be available at the current
state. Due to that the protocol begins with the rule Initialisation which is used to
define the initial knowledge of each party and more specifically where these knowledge
come from. In the premise we have two facts of type Fr one to generate a fresh key
k and one to generate a fresh message m. The rule does not have any action facts, but
does have two facts in its conclusion: these are Alice’s (AliceIn) and Bob’s (BobIn)
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1 rule Initialisation:
2 [ Fr(˜k), Fr(˜m) ]
3 -->
4 [ AliceIn($A,˜k,˜m), BobIn($B,˜k) ]
5
6 rule AliceSends:
7 [ AliceIn($A,˜k,˜m) ]
8 --[ Send($A,˜m) ]->
9 [ Out(senc(˜m,˜k)) ]
10
11 rule BobReceives:
12 [ BobIn($B,˜k), In(senc(m,˜k)) ]
13 --[ Receive($B,m), Secret(m) ]->
14 [ ]
Figure A.3: Example of protocol definition in Tamarin
initial knowledge. AliceIn includes her ID, which is a public variable (denoted with
dollar sign $A), the symmetric key and the message, which are fresh random variables
˜k and ˜m, respectively. BobIn includes his ID $B and the symmetric key ˜k. The next
rule AliceSends models the process of sending the encrypted message. The premise
contains of a single fact to define the initial knowledge required for Alice to send the
encrypted message. The rule contains an action fact Send that will be used to relate the
rule to specific security property (details of how action facts are used will be given in
the next item). Finally, the conclusion of the rule models the fact of sending encrypted
message to the network, which is done by using the built in fact Out for sending and the
built in function senc available from the in-built theory symmetric-encryption.
As mentioned earlier, anything within Out fact becomes available to the adversary. The
last rule BobReceives models the receiving of the message at Bob’s side. As in the
previous rule, the premise recalls the initial knowledge required for the execution of the
rule, i.e., Bob’s initial knowledge given by the fact BobIn and Bob receiving the message
from Alice denoted by the built in fact In. Note that Tamarin assumes that all received
messages are coming from the adversary, i.e., as in this case Alice sends the message,
the adversary captures it, performs an attack if possible (such as modifying the message),
or just keeps a copy of the message and forwards it to Bob. This rule has two action
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1 lemma secrecy:
2 "All m #i1 #i2.
3 Secret(m) @i1 & K(m) @i2 ==> F"
4
5 lemma executable: exists-trace
6 "Ex A B m #i1 #i2.
7 Send(A,m) @i1 & Receive(B,m) @i2
8 & i1 < i2"
Figure A.4: Example of security properties in Tamarin
facts which will be used to ensure the security properties of the protocol in the next item.
Finally, since Bob does not undertake any further actions and no facts will be used in
another rule the conclusion is left empty.
3) A set of lemmas are used to model the properties that need to be proven. Partic-
ularly, lemmas are used to relate the rules to specific security properties. As mentioned
above lemmas and rules are linked through action facts. Example is given in Fig. A.4: The
first lemma secrecy tests if the message m is secret from Bob’s perspective. It involves
the action fact Secret from the rule BobIn. It implies that the input of the action fact
Secret is available only to legitimate users and it is not part of adversary’s knowledge
denoted by the fact K. It can be read as follows: For all messages m and time-points i1,
i2, the fact Secret(m) at time i1 and K(m) at time i2 imply inequality.
By default lemmas are proven true only if it holds for all possible traces, i.e., all pos-
sible scenarios and actions of the adversary. However, if we want to prove that something
could be true only in some of all traces Tamarin has an additional built-in function called
exists-trace. The function is used in the second lemma executable. The lemma
is used to verify that the protocol can be executed. It proves the following: there exists a
trace where agent A sends message m at time-point i1 and agent B receives it at time-point
i2, the addition i1<i2, defines that Send happens before Receive.
As an addition to lemmas, one may add restrictions which can define specific prop-
erties of the action facts. An example which defines equality is given in Fig. A.5. The
meaning of the restriction in Fig. A.5 is: whenever the action fact Equal(x,y) appears
in the protocol definition it implies that x = y and this is true for all x, y and time-
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1 restriction Equality:
2 "All x y #i.
3 Equal(x,y) @i ==> x = y"
Figure A.5: Restriction example in Tamarin
points i. When constructed as lemmas, all restrictions to create an effect must be linked
to an action fact, which in this case is Equal. This restriction might be useful when-
ever one wants to verify another’s signature. However, for the simple example presented
above, this restriction is not linked with any of the action facts of the rules and hence, will
not have an effect on the execution of the protocol.
To prove the security properties (lemmas) Tamarin provides an interactive graphi-
cal user interface (GUI). The proof itself begins with deduction of the knowledge, that
Tamarin has about the property, and finishes with either a possible attack (counterexam-
ple) or a conclusion for correctness of the lemma. Now by combining the codes from
Fig. A.2, A.3 and A.4, one we can try to prove lemma secrecy, i.e., that the message m
is secret from the adversary. The notation used by the Tamarin GUI is presented in Fig.
A.6. As shown on the figure the GUI in Tamarin represents the rules of the protocol as a
rectangle boxes where the premise, action facts and conclusion are separated on different
levels. The adversary actions are represented as ellipses; black to illustrate his reasoning
and grey to illustrate his goals (i.e., facts needed to find a counterexample of lemmas).
These boxes and ellipses are connected by arrows of different colours and type, where
each has its own meaning as shown in the figure. Whenever a linear fact is consumed by
the premise of a rule and is coming from a conclusion of another rule, this is shown by a
black arrow (such facts are the Alicein and BobIn in Fig. A.3). Whenever a persistent
fact (one labeled with exclamation mark !Fact) is consumed by the premise of a rule
and is coming from a conclusion of another rule, this is shown by a grey arrow. All deduc-
tions of the adversary are represented by red arrows. Finally, the relation of time-points
is illustrated using dotted arrows.
Following the above notation the proof of secrecy of the message m begins from Fig.
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Rules of the protocol
Premise
Action facts
Conclusion
Adversary reasoning
Adversary’s goal
used in another rule’s premise
Linear fact from a conclusion
used in another rule’s premise
Persistent fact in a conclusion
Adversary deduction
Time-points’ relation
Figure A.6: Notation used by Tamarin’s GUI
A.7. As discussed, the box in Fig. A.7 represents the rule linked to the lemma which has
to be proven. There are two facts in the premise of the rule BobIn and In. On the lower
level are the actions facts and the name of the rule, particularly action fact Secret is the
one that links the rule with the lemma. The rule does not have any facts in the conclusion,
hence Tamarin does not add anything at the lower level. As mentioned earlier, all received
messages are assumed to be coming from the adversary. This is shown on the left of the
figure. An arrow connects the premise and more specifically the In fact showing that
the encrypted version of the message is sent by adversary, however the dotted line and
the gray ellipse above show that, for this to happen the adversary should have got it from
somewhere, so the first goal of the adversary here is to find where it comes from. Then,
the right top side of the figure shows the final goal of adversary, i.e., to know message m,
represented by the fact !KU(m). During the next steps of the proof the adversary starts
a backwards search of and deducts the facts within the rules to check if it is possible to
achieve the goals shown here.
Next, Tamarin starts looking for possible paths of the facts given in the premise, and
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Figure A.7: Proving secrecy of message m: Part 1
Figure A.8: Proving secrecy of message m: Part 2
where do they come from. As mentioned above the In fact comes from the adversary.
Now, in Fig. A.8 Tamarin has found the origin of the other fact in the premise. This is
illustrated by the black solid line; the conclusion of the rule Initialisation and rule
BobReceives are linked through the linear fact BobIn. However, the origin of the
message is still unknown.
Fig. A.9 shows the next step of the proof. Here, Tamarin has found the origin of the
encrypted message. On the left side of the figure it can be see that before forwarding the
message to Bob the adversary has received it from Alice. Alice sent the message using
Out fact, and as mentioned earlier, anything sent into the network becomes available to
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Figure A.9: Proving secrecy of message m: Part 3
the adversary; this is denoted with red arrow. In the middle line Tamarin gives the name
of the rule AliceSends and the corresponding action facts, and on the top line is the
premise which contains a single linear fact AliceIn. The origin of the linear fact has
been found, which as in Bob’s case is the conclusion of the rule Initialisation.
It can be seen that, once the adversary has found the origin of a fact an ellipse becomes
black. In this current stage the only goal left in order to find an attack and break the lemma
secrecy is the one in the right side of the figure.
Tamarin continues looking for possible pieces of knowledge that could help the ad-
versary learn the message m. This is illustrated on Fig. A.10. The program understands
that the only possible source to learn that is the symmetrically encrypted message sent
by Alice denoted as senc(˜m, ˜k). Here, once the adversary receives the message at
time-point #vl, on one hand he forwards the message to Bob whine on the other hand,
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Figure A.10: Proving secrecy of message m: Part 4
tries to learn m. Tamarin understands that the only way to get m is to decrypt it using the
key k. Given that the goal of the adversary has now changed and it will start looking for
possible sources of the key.
The last part of the proof is presented on Fig. A.11. After all deductions shown on
the previous figures Tamarin has concluded that in order for the adversary to know the
message m, he should either know m itself in advance or the key k. However, there is no
trace of the protocol which gives that possibility. As a result, the adversary’s goals in the
final part of the proof, i.e., the ellipses on the top of Fig. A.11, are still in gray. Therefore,
the simple example of a protocol provides secrecy to the message m.
Now, to finalise the introduction to Tamarin, a quick example of an insecure pro-
tocol is showed on Fig. A.12. The protocol is built by adding an extra fact within the
AliceSends rule. The extra fact is Out(˜k), i.e., along with the encrypted message
senc(˜m, ˜k) Alice also sends her key k in clear text to the network. Fig. A.12 shows
only the last step of the proof. It illustrates that in this case the adversary can obtain the
secret message m. As in the previous case when Alice send the encrypted message, the ad-
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Figure A.11: Proving secrecy of message m: Final part
versary captures it at time-point #vl. However, Alice also sends her key in the network.
The adversary captures that at moment #vk.2. Combining these two facts at moment
#vr.2 the adversary decrypts the encrypted message; as a result at moment #vk.1 the
adversary obtains the message m. This proves the lemma secrecy is not true anymore. In
contrast to the previous case, all ellipses (facts used by the adversary) leading to the ad-
versary knowing the messages, i.e., K(˜m) are in black. This means that all goals of the
adversary have been achieved and Tamarin has found a counter example of lemma se-
crecy. This concludes the introduction to Tamarin-prover. Tamarin is used in Chapter 3
where it is used as a verification tool in order to prove security properties of the proposed
authentication protocol.
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Figure A.12: Example of insecure protocol in Tamarin
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APPENDIX B
Derivation of the channel dispersion in a
finite block-length scenario
This section provides the steps towards finding the closed form expression of the dis-
persion of the channel model assumed in Section 3.3. The initial form of the dispersion
is:
V = Var
ñ
log
Pr(xA, xB)
Pr(xA)Pr(xB)
ô
, (B.1)
where the observations of Alice and Bob are expressed as:
xA = h+ zA (B.2)
xB = h+ zB. (B.3)
In the above zA, zB ∼ N(0, 1) and Var(h) = P . Therefore, one can conclude Pr(xA) ∼
N(0, P + 1), Pr(xB) ∼ N(0, P + 1) and
Pr(xA, xB) ∼ (µ,Σ) ∼

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, (B.4)
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where µ, represents mean and Σ is the covariance matrix.
Due to the fact xA and xB follow normal distribution we have [292]:
Pr(xA) =
exp(−1
2
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σ
)2
)
σ
√
2π
, (B.5)
Pr(xB) =
exp(−1
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2π
. (B.6)
For the case observed here, i.e., σ =
√
P + 1 and µ = 0, the above equals to:
Pr(xA) =
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Pr(xB) =
exp(− x
2
B
2
√
P+1
)»
2π(P + 1)
(B.8)
Next, due to the fact exp(x)exp(y) = exp(x+ y), the product of (B.7) and (B.8) is:
Pr(xA)Pr(xB) =
exp(−x
2
A+x
2
B
2
√
P+1
)
2π(P + 1)
(B.9)
Now, the multivariate normal distribution Pr(xA, xB) is [293]:
Pr(xA, xB) =
exp(−1
2
(x− µ)TΣ−1(x− µ))»
(2π)|x|det(Σ)
, (B.10)
where det, stands for determinant and | · | gives the size of a vector. Combining (B.7),
(B.8) and (B.10) one can obtain the expression for V = Var
ï
log
PrxA,xB
PrxAPrxB
ò
as:
V = Var
ñ
log
PrxA,xB
PrxAPrxB
ô
= Var
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(B.11)
For simplicity the denominator and the numerator of (B.11) are treated separately.
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Starting with the denominator it is known that |x| = 2, furthermore, the determinant
of Σ easily can be evaluated as (1 + P )2 − P 2 = 1 + 2P . Therefore, the denominator of
(B.11) is equal to:
exp
Ç
− x
2
A + x
2
B
2
√
P + 1
å»
4π2(1 + 2P ) (B.12)
= exp
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Next, one can expand the numerator as follows:
2π(P + 1)exp
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(B.16)
The inverse of Σ is:
Σ−1 =
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Combining (B.16) and (B.17), results in:
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+ xB(1+P )
2+4P


xA
xB


(B.19)
= 2π(P + 1)exp

−
xA(1+P )−xBP
2+4P
xB(1+P )−xAP
2+4P


xA
xB


(B.20)
= 2π(P + 1)exp
Ç
−
ñ
x2A(1 + P )− xAxBP
2 + 4P
+
x2B(1 + P )− xAxBP
2 + 4P
ôå
(B.21)
= 2π(P + 1)exp
Ç
−x
2
A(1 + P )− 2xAxBP + x2B(1 + P )
2 + 4P
å
(B.22)
= 2π(P + 1)exp
Ç
−(x
2
A + x
2
B)(1 + P )− 2xAxBP
2 + 4P
å
(B.23)
Now, combining the expression for the numerator (B.23) and the expression for the
denominator (B.14) the full expression for V becomes:
V = Var
log (P + 1)exp(− (x21+x22)(1+P )−2x1x2P2+4P )
exp
(
− x
2
1+x
2
2
2
√
P+1
)√
1 + 2P
 (B.24)
Using the facts exp(x)exp(y) = exp(x − y), log(exp(x)) = x, log(
x
y
) = log(x) − log(y) and
Var(x+ const) = Var(x) one can expand Eq. (B.24) as:
V = Var
Ñ
1
(1 + 2P ) 2
√
P + 1
ï
−
√
P + 1xA
2P −
√
P + 1xA
2
+ 2
√
P + 1xAxBP −
√
P + 1xB
2P −
√
P + 1xB
2 + x1
2
+ 2xA
2P + x2
2 + 2xB
2P + 2 log
Ç
P + 1√
1 + 2P
å√
P + 1
+ 4 log
Ç
P + 1√
1 + 2P
å√
P + 1P
òé
(B.25)
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The above equation has the form Var(aX + aY + bZ), which is equivalent to:
Var(aX + aY + bZ) = a2Var(X) + a2Var(Y ) + b2Var(Z)
+ 2a2Cov(X, Y ) + 2abCov(X,Z) + 2abCov(Y, Z)
where:
a =
Ä
−
√
P + 1−
√
P + 1P + 1 + 2P
ä
2 (1 + 2P )
√
P + 1
(B.26)
and:
b =
P
1 + 2P
(B.27)
Therefore, V equals:
V = a2Var(x2A) + a
2Var(x2B) + b
2V ar(xAxB)
+ 2a2Cov(x2A, x
2
B) + 2abCov(x
2
A, xAxB) + 2abCov(x
2
B, xAxB) (B.28)
Now using the facts:
E(x2) = Var(x) = P + 1, (B.29)
E(x) = µ(x) = 0, (B.30)
the following can be concluded:
Var(x2A) = Var(x
2
B) = 2(P + 1)
2. (B.31)
Next, for Var(xA, xB) we have:
Var(xA, xB) = [Var(xA) + E(xA)
2] · [Var(xB) + E(xB)2]+
Cov(x2A, x
2
B)− [Cov(xA, xB) + E(xA)E(xB)]2 (B.32)
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Recalling (B.29) and (B.30) follows:
Var(xA, xB) = (P + 1)
2 + Cov(x2A, x
2
B)− Cov(xA, xB)2 (B.33)
Now since h, zA, zB are independent in the channel model assumed here, it follows:
Cov(xA, xB) = E[xAxB]− E[xA]E[xB]
= E[(h+ zA)(h+ zB)]− 0
= E[h2] + E[h]E[zB] + E[h]E[zA] + E[zA]E[zB]
= P (B.34)
and:
Cov(x2A, x
2
B) = E[x
2
Ax
2
B]− E[x2A]E[x2B]
= E[(h+ zA)
2(h+ zB)
2]− (P + 1)2
= E[h4] + E[h2]E[z2B] + E[h
2]E[z2A] + E[z
2
A]E[z
2
B]− (P + 1)2
= E[h4] + P + P + 1− (P + 1)2
= 1 + 3P 2 + 2P − (P + 1)2 (B.35)
Using the results from Eq. (B.34) and (B.35) the final expression for Var(xA, xB) is:
Var(xA, xB) = (P + 1)
2 + 1 + 3P 2 + 2P − (P + 1)2 − P 2
Var(x1, x2) = 1 + 2P
2 + 2P (B.36)
The last missing pieces from the expression of V are: Cov(x2B, xAxB) and Cov(x
2
A, xAxB).
Both of which can be evaluated as:
Cov(x2A, xAxB) = E[x
3
AxB]− E[x2A]E[xAxB]
= E[x3AxB]− (P + 1)P
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= E[(h+ zA)
3(h+ zB)]− (P + 1)P
= E[(h3 + z3A + 3h
2zA + 3hz
2
A)(h+ zB)]− (P + 1)P
= E[h4] + 3E[h2]E[z2A]− (P + 1)P
Therefore we have:
Cov(x2A, xAxB) = Cov(x
2
B, xAxB) = 3P
2 + 3P − P (P + 1) (B.37)
Following from the above calculations the full expression of V can be written as:
V =a2Var(x2A) + a
2Var(x2B) + b
2Var(xAxB)
+ 2a2Cov(x2A, x
2
B) + 2abCov(x
2
A, xAxB) + 2abCov(x
2
B, xAxB)
=a22(P + 1)2 + a22(P + 1)2 + b2(1 + 2P 2 + 2P )+
2a2(1 + 3P 2 + 2P − (P + 1)2) + 2ab(3P 2 + 3P − P (P + 1))+
2ab(3P 2 + 3P − P (P + 1))
=4a2(P + 1)2 + b2(1 + 2P 2 + 2P )+
2a2(1 + 3P 2 + 2P − (P + 1)2) + 4ab(3P 2 + 3P − P (P + 1)). (B.38)
By combining some of the terms the final result is:
V = 8aP (aP + a+ bP + b) + 2b2P (P + 1) + 4a2 + b2, (B.39)
where a and b are defined in Eq. (B.26) and Eq. (B.27), respectively.
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